Doesn’t seem that way to me. If I tell a Noble Lie, I don’t believe it (in the epistemic sense), but intend others to do so. If I spread a claim I think is true and it is in fact false, I’m just spreading a falsehood that I’m unaware of.
If what I say is correct, you would not be able to tell, solipsistically, if you believed in any lies that seemed true to you. You need to start with other people’s lies, in particular by thinking about how persistent crazy ideas could fulfil an instrumentaal purpose.
Doesn’t seem that way to me. If I tell a Noble Lie, I don’t believe it (in the epistemic sense), but intend others to do so. If I spread a claim I think is true and it is in fact false, I’m just spreading a falsehood that I’m unaware of.
If what I say is correct, you would not be able to tell, solipsistically, if you believed in any lies that seemed true to you. You need to start with other people’s lies, in particular by thinking about how persistent crazy ideas could fulfil an instrumentaal purpose.