Are you saying you don’t experience qualia and find them a bit surprising (in a way you don’t for containerness)? I find it really hard to not see arguments of this kind as a little disingenous: is the issue genuinely not difficult for some people, or is this a rhetorical stance intended to provoke better arguments, or awareness of the weakness of current arguments?
I have subjective experiences. If that’s the same thing as experiencing qualia, then I experience qualia.
I’m not quite sure what you mean by “surprising” here… no, it does not surprise me that I have subjective experiences, I’ve become rather accustomed to it over the years. I frequently find the idea that my subjective experiences are a function of the formal processes my neurobiology implements a challenging idea… is that what you’re asking?
Then again, I frequently find the idea that my memories of my dead father are a function of the formal processes my neurobiology implements a challenging idea as well. What, on your view, am I entitled to infer from that?
Yes, I meant surprising in light of other discoveries/beliefs.
On memory: is it the conscious experience that’s challenging (in which case it’s just a sub-set of the same issue) or do you find the functional aspects of memory challenging? Even though I know almost nothing about how memory works, I can see plausible models and how it could work, unlike consciousness.
Are you saying you don’t experience qualia and find them a bit surprising (in a way you don’t for containerness)? I find it really hard to not see arguments of this kind as a little disingenous: is the issue genuinely not difficult for some people, or is this a rhetorical stance intended to provoke better arguments, or awareness of the weakness of current arguments?
I have subjective experiences. If that’s the same thing as experiencing qualia, then I experience qualia.
I’m not quite sure what you mean by “surprising” here… no, it does not surprise me that I have subjective experiences, I’ve become rather accustomed to it over the years. I frequently find the idea that my subjective experiences are a function of the formal processes my neurobiology implements a challenging idea… is that what you’re asking?
Then again, I frequently find the idea that my memories of my dead father are a function of the formal processes my neurobiology implements a challenging idea as well. What, on your view, am I entitled to infer from that?
Yes, I meant surprising in light of other discoveries/beliefs.
On memory: is it the conscious experience that’s challenging (in which case it’s just a sub-set of the same issue) or do you find the functional aspects of memory challenging? Even though I know almost nothing about how memory works, I can see plausible models and how it could work, unlike consciousness.