A minor point in relation to this topic, but an important point, generally:
It seems to be more of a contrarian value judgment than a contrarian world model
Correct me if I’m wrong, but isn’t a value judgement necessarily part of a world model? You are a physical object, and your values necessarily derive from the arrangement of the matter that composes you.
Many tell me (effectively) that what I’ve just expressed is a contrarian view. Certainly, for many years I would have happily agreed with the non-overlapping-ness of value judgements and world views. But then I started to think about it. I thought about it all the more carefully because it seemed the conclusion I was reaching was a contrarian position. I thought about it so much, in fact, that it’s now quite obvious to me that I’m right, regardless how large the majority who profess to disagree with me.
Perhaps this illustrates the utility of recognizing an idea’s contrarian nature (and conversely, the danger of not pursuing ideas simply because consensus is deemed to have been already reached).
Correct me if I’m wrong, but isn’t a value judgement necessarily part of a world model? You are a physical object, and your values necessarily derive from the arrangement of the matter that composes you.
That’s confusing levels. A world model that makes some factual assertions, some of which imply “my values are X” is a distinct thing from your values actually being X. To begin with, it’s entirely possible for your world model to imply that “my values are X” when your values are actually Y, in which case your world model is wrong.
To put it simply, what I am saying is that a value judgement is about whatever it is you are in fact judging. While a factual assertion such as you would find in a “model of the world” is about the physical configuration of your brain. This is similar to the use/mention distinction in linguistics. When you make a value judgement you use your values. A model of your brain mentions them.
An argument like this
You are a physical object, and your values necessarily derive from the arrangement of the matter that composes you [therefore a value judgement is necessarily part of a world model].
could be equally well applied to claim that the act of throwing a ball is necessarily part of a world model, because your arm is physical. In fact, they are completely different things (for one thing, simply applying a model will never result in the ball moving), even though a world model may well describe the throwing of a ball.
The judgement is an inference about values. The inference derives from the fact that some value exist. (The existing value exerts a causal influence on one’s inferences.)
This is how it is with all forms of inference.
Throwing a ball is not an inference (note that ‘inference’ and ‘judgement’ are synonyms), thus throwing a ball is no way necessarily part of a world model, and for our purposes, in no way analogous to making a value judgement.
Is my effective altruism a contrarian view? It seems to be more of a contrarian value judgment than a contrarian world model, and by “contrarian view” I tend to mean “contrarian world model.”
Lukeprog thinks that effective altruism is good, and this is a value judgement. Obviously, most of mainstream society doesn’t agree—people prefer to give money to warm fuzzy causes, like “adopt an endangered panda”. So that value judgement is certainly contrarian.
Presumably, lukeprog also believes that “lukeprog thinks effective altruism is good”. This is a fact in his world model. However, most people would agree with him when asked if that is true. We can see that lukeprog likes effective altruism. There’s no reason for anyone to claim “no, he doesn’t think that” when he obviously does. So this element of his world model is not contrarian.
I guess Lukeprog also believes that Lukeprog exists, and that this element of his world view is also not contrarian. So what?
One thing I see repeatedly in others is a deep-rooted reluctance to view themselves as blobs of perfectly standard physical matter. One of the many ways this manifests itself is a failure to consider inferences about one’s own mind as fundamentally similar to any other form of inference. There seems to be an assumption of some kind on non-inferable magic, when many people think about their own motivations. I’m sure you appreciate how fundamentally silly this is, but maybe you could take a little time to meditate on it some more.
Sorry if my tone is a little condescending, but understand that you have totally failed to support your initial claim that I was confused.
That’s not at all what I meant. Obviously minds and brains are just blobs of matter.
You are conflating the claims “lukeprog thinks X is good” and “X is good”. One is an empirical claim, one is a value judgement. More to the point, when someone says “P is a contrarian value judgement, not a contrarian world model”, they obviously intend “world model” to encompass empirical claims and not value judgements.
I’m not conflating anything. Those are different statements, and I’ve never implied otherwise.
The statement “X is good,” which is a value judgement, is also an empirical claim, as was my initial point. Simply restating your denial of that point does not constitute an argument.
“X is good” is a claim about the true state of X, and its relationship to the values of the person making the claim. Since you agree that values derive from physical matter, you must (if you wish to be coherent) also accept that “X is good” is a claim about physical matter, and therefore part of the world model of anybody who believes it.
If there is some particular point or question I can help with, don’t hesitate to ask.
If “X is good” was simply an empirical claim about whether an object conforms to a person’s values, people would frequently say things like “if my values approved of X, then X would be good” and would not say things like “taking a murder pill doesn’t affect the fact that murder is bad”.
Alternative: what if “X is good” was a mathematical claim about the value of a thing according to whatever values the speaker actually holds?
