and this violates the principle of individual self-determination -
To select 3^^^3 people to get dust specks in their eyes also violates the “principle” of individual self-determination. And if 3^^^3 people are possible, 3^^^^3 people are probably possible too, so the idea of fairness doesn’t apply—these people have all been picked out to have their individual self-determination violated.
In general you seem to be trying to wriggle out of the hypothetical as stated by bringing in extra stuff and then deciding based only on that extra stuff.
In general you seem to be trying to wriggle out of the hypothetical as stated by bringing in extra stuff and then deciding based only on that extra stuff.
And assuming that those who reach a different conclusion didn’t include the “extra stuff” in their analysis.
And if 3^^^3 people are possible, 3^^^^3 people are probably possible too,
No, that doesn’t follow at all. It’s ridiculous to even compare the two numbers that way. I would agree that 3^^^4 people might seem somewhat plausible in that case, and 3^^^4 is already larger than 3^^^3 by a factor incomprehensibly greater than 3^^^3. Even 3^^^4 is probably already far excessive for what you need for your argument.
To select 3^^^3 people to get dust specks in their eyes also violates the “principle” of individual self-determination.
True, but it does so significantly less-grossly. The impact on a person’s self-determination and ability to do so from a negligible dust-specking is effectively not-measurable, compared to the lasting results of being tortured, even assuming the individual survives; such torture has consequences beyond the immediate suffering and impedes that person’s ability to be who or what they wish to be even once the torture has ended.
In general you seem to be trying to wriggle out of the hypothetical as stated
Please explain. I wasn’t aware that the hypothetical as stated was anything other than “Would you prefer that one person be horribly tortured for fifty years without hope or rest, or that 3^^^3 people get dust specks in their eyes?”
by bringing in extra stuff and then deciding based only on that extra stuff.
If by “extra stuff” you mean “other consequences” and “based only on that extra stuff” you mean “determining which set of consequences would be less-optimal” then… you’re absolutely right in this part.
To select 3^^^3 people to get dust specks in their eyes also violates the “principle” of individual self-determination.
True, but it does so significantly less-grossly.
Would you say it does so… a factor of 3^^^3 less grossly?
by bringing in extra stuff and then deciding based only on that extra stuff.
If by “extra stuff” you mean “other consequences” and “based only on that extra stuff” you mean “determining which set of consequences would be less-optimal” then… you’re absolutely right in this part.
There’s a phrase: “all other things being equal.” You can always give your answer and then point out that it’s irrelevant to the real world, or ADBOC. But if you start making your own list of things you want the hypothetical to be about, you haven’t given an answer at all.
Would you say it does so… a factor of 3^^^3 less grossly?
Please rephrase. I understand every word and phrase you use, but the arrangement of them in context of this conversation is inscrutable.
There’s a phrase: “all other things being equal.”
Ceteris paribus, yes. I’m fully aware of the phrase, and its ordinary implications to a given dialogue. I’m not able to derive intelligible clues as to why you think bringing it up is relevant to the conversation. Do you believe that I have somehow violated this principle? If so, please explain why—because I disagree with that notion.
You can always give your answer and then point out that it’s irrelevant to the real world, or ADBOC. But if you start making your own list of things you want the hypothetical to be about, you haven’t given an answer at all.
Ahh… the question was framed in the context of how a consequentialistic utilitarian ought to answer it. In pointing out that first-order consequences are insufficient to properly calculate which is preferable I have not altered the question.
Is the nature of your objection to my position the simple fact that I refuse to only consider the immediate suffering of the proposition? If so, then simply put my argument is that you are creating an insufficiently narrow view of the question. I.e.; you are “making your own list of things you want the hypothetical to be about”—or, rather, not about.
Whatever that thing is, it certainly doesn’t properly address, as I argue, the hypothetical as given.
Tell me; on what grounds do you choose to exclude secondary consequences from the metric of deciding which of the two choices is preferable to a consequentialistic utilitarian? How, in addition, does this standard of excluding or including consequences from said calculus affect consequentialism?
Why are some consequences “fit” for consideration, whereas others are “unfit”?
Would you say it does so… a factor of 3^^^3 less grossly?
Please rephrase. I understand every word and phrase you use, but the arrangement of them in context of this conversation is inscrutable.
