The word “True” is overloaded in the ordinary vernacular. Eliezer’s answer is to set up a separate standard for empirical and mathematical propositions.
Empirical assertions use the label “true” when they correspond to reality. Mathematical assertions use the label “valid” when the theorem follows from the axioms.
Eliezer’s answer is to set up a separate standard for empirical and mathematical propositions.
I dont’ think it is, and that’s a bad answer anyway. To say that two unrelated approaches are both truth allows anthing to join the truth club, since there are no longer criteria for membership.
Well, I don’t think that Eliezer would call mathematically valid propositions “true.” I don’t find that answer any more satisfying than you do. But (as your link suggests), I don’t think he can do better without abandoning the correspondence theory.
The word “True” is overloaded in the ordinary vernacular. Eliezer’s answer is to set up a separate standard for empirical and mathematical propositions.
Empirical assertions use the label “true” when they correspond to reality. Mathematical assertions use the label “valid” when the theorem follows from the axioms.
I dont’ think it is, and that’s a bad answer anyway. To say that two unrelated approaches are both truth allows anthing to join the truth club, since there are no longer criteria for membership.
However, there is an approach that allows pluralism, AKA “overloading”, but avoids Anything Goes
Well, I don’t think that Eliezer would call mathematically valid propositions “true.” I don’t find that answer any more satisfying than you do. But (as your link suggests), I don’t think he can do better without abandoning the correspondence theory.