Bit of an implied false dichotomy, or at least an uncharitable reading.
You should get near universal agreement for stating that our intuitions are not strictly universally shared. Even the relevant quote you used qualified the “universally shared” with a “more or less”.
Since we do share a cognitive architecture with many common elements, we should expect that—analogous to our various utility functions for which we surmise the existence of a CEV—there is a CEV-concept-analogon usable for philosophical intuitions, a sort of CEI. Whether a CEI still falls under the purview of “more or less” is up to debate. Just as gender-specific (culture-specific) CEVs would show differences, so would gender-specific (culture-specific) CEIs.
If you had to make a bet on whether human X shared a specific intuition with you, don’t you think chances are that he/she does?
Indeed—like most philosophy, x-phi focuses on the controversial questions, so the conclusion that intuitions generally vary is not justified. However, for this reason it’s a fairly effective attack on philosophy which attempts to use exactly those intuitions to solve exactly those questions.
Bit of an implied false dichotomy, or at least an uncharitable reading.
You should get near universal agreement for stating that our intuitions are not strictly universally shared. Even the relevant quote you used qualified the “universally shared” with a “more or less”.
Since we do share a cognitive architecture with many common elements, we should expect that—analogous to our various utility functions for which we surmise the existence of a CEV—there is a CEV-concept-analogon usable for philosophical intuitions, a sort of CEI. Whether a CEI still falls under the purview of “more or less” is up to debate. Just as gender-specific (culture-specific) CEVs would show differences, so would gender-specific (culture-specific) CEIs.
If you had to make a bet on whether human X shared a specific intuition with you, don’t you think chances are that he/she does?
Indeed—like most philosophy, x-phi focuses on the controversial questions, so the conclusion that intuitions generally vary is not justified. However, for this reason it’s a fairly effective attack on philosophy which attempts to use exactly those intuitions to solve exactly those questions.