Personally, I think this one is more relevant. The biggest problem with the argument from visions and miracles, barring some much more complicated discussions of neurology than are really necessary, is that it proves too much, namely multiple contradictory religions.
It’s a good post, but overly logical and technically involved for a non-LWer. Even if you agree with the logic, I can hardly imagine a religious person alieving that their favorite doctrine proves too much.
It’s a very interesting post. You’re right that we can’t accept all visions, because they will contradict each other, but in fact I think that many don’t. It’s entirely plausible in my mind that God really did appear to Mohammed as well as Joseph Smith, for instance, and they don’t have to invalidate each other. But of course if you take every single claim that’s ever been made, it becomes ridiculous.
Does it prove too much, then, to say that some visions are real and some are mental glitches? I’m not suggesting any way of actually telling the difference.
Well, it’s certainly not a very parsimonious explanation. This conversation has branched in a lot of places, so I’m not sure where that comment is right now, but as someone else has already pointed out, what about the explanation that most lightning bolts are merely electromagnetic events, but some are thrown by Thor?
Proposing a second mechanism which accounts for some cases of a phenomenon, when the first mechanism accounts for others, is more complex (and thus in the absence of evidence less likely to be correct) than the supposition that the first mechanism accounts for all cases of the phenomenon. If there’s no way to tell them apart, then observations of miracles and visions don’t count as evidence favoring the explanation of visions-plus-brain-glitches over the explanation of brain glitches alone.
It’s possible, but that doesn’t mean we have any reason to suppose it’s true. And when we have no reason to suppose something is true, it generally isn’t.
Personally, I think this one is more relevant. The biggest problem with the argument from visions and miracles, barring some much more complicated discussions of neurology than are really necessary, is that it proves too much, namely multiple contradictory religions.
It’s a good post, but overly logical and technically involved for a non-LWer. Even if you agree with the logic, I can hardly imagine a religious person alieving that their favorite doctrine proves too much.
It’s a very interesting post. You’re right that we can’t accept all visions, because they will contradict each other, but in fact I think that many don’t. It’s entirely plausible in my mind that God really did appear to Mohammed as well as Joseph Smith, for instance, and they don’t have to invalidate each other. But of course if you take every single claim that’s ever been made, it becomes ridiculous.
Does it prove too much, then, to say that some visions are real and some are mental glitches? I’m not suggesting any way of actually telling the difference.
Well, it’s certainly not a very parsimonious explanation. This conversation has branched in a lot of places, so I’m not sure where that comment is right now, but as someone else has already pointed out, what about the explanation that most lightning bolts are merely electromagnetic events, but some are thrown by Thor?
Proposing a second mechanism which accounts for some cases of a phenomenon, when the first mechanism accounts for others, is more complex (and thus in the absence of evidence less likely to be correct) than the supposition that the first mechanism accounts for all cases of the phenomenon. If there’s no way to tell them apart, then observations of miracles and visions don’t count as evidence favoring the explanation of visions-plus-brain-glitches over the explanation of brain glitches alone.
It’s possible, but that doesn’t mean we have any reason to suppose it’s true. And when we have no reason to suppose something is true, it generally isn’t.