To lie convincingly, it is necessary to first believe the lie yourself; in other words once you deceive yourself, convincing others is easy. The reason for this phenomenon appears to be the behavioral clues offered when one knowingly lies. Why is it that we offer these behavioral clues when we lie? Surely it would be advantageous to disguise our lies?
The only possible reason appears to be, that these behavioral clues are the only way we have of knowing of ourselves, that we lie. Without this metaphorical ‘crossing of fingers’, we would have no way of knowing that we lied. If this is the case, then behaviorism has a point; much as we might like to think otherwise, it appears that we may be nothing more than the sum of our behavior.
On the basis that if one makes definite assertions, responses are more likely :-)
My question: Why is it an evolutionary advantage to betray our lies with behavioural clues? Until challenged with an alternative reason that makes any sense, my assertion remains the only possible reason.
Why is it an evolutionary advantage to betray our lies with behavioural clues?
I notice that when mammals hide from predators, or stealthily approach prey, they frequently betray their location and presence. For example, they frequently vibrate the air, radiate heat, and exude various chemicals, which some animals can sense.
To ask why it’s an evolutionary advantage to betray our location with such cues is to ask a question so wrong that the attempt to answer it will systematically lead me away from understanding what’s going on.
Now, it may be that lying is not analogous; that there really is a selected-for predisposition to be caught out in our lies, as you imply with your question. And if so, asking where that selection pressure comes from is a useful question.
Until challenged with an alternative reason that makes any sense
Those who are unable to lie (e.g., because of involuntary behavioral cues) can credibly signal when they are telling the truth (through a lack of those involuntary cues); those who are good liars have no such credible signal. Related.
I don’t buy that lying requires believing the lies even a little bit. Internalization may be important, but understanding religious thought and being able to speak about it convincingly doesn’t require belief by any means.
It seems transparent that bad liars are exhibiting stress tics rather than trying to protect their internal narrative given the techniques for becoming a better liar (i.e. relax, practice, be confident) and the similarity to nervous people telling the truth when they’re worried they’ll get in trouble for it anyways (in the face of interrogation, for instance).
To lie convincingly, it is necessary to first believe the lie yourself; in other words once you deceive yourself, convincing others is easy. The reason for this phenomenon appears to be the behavioral clues offered when one knowingly lies. Why is it that we offer these behavioral clues when we lie? Surely it would be advantageous to disguise our lies?
The only possible reason appears to be, that these behavioral clues are the only way we have of knowing of ourselves, that we lie. Without this metaphorical ‘crossing of fingers’, we would have no way of knowing that we lied. If this is the case, then behaviorism has a point; much as we might like to think otherwise, it appears that we may be nothing more than the sum of our behavior.
Wait, what?
On what basis do you infer that this is the only possible reason?
On the basis that if one makes definite assertions, responses are more likely :-)
My question: Why is it an evolutionary advantage to betray our lies with behavioural clues? Until challenged with an alternative reason that makes any sense, my assertion remains the only possible reason.
I notice that when mammals hide from predators, or stealthily approach prey, they frequently betray their location and presence. For example, they frequently vibrate the air, radiate heat, and exude various chemicals, which some animals can sense.
To ask why it’s an evolutionary advantage to betray our location with such cues is to ask a question so wrong that the attempt to answer it will systematically lead me away from understanding what’s going on.
Now, it may be that lying is not analogous; that there really is a selected-for predisposition to be caught out in our lies, as you imply with your question. And if so, asking where that selection pressure comes from is a useful question.
But that’s a significant “if.”
These signals appear to be unavoidable. When we lie, however, many of our behavioural signals appear to be avoidable: for example.
There is no dispute that we betray our own lies; but why do we betray our lies?
Those who are unable to lie (e.g., because of involuntary behavioral cues) can credibly signal when they are telling the truth (through a lack of those involuntary cues); those who are good liars have no such credible signal. Related.
I don’t buy that lying requires believing the lies even a little bit. Internalization may be important, but understanding religious thought and being able to speak about it convincingly doesn’t require belief by any means.
It seems transparent that bad liars are exhibiting stress tics rather than trying to protect their internal narrative given the techniques for becoming a better liar (i.e. relax, practice, be confident) and the similarity to nervous people telling the truth when they’re worried they’ll get in trouble for it anyways (in the face of interrogation, for instance).