So, I can see that you would care similarly as you would in a multiverse with magical reality fluid that’s distributed in the same proportions as your measure of caring, and if your measure of caring is K-complexity with respect to a universal Turing machine (UTM) we would consider simple, it’s at least one plausible possibility that the true magical reality fluid that’s distributed in roughly those proportions. But given the state of our confusion, I think that conditional on there being a true measure, any single hypothesis as to how that measure is distributed should have significantly less than 50% probability, so “Conditional on there being a true measure, I would act the same way as according to my K-complexity based preferences” sounds wrong to me. (One particularly salient other possibility is that we could have magical reality fluid due to Tegmark I—infinite space—and Tegmark III—many-worlds—but not due to all mathematically possible universes existing, in which case we surely wouldn’t get weightings that are close to K-complexity with a simple UTM. I mean, this is a case of one single universe, but with all possible experiences existing, to different degrees.)
So, I can see that you would care similarly as you would in a multiverse with magical reality fluid that’s distributed in the same proportions as your measure of caring, and if your measure of caring is K-complexity with respect to a universal Turing machine (UTM) we would consider simple, it’s at least one plausible possibility that the true magical reality fluid that’s distributed in roughly those proportions. But given the state of our confusion, I think that conditional on there being a true measure, any single hypothesis as to how that measure is distributed should have significantly less than 50% probability, so “Conditional on there being a true measure, I would act the same way as according to my K-complexity based preferences” sounds wrong to me. (One particularly salient other possibility is that we could have magical reality fluid due to Tegmark I—infinite space—and Tegmark III—many-worlds—but not due to all mathematically possible universes existing, in which case we surely wouldn’t get weightings that are close to K-complexity with a simple UTM. I mean, this is a case of one single universe, but with all possible experiences existing, to different degrees.)
Conditional on there being a true measure, I would think it is reasonably likely that that measure is 100% at one possible universe.