V.Nesov:
There is nothing symmetrical about choices of two players. One is playing for paperclips, another for different number of lives. One selects P2.Decision, another selects P1.Decision. How to recognize the “symmetry” of decisions, if they are not called by the same name?
The decision processes can be isomorphic. We can think about the paperclipper being absoulutely the same as we are, except valuing paperclips instead of our values. This of course assumes we can separate the thinking into “values part” and “algorithmic part” (and that the utility function of the paperclipper is such that the payoff matrix is symmetric), which seems unrealistic and that’s why I wrote I don’t know what strategy is the best.
V.Nesov: There is nothing symmetrical about choices of two players. One is playing for paperclips, another for different number of lives. One selects P2.Decision, another selects P1.Decision. How to recognize the “symmetry” of decisions, if they are not called by the same name?
The decision processes can be isomorphic. We can think about the paperclipper being absoulutely the same as we are, except valuing paperclips instead of our values. This of course assumes we can separate the thinking into “values part” and “algorithmic part” (and that the utility function of the paperclipper is such that the payoff matrix is symmetric), which seems unrealistic and that’s why I wrote I don’t know what strategy is the best.