You’re both arguing over your impressions of philosophy. I’m more inclined to agree with Lukeprog’s impression unless you have some way of showing that your impression is more accurate. Like, for example, show me three papers in meta-ethics from the last year that you think highlight what is representational of that area of philosophy.
From my reading of philosophy, the most well known philosophers (who I’d assume are representational of the top 10% of the field) do keep intuitions and conceptual analysis in their toolbox. But when they bring it out of the toolbox, they dress it up so that it’s not prima facie stupid (and then you get a fractal mess of philosophers publishing how the intuition is wrong where their intuition isn’t, or how they shouldn’t be using intuitions, or how intuitions are useful, and so on with no resolution). If I were to take a step back and look at what philosophy accomplishes, I think I’d have to say “confusion.”
You can say this is just the way things are in philosophy, but then why should we fund philosophy?
You can say this is just the way things are in philosophy, but then why should we fund philosophy?
Because some of us realize that there are types of inquiry which are valuable and useful despite the confusion they offer to hyper-systemizing brains who can’t accept any view of reality outside a broken conception of radically reductive materialism.
How is philosophy going to get us the correct conception of reality? How will we know it when it happens? (I think science will progress us to the point where philosophy can answer the question, but by then anyone could)
You’re both arguing over your impressions of philosophy. I’m more inclined to agree with Lukeprog’s impression unless you have some way of showing that your impression is more accurate. Like, for example, show me three papers in meta-ethics from the last year that you think highlight what is representational of that area of philosophy.
From my reading of philosophy, the most well known philosophers (who I’d assume are representational of the top 10% of the field) do keep intuitions and conceptual analysis in their toolbox. But when they bring it out of the toolbox, they dress it up so that it’s not prima facie stupid (and then you get a fractal mess of philosophers publishing how the intuition is wrong where their intuition isn’t, or how they shouldn’t be using intuitions, or how intuitions are useful, and so on with no resolution). If I were to take a step back and look at what philosophy accomplishes, I think I’d have to say “confusion.”
You can say this is just the way things are in philosophy, but then why should we fund philosophy?
Because some of us realize that there are types of inquiry which are valuable and useful despite the confusion they offer to hyper-systemizing brains who can’t accept any view of reality outside a broken conception of radically reductive materialism.
I’m not even remotely autistic.
How is philosophy going to get us the correct conception of reality? How will we know it when it happens? (I think science will progress us to the point where philosophy can answer the question, but by then anyone could)