All I’ve asked you to do is at least pretend you have some familiarity with the field’s content, and how that content relates to its raison d’etre.
I don’t understand. Certainly, I’m at least “pretending” to have “some familiarity” with the field’s content, and how that content relates to its raison d’etre, by way of citing hundreds of works in the field, quoting philosophers, hosting a podcast for which I interviewed dozens of philosophers for hours on end, etc.
it’s implicit in the points you’ve repeatedly made, viz. “philosophers are stupid, if they only paid attention to science....” Well, they do pay attention to science, in fact there is a whole realm of philosophers who pay attention to science and make that a centerpiece of their discussion
Of course many philosophers pay attention to science. When Eliezer wrote, “If there’s any centralized repository of reductionist-grade naturalistic cognitive philosophy, I’ve never heard mention of it,” I replied (earlier in this sequence):
When I read that I thought: What? That’s Quinean naturalism! That’s Kornblith and Stich and Bickle and the Churchlands and Thagard and Metzinger and Northoff! There are hundreds of philosophers who do that!
Again: you’re straw-manning me. I’ve said specific things about the ways in which many philosophers are ignoring scientific results, but I’m quite aware that they pay attention to other parts of science, and of course that many of them (e.g. the experimental philosophers) pay attention to the kinds of evidence that I’m accusing others of ignoring.
you said in your article that, since some philosophers accept intuitions as valid… therefore we should consider philosophy an artifact of Cartesian thinking.
Straw man number… 5? 6? I’ve lost count. Where did I say that?
You’ve taken it for granted without outright saying it.
Wait, first you claim that “you said in your article that...” and in the very next paragraph you claim that I’ve “taken it for granted without outright saying it”? I’m very confused.
I see, so the cultural norm is to take unfavorable samples of a field you don’t like, present them as exemplars, complain when people don’t accept that position without criticism, and then hide behind rules meant to fortify your pre-existing groupthink.
No. I complain when I do all the work of presenting arguments, examples, and evidence, and you simply deny it all without presenting any arguments, examples, and evidence of your own.
Certainly, I’m at least “pretending” to have “some familiarity” with the field’s content, and how that content relates to its raison d’etre, by way of citing hundreds of works in the field, quoting philosophers, hosting a podcast for which I interviewed dozens of philosophers for hours on end, etc.
You’d think if this were the case you’d be able to make a more honest assessment of the field.
I’ve said specific things about the ways in which many philosophers are ignoring scientific results, but I’m quite aware that they pay attention to other parts of science, and of course that many of them (e.g. the experimental philosophers) pay attention to the kinds of evidence that I’m accusing others of ignoring.
Alright, I’ll grant you this. You’ve still made the point that the field of philosophy has not acknowledged the unreliability of intuitions, as if this were a novel insight and not something that is taken very seriously in the modern-day (at least) debates, and that this is a fundamental flaw in the discipline itself.
Where did I say that?
Right here:
What would happen if we dropped all philosophical methods that were developed when we had a Cartesian view of the mind and of reason, and instead invented philosophy anew given what we now know about the physical processes that produce human reasoning?
The implication being that Cartesian views of mind and reason are in any way relevant to modern philosophy. This isn’t even true for Continental philosophy and hasn’t been for a long time.
Wait, first you claim that “you said in your article that...” and in the very next paragraph you claim that I’ve “taken it for granted without outright saying it”? I’m very confused.
I agree, you are, so let’s slow down and look at my actual criticism again.
What you wrote was that philosophers accept intutions at face value, uncritically...which isn’t true, and I responded accordingly.
What you implied, in that it follows necessarily from your explicitly-made argument, is that since some philosophers accept intutions as valid, therefore the discipline-as-a-whole is broken. But that isn’t true; the entire point is to discuss disparate, conflicting, and even dubious ideas; this is no blackmark as you’ve construed it.
No. I complain when I do all the work of presenting arguments, examples, and evidence, and you simply deny it all without presenting any arguments, examples, and evidence of your own.
A convenient way to hide behind your biases, I suppose, but I’m not sure what it accomplishes otherwise. Even the Stanford Encyclopedia’s entries on moral theory and ethics don’t back up your “unique” assessment of the field.
I don’t think this is going anywhere useful. You’re still straw-manning me and failing to provide exact counterexamples and counter-evidence. I’m moving on to more productive activities.
I don’t understand. Certainly, I’m at least “pretending” to have “some familiarity” with the field’s content, and how that content relates to its raison d’etre, by way of citing hundreds of works in the field, quoting philosophers, hosting a podcast for which I interviewed dozens of philosophers for hours on end, etc.
Of course many philosophers pay attention to science. When Eliezer wrote, “If there’s any centralized repository of reductionist-grade naturalistic cognitive philosophy, I’ve never heard mention of it,” I replied (earlier in this sequence):
Again: you’re straw-manning me. I’ve said specific things about the ways in which many philosophers are ignoring scientific results, but I’m quite aware that they pay attention to other parts of science, and of course that many of them (e.g. the experimental philosophers) pay attention to the kinds of evidence that I’m accusing others of ignoring.
Straw man number… 5? 6? I’ve lost count. Where did I say that?
Wait, first you claim that “you said in your article that...” and in the very next paragraph you claim that I’ve “taken it for granted without outright saying it”? I’m very confused.
No. I complain when I do all the work of presenting arguments, examples, and evidence, and you simply deny it all without presenting any arguments, examples, and evidence of your own.
You’d think if this were the case you’d be able to make a more honest assessment of the field.
Alright, I’ll grant you this. You’ve still made the point that the field of philosophy has not acknowledged the unreliability of intuitions, as if this were a novel insight and not something that is taken very seriously in the modern-day (at least) debates, and that this is a fundamental flaw in the discipline itself.
Right here:
The implication being that Cartesian views of mind and reason are in any way relevant to modern philosophy. This isn’t even true for Continental philosophy and hasn’t been for a long time.
I agree, you are, so let’s slow down and look at my actual criticism again.
What you wrote was that philosophers accept intutions at face value, uncritically...which isn’t true, and I responded accordingly.
What you implied, in that it follows necessarily from your explicitly-made argument, is that since some philosophers accept intutions as valid, therefore the discipline-as-a-whole is broken. But that isn’t true; the entire point is to discuss disparate, conflicting, and even dubious ideas; this is no blackmark as you’ve construed it.
A convenient way to hide behind your biases, I suppose, but I’m not sure what it accomplishes otherwise. Even the Stanford Encyclopedia’s entries on moral theory and ethics don’t back up your “unique” assessment of the field.
I don’t think this is going anywhere useful. You’re still straw-manning me and failing to provide exact counterexamples and counter-evidence. I’m moving on to more productive activities.