The upshot is that as soon as you allow things to be immoral (or violate rights, or whatever) to various degrees, not just black and white “immoral” and “not immoral,” you have exactly the same problem, so talking about torture being a violation of rights doesn’t bring anything new to the table unless you’re prepared to bite some pretty bitter bullets.
Is the nature of your objection to my position the simple fact that I refuse to only consider the immediate suffering of the proposition?
Yeah, pretty much. If it were logically impossible for ceteris to be paribus, there would be every reason to reject the hypothetical. But it’s not—those worlds are perfectly possible, you are merely asked to say which you like better. To bring in “secondary factors” (i.e. look at worlds where ceteris isn’t paribus) and then decide based on those factors alone isn’t a correction to the original question, it’s answering a completely different question.
The upshot is that as soon as you allow things to be immoral (or violate rights, or whatever) to various degrees, not just black and white “immoral” and “not immoral,” you have exactly the same problem,
Do I correctly understand you to believe that I was including the right of individual self-determination as an independent valuative norm, rather than for its utility? (Also, please note that I did not originally use the term “right” but rather “principle”.)
so talking about torture being a violation of rights doesn’t bring anything new to the table unless you’re prepared to bite some pretty bitter bullets.
Incorrect. I can only assume that you are thinking that I’m concerned, here, about the violation of rights in general, as opposed to individual self-determination in specific. My point was to demonstrate that the direct impact of torture vs. dustspecks goes beyond merely suffering.
Really, this only serves to illustrate my belief of the eroneous nature of associating “utilons” with “happiness”. We derive utility from things other than feeling pleasure; we experience disutility from things other than experiencing suffering. However, suffering when present in sufficient quantities in a single person can and does impact those other forms of disutility… such as the loss of capacity for self-determination.
Please note: self-determination as I am using it does NOT refer to getting to choose whether or not the event itself (speck vs. torture) happens to you. It refers to the ability, thereafter, to make competent decisions about your own life, or have the capacity to determine for yourself who you wish to be.
Is the nature of your objection to my position the simple fact that I refuse to only consider the immediate suffering of the proposition?
Yeah, pretty much. If it were logically impossible for ceteris to be paribus,
I see. You are under the misapprehension that I am not applying the principle of ceteris paribus to the argument. Rest assured that this is a misapprehension. I in fact am treating this as an “all other things being equal” scenario.
I simply have a more expansive view of the definition of “consequence” than “suffering alone”.
To bring in “secondary factors” (i.e. look at worlds where ceteris isn’t paribus) and then decide based on those factors alone isn’t a correction to the original question, it’s answering a completely different question.
I never even intimated that “only the secondary consequences should be considered”. Please discontinue the use of this strawman view of my argument.
Considering secondary consequences of a choice is not “looking at worlds where ceteris isn’t paribus”. I am quite frankly at a total loss as to understanding why you should be possessed of such a belief in the first place.
Where did I go wrong in getting you to understand that my argument is in alignment with the ceteris paribus principle?
Why do you continue to feel it appropriate do decide that only some consequences “actually count” as consequences?
Do I correctly understand you to believe that I was including the right of individual self-determination as an independent valuative norm, rather than for its utility? (Also, please note that I did not originally use the term “right” but rather “principle”.)
Just that you were applying it to torture while not applying it to dust specks—a qualitative difference.
I never even intimated that “only the secondary consequences should be considered”. Please discontinue the use of this strawman view of my argument.
You never said, it, and yet in your argument only the secondary factors mattered to your decision.
Considering secondary consequences of a choice is not “looking at worlds where ceteris isn’t paribus”. I am quite frankly at a total loss as to understanding why you should be possessed of such a belief in the first place.
If you don’t think you can judge how much you’d like two worlds to exist independent of there being someone in those worlds to make a “choice,” then you reject utilitarianism.
Where did I go wrong in getting you to understand that my argument is in alignment with the ceteris paribus principle?
My guess would be when your argument wasn’t in alignment with the ceteris paribus principle.
Why do you continue to feel it appropriate do decide that only some consequences “actually count” as consequences?
Because the consequences that “actually count” were the ones that make up the original problem. “Secondary consequences” that are not logically equivalent (this does not mean causally related) to the original consequences merely mean that you’re answering a different question than the one that was asked.
Just that you were applying [the principle of self-determination] to torture while not applying it to dust specks—a qualitative difference.
