Trivially, it is the world model of the person making the value judgement I’m talking about. I’m trying hard, but I’m afraid I really don’t understand the point of your comment.
If I make a judgement of value, I’m making an inference about an arrangement of matter (mostly in my brain), which (inference) is therefore part of my world model. This can’t be otherwise.
Furthermore, any entity capable of modeling some aspect of reality must be, by definition, capable of isolating salient phenomena, which amounts to making value judgements. Thus, I’m forced to disagree when you say “your world model does not necessarily include values...”
Your final sentence is trivially correct, but its relevance is beyond me. Sorry. If you mean that my world model may not include values I actually possess, this is correct of course, but nobody stipulated that a world model must be correct.
I don’t think we understand each other. Let me try to unroll.
A model (of the kind we are talking about) is some representation of reality. It exists in a mind.
Let’s take Alice. Alice holds an apple in her hand. Alice believes that if she lets go of the apple it will fall to the ground. This is an example of a simple world model that exists inside Alice’s mind: basically, that there is such a thing as gravity and that it pulls objects towards the ground.
You said “isn’t a value judgement necessarily part of a world model?” I don’t see a value judgement in this particular world model inside Alice’s mind.
You also said “You are a physical object, and your values necessarily derive from the arrangement of the matter that composes you.” That is a claim about how Alice’s values came to be. But I don’t see why Alice’s values must necessarily be part of all world models that exists inside Alice’s mind.
I never said anything of the sort that Alice’s values must necessarily be part of all world models that exist inside Alice’s mind. (Note, though, that if we are talking about ‘world model,’ singular, as I was, then world model necessarily includes perception of some values.)
When I say that a value judgement is necessarily part of a world model, I mean that if I make a value judgement, then that judgement is necessarily part of my world model.
When I say that a value judgement is necessarily part of a world model, I mean that if I make a value judgement, then that judgement is necessarily part of my world model.
So, Alice likes cabernet and dislikes merlot. Alice says “I value cabernet more than merlot”. This is a value judgement. How is it a part of Alice’s world model and which world model?
By any chance, are you calling “a world model” the totality of a person’s ideas, perceptions, representations, etc. of external reality?
Alice is part of the world, right? So any belief about Alice is part of a world model. Any belief about Alice’s preference for cabernet is part of a world model—specifically, the world model of who-ever holds that belief.
By any chance....?
Yes.
(The phrase “the totality of” could, without any impact on our current discussion, be replaced with “elements of”. )
Is there something wrong with that? I inferred that to also be the meaning of the original poster.
specifically, the world model of who-ever holds that belief
Not “whoever”, we are talking specifically about Alice. Is Alice’s preference for cabernet part of Alice’s world model?
I have a feeling we’re getting into the snake-eating-its-own-tail loops. If Alice’s preferences are part of Alice’s world model then Alice’s world model is part of Alice’s world model as well. Recurse until you’re are reduced to praying to the Holy Trinity of Godel, Escher, and Bach :-)
The phrase “the totality of” could, without any impact on our current discussion, be replaced with “elements of”.
Could it? You are saying that value judgments must be a part of. Are there “elements of” which do not contain value judgements?
Are there “elements of” which don’t contain value judgements?
That strikes me as a question for dictionary writers. If we agree that Newton’s laws of motion constitute such an element, then clearly, there are such elements that do not not contain value judgements.
Is Alice’s preference for cabernet part of Alice’s world model?
iff she perceives that preference.
If Alice’s preferences are part of Alice’s world model, then Alice’s world model is part of Alice’s world model as well.
I’m not sure this follows by logical necessity, but how is this unusual? When I mention Newton’s laws, am I not implicitly aware that I have this world model? Does my world model, therefore, not include some description of my world model? How is this relevant?
Trivially, it is the world model of the person making the value judgement I’m talking about. I’m trying hard, but I’m afraid I really don’t understand the point of your comment.
If I make a judgement of value, I’m making an inference about an arrangement of matter (mostly in my brain), which (inference) is therefore part of my world model. This can’t be otherwise.
Furthermore, any entity capable of modeling some aspect of reality must be, by definition, capable of isolating salient phenomena, which amounts to making value judgements. Thus, I’m forced to disagree when you say “your world model does not necessarily include values...”
Your final sentence is trivially correct, but its relevance is beyond me. Sorry. If you mean that my world model may not include values I actually possess, this is correct of course, but nobody stipulated that a world model must be correct.
I don’t think we understand each other. Let me try to unroll.
A model (of the kind we are talking about) is some representation of reality. It exists in a mind.
Let’s take Alice. Alice holds an apple in her hand. Alice believes that if she lets go of the apple it will fall to the ground. This is an example of a simple world model that exists inside Alice’s mind: basically, that there is such a thing as gravity and that it pulls objects towards the ground.
You said “isn’t a value judgement necessarily part of a world model?” I don’t see a value judgement in this particular world model inside Alice’s mind.
You also said “You are a physical object, and your values necessarily derive from the arrangement of the matter that composes you.” That is a claim about how Alice’s values came to be. But I don’t see why Alice’s values must necessarily be part of all world models that exists inside Alice’s mind.
I never said anything of the sort that Alice’s values must necessarily be part of all world models that exist inside Alice’s mind. (Note, though, that if we are talking about ‘world model,’ singular, as I was, then world model necessarily includes perception of some values.)
When I say that a value judgement is necessarily part of a world model, I mean that if I make a value judgement, then that judgement is necessarily part of my world model.
So, Alice likes cabernet and dislikes merlot. Alice says “I value cabernet more than merlot”. This is a value judgement. How is it a part of Alice’s world model and which world model?
By any chance, are you calling “a world model” the totality of a person’s ideas, perceptions, representations, etc. of external reality?
Alice is part of the world, right? So any belief about Alice is part of a world model. Any belief about Alice’s preference for cabernet is part of a world model—specifically, the world model of who-ever holds that belief.
Yes. (The phrase “the totality of” could, without any impact on our current discussion, be replaced with “elements of”. )
Is there something wrong with that? I inferred that to also be the meaning of the original poster.
Not “whoever”, we are talking specifically about Alice. Is Alice’s preference for cabernet part of Alice’s world model?
I have a feeling we’re getting into the snake-eating-its-own-tail loops. If Alice’s preferences are part of Alice’s world model then Alice’s world model is part of Alice’s world model as well. Recurse until you’re are reduced to praying to the Holy Trinity of Godel, Escher, and Bach :-)
Could it? You are saying that value judgments must be a part of. Are there “elements of” which do not contain value judgements?
That strikes me as a question for dictionary writers. If we agree that Newton’s laws of motion constitute such an element, then clearly, there are such elements that do not not contain value judgements.
iff she perceives that preference.
I’m not sure this follows by logical necessity, but how is this unusual? When I mention Newton’s laws, am I not implicitly aware that I have this world model? Does my world model, therefore, not include some description of my world model? How is this relevant?