Wait.… it seems you’re suggesting that the expected value of a soul to an atheist exceeds the otiosity threshold. Did I read that right? I’m interested in your reasoning, if so.
It depends on one’s subjective uncertainty. I know there are atheists who have been persuaded by visions or Pascal’s wager that they were wrong, so the risk would seem to be real, and given the stakes, $120 seems like chump change for insurance—even if you try to defeat a Pascal’s wager by bounded utility, the bound would have to be extremely large to be plausible...
If atheists thinks that there’s a small chance that they will turn into theists and be glad to be in possession of a spare soul, then they must think that theists value spare souls. So it would seem more valuable to theists, who don’t have to multiply the value of the transaction by the small chance.
There are some differences between typical theists and the hypothetical atheist-turned-theist. In particular, the theist has had a lifetime to keep a clean soul. But many theists think they do a bad job. If the spare soul has tail risk value to an atheist, it should have more value to the bad theists. The other difference is that the atheist is not a believer at the time of the transaction. Perhaps the belief of the theist makes it a greater sin to trade in souls.
But it seems like a lot of details have to go right for it to be a better deal for the atheist than the theist.
Mm. Are you suggesting that the subjective uncertainty of a typical atheist on this question causes expected value to exceed the otiosity threshold? Or merely that there are some atheists for whom this is true? I’ll agree with the latter.
Though, thinking about this, surely this would be much more likely for theists, no? So wouldn’t the maximum expected value of your soul likely be higher, thereby securing you a higher sale price, in a theist community? (Preferably one with a sense of humor about theology.)
It depends on one’s subjective uncertainty. I know there are atheists who have been persuaded by visions or Pascal’s wager that they were wrong, so the risk would seem to be real, and given the stakes, $120 seems like chump change for insurance—even if you try to defeat a Pascal’s wager by bounded utility, the bound would have to be extremely large to be plausible...
If atheists thinks that there’s a small chance that they will turn into theists and be glad to be in possession of a spare soul, then they must think that theists value spare souls. So it would seem more valuable to theists, who don’t have to multiply the value of the transaction by the small chance.
There are some differences between typical theists and the hypothetical atheist-turned-theist. In particular, the theist has had a lifetime to keep a clean soul. But many theists think they do a bad job. If the spare soul has tail risk value to an atheist, it should have more value to the bad theists. The other difference is that the atheist is not a believer at the time of the transaction. Perhaps the belief of the theist makes it a greater sin to trade in souls.
But it seems like a lot of details have to go right for it to be a better deal for the atheist than the theist.
Mm. Are you suggesting that the subjective uncertainty of a typical atheist on this question causes expected value to exceed the otiosity threshold? Or merely that there are some atheists for whom this is true? I’ll agree with the latter.
Though, thinking about this, surely this would be much more likely for theists, no? So wouldn’t the maximum expected value of your soul likely be higher, thereby securing you a higher sale price, in a theist community? (Preferably one with a sense of humor about theology.)