Not even remotely. I applied it to both; it simply does not alter the anti-utility of dust specks. Receiving a dust-speck in one’s eye does not alter in any measurable way the capacity for self-determination of an arbitrary individual.
You never said, it, and yet in your argument only the secondary factors mattered to your decision.
False. The secondary consequences when added to the primary caused torture, even in the linear-additive condition, to be the worse option. They overwhelmed the primary.
If you don’t think you can judge how much you’d like two worlds to exist independent of there being someone in those worlds to make a “choice,” then you reject utilitarianism.
… what? At what point, exactly, did this become a valid thing for you to say to me? The hypothetical asked us which scenario was worse. That is a choice to be made.
Furthermore, exactly how does the notion of required agency abrogate utilitarianism? That doesn’t even remotely compute. Of the many-fold forms of utilitarianism of which I am aware, not a single one has such a standard. The very notion of a moral system which might require that it be applicable without an agent is self-contradicting.
My guess would be when your argument wasn’t in alignment with the ceteris paribus principle.
Ahh. I must conclude that either you haven’t been reading a single thing I’ve written, or else you are delusional, or else you are writing to me somehow from a parallel world. Or you are simply lying. These are the only available options, as your statement is not in accordance with the reality I can observe in this comment thread.
Because the consequences that “actually count” were the ones that make up the original problem.
This is not even remotely interesting as an argument. The consequences of the original problem are those consequences the original problem’s choices would result in. Your failure to consider those consequences does not, under any rational circumstances, mean those consequences did not exist. It only means that you made an incomplete analysis.
And that, of course, was my original point: that the rejection of secondary consequences was a failure of analysis. They were there.
“Secondary consequences” that are not logically equivalent (this does not mean causally related) to the original consequences merely mean that you’re answering a different question than the one that was asked.
A consequence of an action or history is a consequence of that action or history. When selecting from a given action or history against another, as a consequentialistic utilitarian, one must weigh the consequences of a given action or history against one another. That is essentially a tautological statement.
Now—let’s try this again: what makes one category of consequences “real” consequences, and others “unimportant”, and why are you the arbiter of these things? Why are some forms of utility “countable” and others “ignorable”? Furthermore, on what grounds can you possibly justify making such an assertion and still call yourself a utilitarian?
Please, in responding, do note that the mere assertion that consequences are not logically equivalent to consequences will not fly. It is a non-argument. You’ll simply have to provide an actual argument if you expect me to begin to be convinced of your position. Thus far, it seems inherently paradoxical. You expect me to believe that A != A. My brain is not wired to accept such paradoxes.
I’ll start winding down my answers now. This looks like it may actually hit reverse returns.
Just that you were applying [the principle of self-determination] to torture while not applying it to dust specks—a qualitative difference.
Not even remotely. I applied it to both; it simply does not alter the anti-utility of dust specks. Receiving a dust-speck in one’s eye does not alter in any measurable way the capacity for self-determination of an arbitrary individual.
And yet not long ago you said this:
To select 3^^^3 people to get dust specks in their eyes also violates the “principle” of individual self-determination.
True, but it does so significantly less-grossly.
Also remember that the dust speck causes them to blink, measurably.
-
If you don’t think you can judge how much you’d like two worlds to exist independent of there being someone in those worlds to make a “choice,” then you reject utilitarianism.
… what? At what point, exactly, did this become a valid thing for you to say to me? The hypothetical asked us which scenario was worse. That is a choice to be made.
Utilitarianism means that the preference ranking of possible worlds is determined only by the properties of those worlds. The hypothetical is asking for that preference ranking. The fact that you have to choose is a not one of the properties of those worlds.
Also remember that the dust speck causes them to blink, measurably.
That has no bearing on the question of self-determination. The sum total of a finitely-large-but-humanly-incomprehensible infinitessimal suffering events in terms of their impact on self-determination is, arguably, non-negligible, but it certainly isn’t equivalent to the total, repeated, ruination of said function.
The fact that you have to choose is a not one of the properties of those worlds.
May or may not be a property of those worlds. The question is agnostic to how the worlds are implemented. This is not a trivial or irrelevant detail. In the absence of justification for removal of this property it must be considered.
Even if we do away with that consideration, however, on the balance the argument I’ve been making holds true.