If “X is good” was simply an empirical claim about whether an object conforms to a person’s values, people would frequently say things like “if my values approved of X, then X would be good”....
If that is your basis for a scientific standard, then I’m afraid I must withdraw from this discussion.
Ditto, if this is your idea of humor.
what if “X is good” was a mathematical claim about the value of a thing according to whatever values the speaker actually holds?
That’s just silly. What if c = 299,792,458 m/s is a mathematical claim about the speed of light, according to what the speed of light actually is? May I suggest that you don’t invent unnecessary complexity to disguise the demise of a long deceased argument.
My theory is that the dualistic theory of mind is an artifact of the lossy compression algorithm which, conveniently, prevents introspection from turning into infinite recursion. Lack of neurosurgery in the environment of ancestral adaptation made that an acceptable compromise.
I quite like Bob Trivers’ self-deception theory, though I only have tangential acquaintance with it. We might anticipate that self deception is harder if we are inclined to recognize the bit we call “me” as caused by some inner mechanism, hence it may be profitable to suppress that recognition, if Trivers is on to something.
Wild speculation on my part, of course. There may simply be no good reason, from the point of view of historic genetic fitness, to be good at self analysis, and you’re quite possibly on to something, that the computational overhead just doesn’t pay off.
but isn’t a value judgement necessarily part of a world model? You are a physical object, and your values necessarily derive from the arrangement of the matter that composes you.
The issue is, whose world model? Your world model does not necessarily include values even if they were to be deterministically derived from “the arrangement of the matter”.
The map is not the territory. Models are imperfect and many different models can be build on the basis of the same reality.
Trivially, it is the world model of the person making the value judgement I’m talking about. I’m trying hard, but I’m afraid I really don’t understand the point of your comment.
If I make a judgement of value, I’m making an inference about an arrangement of matter (mostly in my brain), which (inference) is therefore part of my world model. This can’t be otherwise.
Furthermore, any entity capable of modeling some aspect of reality must be, by definition, capable of isolating salient phenomena, which amounts to making value judgements. Thus, I’m forced to disagree when you say “your world model does not necessarily include values...”
Your final sentence is trivially correct, but its relevance is beyond me. Sorry. If you mean that my world model may not include values I actually possess, this is correct of course, but nobody stipulated that a world model must be correct.
I don’t think we understand each other. Let me try to unroll.
A model (of the kind we are talking about) is some representation of reality. It exists in a mind.
Let’s take Alice. Alice holds an apple in her hand. Alice believes that if she lets go of the apple it will fall to the ground. This is an example of a simple world model that exists inside Alice’s mind: basically, that there is such a thing as gravity and that it pulls objects towards the ground.
You said “isn’t a value judgement necessarily part of a world model?” I don’t see a value judgement in this particular world model inside Alice’s mind.
You also said “You are a physical object, and your values necessarily derive from the arrangement of the matter that composes you.” That is a claim about how Alice’s values came to be. But I don’t see why Alice’s values must necessarily be part of all world models that exists inside Alice’s mind.
I never said anything of the sort that Alice’s values must necessarily be part of all world models that exist inside Alice’s mind. (Note, though, that if we are talking about ‘world model,’ singular, as I was, then world model necessarily includes perception of some values.)
When I say that a value judgement is necessarily part of a world model, I mean that if I make a value judgement, then that judgement is necessarily part of my world model.
When I say that a value judgement is necessarily part of a world model, I mean that if I make a value judgement, then that judgement is necessarily part of my world model.
So, Alice likes cabernet and dislikes merlot. Alice says “I value cabernet more than merlot”. This is a value judgement. How is it a part of Alice’s world model and which world model?
By any chance, are you calling “a world model” the totality of a person’s ideas, perceptions, representations, etc. of external reality?
Alice is part of the world, right? So any belief about Alice is part of a world model. Any belief about Alice’s preference for cabernet is part of a world model—specifically, the world model of who-ever holds that belief.
By any chance....?
Yes.
(The phrase “the totality of” could, without any impact on our current discussion, be replaced with “elements of”. )
Is there something wrong with that? I inferred that to also be the meaning of the original poster.
specifically, the world model of who-ever holds that belief
Not “whoever”, we are talking specifically about Alice. Is Alice’s preference for cabernet part of Alice’s world model?
I have a feeling we’re getting into the snake-eating-its-own-tail loops. If Alice’s preferences are part of Alice’s world model then Alice’s world model is part of Alice’s world model as well. Recurse until you’re are reduced to praying to the Holy Trinity of Godel, Escher, and Bach :-)
The phrase “the totality of” could, without any impact on our current discussion, be replaced with “elements of”.
Could it? You are saying that value judgments must be a part of. Are there “elements of” which do not contain value judgements?
