If two theories both lead me to anticipate the same experience, the fact that I have that experience isn’t grounds for choosing among them.
So, sure, the fact that I keep having experiences is grounds for preferring a theory of subjective-experience-explaining-but-otherwise-mysterious qualia over a theory that predicts no subjective experience at all, but not necessarily grounds for preferring it to a theory of subjective-experience-explaining-neural-activity.
If two theories both lead me to anticipate the same experience, the fact that I have that experience isn’t grounds for choosing among them.
So, sure, the fact that I keep having experiences is grounds for preferring a theory of subjective-experience-explaining-but-otherwise-mysterious qualia over a theory that predicts no subjective experience at all, but not necessarily grounds for preferring it to a theory of subjective-experience-explaining-neural-activity.
They don’t necessarily once you start talking about uploads, or the afterlife for that matter.