To select 3^^^3 people to get dust specks in their eyes also violates the “principle” of individual self-determination. And if 3^^^3 people are possible, 3^^^^3 people are probably possible too, so the idea of fairness doesn’t apply—these people have all been picked out to have their individual self-determination violated.
In general you seem to be trying to wriggle out of the hypothetical as stated by bringing in extra stuff and then deciding based only on that extra stuff.
And assuming that those who reach a different conclusion didn’t include the “extra stuff” in their analysis.
No, that doesn’t follow at all. It’s ridiculous to even compare the two numbers that way. I would agree that 3^^^4 people might seem somewhat plausible in that case, and 3^^^4 is already larger than 3^^^3 by a factor incomprehensibly greater than 3^^^3. Even 3^^^4 is probably already far excessive for what you need for your argument.
True, but it does so significantly less-grossly. The impact on a person’s self-determination and ability to do so from a negligible dust-specking is effectively not-measurable, compared to the lasting results of being tortured, even assuming the individual survives; such torture has consequences beyond the immediate suffering and impedes that person’s ability to be who or what they wish to be even once the torture has ended.
Please explain. I wasn’t aware that the hypothetical as stated was anything other than “Would you prefer that one person be horribly tortured for fifty years without hope or rest, or that 3^^^3 people get dust specks in their eyes?”
If by “extra stuff” you mean “other consequences” and “based only on that extra stuff” you mean “determining which set of consequences would be less-optimal” then… you’re absolutely right in this part.
Would you say it does so… a factor of 3^^^3 less grossly?
There’s a phrase: “all other things being equal.” You can always give your answer and then point out that it’s irrelevant to the real world, or ADBOC. But if you start making your own list of things you want the hypothetical to be about, you haven’t given an answer at all.
Please rephrase. I understand every word and phrase you use, but the arrangement of them in context of this conversation is inscrutable.
Ceteris paribus, yes. I’m fully aware of the phrase, and its ordinary implications to a given dialogue. I’m not able to derive intelligible clues as to why you think bringing it up is relevant to the conversation. Do you believe that I have somehow violated this principle? If so, please explain why—because I disagree with that notion.
Ahh… the question was framed in the context of how a consequentialistic utilitarian ought to answer it. In pointing out that first-order consequences are insufficient to properly calculate which is preferable I have not altered the question.
Is the nature of your objection to my position the simple fact that I refuse to only consider the immediate suffering of the proposition? If so, then simply put my argument is that you are creating an insufficiently narrow view of the question. I.e.; you are “making your own list of things you want the hypothetical to be about”—or, rather, not about.
Whatever that thing is, it certainly doesn’t properly address, as I argue, the hypothetical as given.
Tell me; on what grounds do you choose to exclude secondary consequences from the metric of deciding which of the two choices is preferable to a consequentialistic utilitarian? How, in addition, does this standard of excluding or including consequences from said calculus affect consequentialism?
Why are some consequences “fit” for consideration, whereas others are “unfit”?
The upshot is that as soon as you allow things to be immoral (or violate rights, or whatever) to various degrees, not just black and white “immoral” and “not immoral,” you have exactly the same problem, so talking about torture being a violation of rights doesn’t bring anything new to the table unless you’re prepared to bite some pretty bitter bullets.
Yeah, pretty much. If it were logically impossible for ceteris to be paribus, there would be every reason to reject the hypothetical. But it’s not—those worlds are perfectly possible, you are merely asked to say which you like better. To bring in “secondary factors” (i.e. look at worlds where ceteris isn’t paribus) and then decide based on those factors alone isn’t a correction to the original question, it’s answering a completely different question.
Do I correctly understand you to believe that I was including the right of individual self-determination as an independent valuative norm, rather than for its utility? (Also, please note that I did not originally use the term “right” but rather “principle”.)
Incorrect. I can only assume that you are thinking that I’m concerned, here, about the violation of rights in general, as opposed to individual self-determination in specific. My point was to demonstrate that the direct impact of torture vs. dustspecks goes beyond merely suffering.
Really, this only serves to illustrate my belief of the eroneous nature of associating “utilons” with “happiness”. We derive utility from things other than feeling pleasure; we experience disutility from things other than experiencing suffering. However, suffering when present in sufficient quantities in a single person can and does impact those other forms of disutility… such as the loss of capacity for self-determination.
Please note: self-determination as I am using it does NOT refer to getting to choose whether or not the event itself (speck vs. torture) happens to you. It refers to the ability, thereafter, to make competent decisions about your own life, or have the capacity to determine for yourself who you wish to be.