Are there “elements of” which don’t contain value judgements?
That strikes me as a question for dictionary writers. If we agree that Newton’s laws of motion constitute such an element, then clearly, there are such elements that do not not contain value judgements.
Is Alice’s preference for cabernet part of Alice’s world model?
iff she perceives that preference.
If Alice’s preferences are part of Alice’s world model, then Alice’s world model is part of Alice’s world model as well.
I’m not sure this follows by logical necessity, but how is this unusual? When I mention Newton’s laws, am I not implicitly aware that I have this world model? Does my world model, therefore, not include some description of my world model? How is this relevant?
A minor point in relation to this topic, but an important point, generally:
Correct me if I’m wrong, but isn’t a value judgement necessarily part of a world model? You are a physical object, and your values necessarily derive from the arrangement of the matter that composes you.
Many tell me (effectively) that what I’ve just expressed is a contrarian view. Certainly, for many years I would have happily agreed with the non-overlapping-ness of value judgements and world views. But then I started to think about it. I thought about it all the more carefully because it seemed the conclusion I was reaching was a contrarian position. I thought about it so much, in fact, that it’s now quite obvious to me that I’m right, regardless how large the majority who profess to disagree with me.
Perhaps this illustrates the utility of recognizing an idea’s contrarian nature (and conversely, the danger of not pursuing ideas simply because consensus is deemed to have been already reached).
That’s confusing levels. A world model that makes some factual assertions, some of which imply “my values are X” is a distinct thing from your values actually being X. To begin with, it’s entirely possible for your world model to imply that “my values are X” when your values are actually Y, in which case your world model is wrong.
What levels am I confusing? Are you sure it’s not you that is confused?
Your comment bears some resemblance to that of Lumifer. See my reply above.
To put it simply, what I am saying is that a value judgement is about whatever it is you are in fact judging. While a factual assertion such as you would find in a “model of the world” is about the physical configuration of your brain. This is similar to the use/mention distinction in linguistics. When you make a value judgement you use your values. A model of your brain mentions them.
An argument like this
could be equally well applied to claim that the act of throwing a ball is necessarily part of a world model, because your arm is physical. In fact, they are completely different things (for one thing, simply applying a model will never result in the ball moving), even though a world model may well describe the throwing of a ball.
A value judgement both uses and mentions values.
The judgement is an inference about values. The inference derives from the fact that some value exist. (The existing value exerts a causal influence on one’s inferences.)
This is how it is with all forms of inference.
Throwing a ball is not an inference (note that ‘inference’ and ‘judgement’ are synonyms), thus throwing a ball is no way necessarily part of a world model, and for our purposes, in no way analogous to making a value judgement.
Here is a quote from the article:
Lukeprog thinks that effective altruism is good, and this is a value judgement. Obviously, most of mainstream society doesn’t agree—people prefer to give money to warm fuzzy causes, like “adopt an endangered panda”. So that value judgement is certainly contrarian.
Presumably, lukeprog also believes that “lukeprog thinks effective altruism is good”. This is a fact in his world model. However, most people would agree with him when asked if that is true. We can see that lukeprog likes effective altruism. There’s no reason for anyone to claim “no, he doesn’t think that” when he obviously does. So this element of his world model is not contrarian.
I guess Lukeprog also believes that Lukeprog exists, and that this element of his world view is also not contrarian. So what?
One thing I see repeatedly in others is a deep-rooted reluctance to view themselves as blobs of perfectly standard physical matter. One of the many ways this manifests itself is a failure to consider inferences about one’s own mind as fundamentally similar to any other form of inference. There seems to be an assumption of some kind on non-inferable magic, when many people think about their own motivations. I’m sure you appreciate how fundamentally silly this is, but maybe you could take a little time to meditate on it some more.
Sorry if my tone is a little condescending, but understand that you have totally failed to support your initial claim that I was confused.
That’s not at all what I meant. Obviously minds and brains are just blobs of matter.
You are conflating the claims “lukeprog thinks X is good” and “X is good”. One is an empirical claim, one is a value judgement. More to the point, when someone says “P is a contrarian value judgement, not a contrarian world model”, they obviously intend “world model” to encompass empirical claims and not value judgements.
I’m not conflating anything. Those are different statements, and I’ve never implied otherwise.
The statement “X is good,” which is a value judgement, is also an empirical claim, as was my initial point. Simply restating your denial of that point does not constitute an argument.
“X is good” is a claim about the true state of X, and its relationship to the values of the person making the claim. Since you agree that values derive from physical matter, you must (if you wish to be coherent) also accept that “X is good” is a claim about physical matter, and therefore part of the world model of anybody who believes it.
If there is some particular point or question I can help with, don’t hesitate to ask.
