the reason we find ourselves in a simple-looking world is that all possible experiences are consciously experienced, including the ones where the world looks simple, and we just happen to experience the latter. (2) If this is correct, then you cannot use the fact that you look around and see a simple-looking world to infer that you live in a simple-looking world, because there are plenty of complex interventionistic worlds that look deceptively simple. In fact, the prior probability that the particular world you see is actually simple is extremely low.
But most worlds aren’t “complex worlds appearing simple”, most worlds are just “complex worlds”, right? So the fact that we find ourselves in a simple world should still enormously surprise us. And any theory that causes us to “naturally” expect simple worlds would seem to have an enormous advantage.
But most worlds aren’t “complex worlds appearing simple”, most worlds are just “complex worlds”, right? So the fact that we find ourselves in a simple world should still enormously surprise us. And any theory that causes us to “naturally” expect simple worlds would seem to have an enormous advantage.