I see. You are under the misapprehension that I am not applying the principle of ceteris paribus to the argument. Rest assured that this is a misapprehension. I in fact am treating this as an “all other things being equal” scenario.
I simply have a more expansive view of the definition of “consequence” than “suffering alone”.
I never even intimated that “only the secondary consequences should be considered”. Please discontinue the use of this strawman view of my argument.
Considering secondary consequences of a choice is not “looking at worlds where ceteris isn’t paribus”. I am quite frankly at a total loss as to understanding why you should be possessed of such a belief in the first place.
Where did I go wrong in getting you to understand that my argument is in alignment with the ceteris paribus principle?
Why do you continue to feel it appropriate do decide that only some consequences “actually count” as consequences?
Just that you were applying it to torture while not applying it to dust specks—a qualitative difference.
You never said, it, and yet in your argument only the secondary factors mattered to your decision.
If you don’t think you can judge how much you’d like two worlds to exist independent of there being someone in those worlds to make a “choice,” then you reject utilitarianism.
My guess would be when your argument wasn’t in alignment with the ceteris paribus principle.
Because the consequences that “actually count” were the ones that make up the original problem. “Secondary consequences” that are not logically equivalent (this does not mean causally related) to the original consequences merely mean that you’re answering a different question than the one that was asked.
Not even remotely. I applied it to both; it simply does not alter the anti-utility of dust specks. Receiving a dust-speck in one’s eye does not alter in any measurable way the capacity for self-determination of an arbitrary individual.
False. The secondary consequences when added to the primary caused torture, even in the linear-additive condition, to be the worse option. They overwhelmed the primary.
… what? At what point, exactly, did this become a valid thing for you to say to me? The hypothetical asked us which scenario was worse. That is a choice to be made.
Furthermore, exactly how does the notion of required agency abrogate utilitarianism? That doesn’t even remotely compute. Of the many-fold forms of utilitarianism of which I am aware, not a single one has such a standard. The very notion of a moral system which might require that it be applicable without an agent is self-contradicting.
Ahh. I must conclude that either you haven’t been reading a single thing I’ve written, or else you are delusional, or else you are writing to me somehow from a parallel world. Or you are simply lying. These are the only available options, as your statement is not in accordance with the reality I can observe in this comment thread.
This is not even remotely interesting as an argument. The consequences of the original problem are those consequences the original problem’s choices would result in. Your failure to consider those consequences does not, under any rational circumstances, mean those consequences did not exist. It only means that you made an incomplete analysis.
And that, of course, was my original point: that the rejection of secondary consequences was a failure of analysis. They were there.
A consequence of an action or history is a consequence of that action or history. When selecting from a given action or history against another, as a consequentialistic utilitarian, one must weigh the consequences of a given action or history against one another. That is essentially a tautological statement.
Now—let’s try this again: what makes one category of consequences “real” consequences, and others “unimportant”, and why are you the arbiter of these things? Why are some forms of utility “countable” and others “ignorable”? Furthermore, on what grounds can you possibly justify making such an assertion and still call yourself a utilitarian?
Please, in responding, do note that the mere assertion that consequences are not logically equivalent to consequences will not fly. It is a non-argument. You’ll simply have to provide an actual argument if you expect me to begin to be convinced of your position. Thus far, it seems inherently paradoxical. You expect me to believe that
A != A. My brain is not wired to accept such paradoxes.I’ll start winding down my answers now. This looks like it may actually hit reverse returns.
And yet not long ago you said this:
Also remember that the dust speck causes them to blink, measurably.
-
Utilitarianism means that the preference ranking of possible worlds is determined only by the properties of those worlds. The hypothetical is asking for that preference ranking. The fact that you have to choose is a not one of the properties of those worlds.
That has no bearing on the question of self-determination. The sum total of a finitely-large-but-humanly-incomprehensible infinitessimal suffering events in terms of their impact on self-determination is, arguably, non-negligible, but it certainly isn’t equivalent to the total, repeated, ruination of said function.
May or may not be a property of those worlds. The question is agnostic to how the worlds are implemented. This is not a trivial or irrelevant detail. In the absence of justification for removal of this property it must be considered.
Even if we do away with that consideration, however, on the balance the argument I’ve been making holds true.