If “X is good” was simply an empirical claim about whether an object conforms to a person’s values, people would frequently say things like “if my values approved of X, then X would be good” and would not say things like “taking a murder pill doesn’t affect the fact that murder is bad”.
Alternative: what if “X is good” was a mathematical claim about the value of a thing according to whatever values the speaker actually holds?
If that is your basis for a scientific standard, then I’m afraid I must withdraw from this discussion.
Ditto, if this is your idea of humor.
That’s just silly. What if c = 299,792,458 m/s is a mathematical claim about the speed of light, according to what the speed of light actually is? May I suggest that you don’t invent unnecessary complexity to disguise the demise of a long deceased argument.
No further comment from me.
My theory is that the dualistic theory of mind is an artifact of the lossy compression algorithm which, conveniently, prevents introspection from turning into infinite recursion. Lack of neurosurgery in the environment of ancestral adaptation made that an acceptable compromise.
I quite like Bob Trivers’ self-deception theory, though I only have tangential acquaintance with it. We might anticipate that self deception is harder if we are inclined to recognize the bit we call “me” as caused by some inner mechanism, hence it may be profitable to suppress that recognition, if Trivers is on to something.
Wild speculation on my part, of course. There may simply be no good reason, from the point of view of historic genetic fitness, to be good at self analysis, and you’re quite possibly on to something, that the computational overhead just doesn’t pay off.
The issue is, whose world model? Your world model does not necessarily include values even if they were to be deterministically derived from “the arrangement of the matter”.
The map is not the territory. Models are imperfect and many different models can be build on the basis of the same reality.
Trivially, it is the world model of the person making the value judgement I’m talking about. I’m trying hard, but I’m afraid I really don’t understand the point of your comment.
If I make a judgement of value, I’m making an inference about an arrangement of matter (mostly in my brain), which (inference) is therefore part of my world model. This can’t be otherwise.
Furthermore, any entity capable of modeling some aspect of reality must be, by definition, capable of isolating salient phenomena, which amounts to making value judgements. Thus, I’m forced to disagree when you say “your world model does not necessarily include values...”
Your final sentence is trivially correct, but its relevance is beyond me. Sorry. If you mean that my world model may not include values I actually possess, this is correct of course, but nobody stipulated that a world model must be correct.
I don’t think we understand each other. Let me try to unroll.
A model (of the kind we are talking about) is some representation of reality. It exists in a mind.
Let’s take Alice. Alice holds an apple in her hand. Alice believes that if she lets go of the apple it will fall to the ground. This is an example of a simple world model that exists inside Alice’s mind: basically, that there is such a thing as gravity and that it pulls objects towards the ground.
You said “isn’t a value judgement necessarily part of a world model?” I don’t see a value judgement in this particular world model inside Alice’s mind.
You also said “You are a physical object, and your values necessarily derive from the arrangement of the matter that composes you.” That is a claim about how Alice’s values came to be. But I don’t see why Alice’s values must necessarily be part of all world models that exists inside Alice’s mind.
I never said anything of the sort that Alice’s values must necessarily be part of all world models that exist inside Alice’s mind. (Note, though, that if we are talking about ‘world model,’ singular, as I was, then world model necessarily includes perception of some values.)
When I say that a value judgement is necessarily part of a world model, I mean that if I make a value judgement, then that judgement is necessarily part of my world model.
So, Alice likes cabernet and dislikes merlot. Alice says “I value cabernet more than merlot”. This is a value judgement. How is it a part of Alice’s world model and which world model?
By any chance, are you calling “a world model” the totality of a person’s ideas, perceptions, representations, etc. of external reality?
Alice is part of the world, right? So any belief about Alice is part of a world model. Any belief about Alice’s preference for cabernet is part of a world model—specifically, the world model of who-ever holds that belief.
Yes. (The phrase “the totality of” could, without any impact on our current discussion, be replaced with “elements of”. )
Is there something wrong with that? I inferred that to also be the meaning of the original poster.
Not “whoever”, we are talking specifically about Alice. Is Alice’s preference for cabernet part of Alice’s world model?
I have a feeling we’re getting into the snake-eating-its-own-tail loops. If Alice’s preferences are part of Alice’s world model then Alice’s world model is part of Alice’s world model as well. Recurse until you’re are reduced to praying to the Holy Trinity of Godel, Escher, and Bach :-)
Could it? You are saying that value judgments must be a part of. Are there “elements of” which do not contain value judgements?
That strikes me as a question for dictionary writers. If we agree that Newton’s laws of motion constitute such an element, then clearly, there are such elements that do not not contain value judgements.
iff she perceives that preference.
I’m not sure this follows by logical necessity, but how is this unusual? When I mention Newton’s laws, am I not implicitly aware that I have this world model? Does my world model, therefore, not include some description of my world model? How is this relevant?