What I think of the case for qualia is beside the point, I was just commenting on your ‘moral hazard’ argument. There you said that even if we assume that we have only weak evidence for the reality of qualia, we should take the possibility seriously, since we can be confident that qualia are morally significant. I was just pointing out that this argument is made problematic by the fact that our confidence in the moral significance of qualia can be no stronger than our confidence in their reality, and therefore by assumption must be weak.
I am guessing that Juno_Watt means that strong evidence for our own perception of qualia makes them real enough to seriously consider their moral significance, whether or not they are “objectively real”.
What? Are you saying we have weak evidence for even in ourselves?
What I think of the case for qualia is beside the point, I was just commenting on your ‘moral hazard’ argument. There you said that even if we assume that we have only weak evidence for the reality of qualia, we should take the possibility seriously, since we can be confident that qualia are morally significant. I was just pointing out that this argument is made problematic by the fact that our confidence in the moral significance of qualia can be no stronger than our confidence in their reality, and therefore by assumption must be weak.
But of course it can. i can be much more confident in
(P → Q)
than I am in P. For instance, I can be highly confident that if i won the lottery, I could buy a yacht.
I am guessing that Juno_Watt means that strong evidence for our own perception of qualia makes them real enough to seriously consider their moral significance, whether or not they are “objectively real”.