The second stage means we have assumed there are no non-shared intuitions. The fourth stage just established that the set of stipulatively shared intutions isn’t empty.
First and second, we define “true Scottsman” as what we want him to be. Third, we reject everyone who does not meet our definition. Fourth, hopefully there remains at least one person compatible with our definition.
Here are some circumstances where we should:-
First we define “intuition” as a basic idea or principle that we need , and which can’t be derived from anything else.
Secondly, we further stipulate that intutions must be shared.
Thirdly, we use empirical philosophy to reject any purported intuitions that don’t meet the last criterion.
Fourthly: If the result is a non-empty set, we should accept that there are shared intuitions.
But then, if we do that, we haven’t assumed it. We’ve carefully selected and tested and research which ones are actually shared.
The second stage means we have assumed there are no non-shared intuitions. The fourth stage just established that the set of stipulatively shared intutions isn’t empty.
How exactly does this differ from the “No true Scotsman” fallacy?
First and second, we define “true Scottsman” as what we want him to be. Third, we reject everyone who does not meet our definition. Fourth, hopefully there remains at least one person compatible with our definition.
I’m well aware of the parallel. But a lot of LWer’s seem to approve of the TSD when it takes the form redefining a term scientifically.
ETA: case in point