Agreed. However, it’s still the right view, as well as being the most useful one, since tabooing lets us figure out why people care about which ‘theory’ of ‘truth’ is.… (is what? true?). The real debate is over whether correspondence to the world is important in various discussions, not over whether everyone means the same thing (‘correspondence’) by a certain word (‘truth’).
Let “that which should be believed” be the defintiion of truth.
You can stipulate whatever you want, but “that which should be believed” simply isn’t a credible definition for that word. First, just about everyone thinks it’s possible, in certain circumstances, to ought to believe a falsehood. Second, propositional ‘belief’ itself is the conviction that something is true; we can’t understand belief until we first understand what truth is, or in what sense ‘truth’ is being used when we talk about believing something. Truth is a more basic concept than belief.
Agreed. However, it’s still the right view, as well as being the most useful one, since tabooing lets us figure out why people care about which ‘theory’ of ‘truth’ is.… (is what? true?). The real debate is over whether correspondence to the world is important in various discussions, not over whether everyone means the same thing (‘correspondence’) by a certain word (‘truth’).
You can stipulate whatever you want, but “that which should be believed” simply isn’t a credible definition for that word. First, just about everyone thinks it’s possible, in certain circumstances, to ought to believe a falsehood. Second, propositional ‘belief’ itself is the conviction that something is true; we can’t understand belief until we first understand what truth is, or in what sense ‘truth’ is being used when we talk about believing something. Truth is a more basic concept than belief.