I’ve come around to the “conflict-vs-mistake framing” in particular because “every significant disagreement has elements of both”.
It must be the case, in some sense anyways, that every ‘conflict theory’ begins its (epistemic) existence as a ‘mistake theory’ and is thus, hopefully, at least somewhat amenable to being considered ‘mistaken’ later given sufficient contrary evidence.
In general too, conflict theories seem to have a ‘memetic’ advantage in being ‘epistemically totalitarian’, i.e. subsuming all subsequent evidence (until the existence of the conflict is itself later considered mistaken).
It’s also true that something like philanthropy could be both net-positive for everyone and net-negative for a particular political coalition.
I’ve come around to the “conflict-vs-mistake framing” in particular because “every significant disagreement has elements of both”.
It must be the case, in some sense anyways, that every ‘conflict theory’ begins its (epistemic) existence as a ‘mistake theory’ and is thus, hopefully, at least somewhat amenable to being considered ‘mistaken’ later given sufficient contrary evidence.
In general too, conflict theories seem to have a ‘memetic’ advantage in being ‘epistemically totalitarian’, i.e. subsuming all subsequent evidence (until the existence of the conflict is itself later considered mistaken).
It’s also true that something like philanthropy could be both net-positive for everyone and net-negative for a particular political coalition.