In general, for almost no moral framework should one attempt to make the law match it.
Of course not. I was not especially aware that I had extended the discussion beyond the realm of the moral into the legal, however—so I can’t say I find anything relating to the comparison between the two to be especially relevant to the discussion at hand.
Can I or can I not take you to mean that increased incidence of torture, likely or assured, is always worth the benefit of torture being illegal according to the law and/or common perception? Usually worth it? Never worth it?
I am not, here, making any forays into the legal arena. I will say that I, agnostic to any other considerations, strongly prefers scenarios that result in less torture being committed as opposed to more.
Perhaps the biggest consideration is the nature of the causal relationship between one’s act and the decision to torture?
My argument, here, does rest on the need to consider secondary consequences when making a properly “consequentialist” argument for which choice to make, yes. I’m not entirely sure that actually answers the question you’re asking, however.
I am not, here, making any forays into the legal arena.
I see the following as an argument against legalizing or otherwise endorsing behavior, but not as an argument against an individual’s performing the behavior:
I cannot accept the culture/society that would permit such a torture to exist.
On the balance, how did the gatherer effect the social taboo against “work” on the Sabbath?
Numbers 15:32-36
King James Version (KJV)
And while the children of Israel were in the wilderness, they found a man that gathered sticks upon the sabbath day.
And they that found him gathering sticks brought him unto Moses and Aaron, and unto all the congregation.
And they put him in ward, because it was not declared what should be done to him.
And the LORD said unto Moses, The man shall be surely put to death: all the congregation shall stone him with stones without the camp.
And all the congregation brought him without the camp, and stoned him with stones, and he died; as the LORD commanded Moses.
He provided an excuse to reinforce the prohibition. Someone knowing the outcome of the story couldn’t have said his action made it less taboo, as it wasn’t previously established that it as a capital offense. All the more so for the 1,000,001st person to torture someone, after the million who preceded him, so long as the 1,000,001st is punished severely.
I see the following as an argument against legalizing or otherwise endorsing behavior, but not as an argument against an individual’s performing the behavior:
As a general trend if we accept one form of action as opposed to the other we are reducing the threshold towards its being repeated. This is akin to the Broken Window Theory: what was permitted once may be argued more permissible in the future due to said permission. Individual instances of a behavior then become arguments for or against it. For example, I believe that the US’s practice of condoning “enhanced interrogation techniques” was directly contributive to the events in Abu Ghraib.
What I mean to say is: as a practical argument, deciding between the two must consider the impact of the decision on the likelihood for the type of behavior to recur, amongst other things. The key is in that “or otherwise endorsing behavior”—graffiti in a neighborhood results in increased burglaries, litering, and other forms of crime. Increasing the instances of intentional/chosen torture increases the likelihood of acts of equivalent or lesser severity being committed.
On the balance, how did the gatherer effect the social taboo against “work” on the Sabbath? [...] All the more so for the 1,000,001st person to torture someone, after the million who preceded him, so long as the 1,000,001st is punished severely.
There is historical inertia to how individual actions accumulate to affect the actions society deems acceptable, yes. This is an element of my argument.
as a practical argument, deciding between the two must consider the impact of the decision on the likelihood for the type of behavior to recur, amongst other things.
Part of figuring out the impact of the decision on the likelihood for the type of behavior to recur is other peoples’ responses to it, amongst other things.
The act of painting graffiti doesn’t cause crime, certain responses to it do. Increasing the instances of graffiti only increases crime all else equal, but does not increase it irrespective of communal response.
In this post and several of its threads you seem to be violating the principle of least convenient possible world. One of your original criticisms of torture instead of specks was that it assumed very particular consequences of actions—that torturing wouldn’t ever affect future choices to torture. However, you illegitimately assume that it will always affect future choices to torture by making it more likely. It seems almost parallel.
If anything, appealing to future cases makes the argument for specking stronger. At a certain number of future cases, at a certain quantity of specks, more people would be tortured for 50 years if one always chose specks than if one always chose torture!
One of your original criticisms of torture instead of specks was that it assumed very particular consequences of actions—that torturing wouldn’t ever affect future choices to torture.
… My original criticism depended on the idea that torturing would affect future choices to torture. That continues to be my criticism. From where do you derive this idea that I assert it does not?
However, you illegitimately assume that it will always affect future choices to torture by making it more likely.
Please explain why you find this to be an “illegitimate assumption”. Especially in the face of the explanations I have thus far given as to why it would in fact occur.
At a certain number of future cases, at a certain quantity of specks, more people would be tortured for 50 years if one always chose specks than if one always chose torture!
I disagree. Strongly. Very strongly, in fact. For the same reason I’ve already made: by the time 3^^^3 people are tortured for fifty years as a result of dustspecks, for the equivalent number of choices to be made for torture instead would require—even if we assume that the torture scenario has only a quarter the total suffering of the 3^^^3 speckings—the sheer volume of such tortures would definitely invoke the Broken Window Theory. At a certain point human beings will—from sheer necessity for psychological stability—engage in the suspension of moral belief. “One person dying is a tragedy; a thousand is a statistic; a million is a number.” Such immunization to the suffering of others as would be resultant from the sheer volume of such suffering would result, unless some major alterations are made to human psychology, in the institutionalization of such suffering. As a result of that, then, there would be—again, all other things being equal—far more torture, rape, and sheer absence of compassion and aid resultant. We still have societies of this nature today.
If nothing else, the expansion from a single instance to multiple makes this principle far more overtly obvious—it allowed me to make what I personally feel an absurd declaration (that ‘terrific’ torture for fifty years is equivalent to 1/4th of 3^^^3 almost-unnoticeable near-instant nuisance events in terms of direct suffering—when as I said before I feel that dustspecking is infinitessimal in comparison to said torture.)
And that’s only considering the immediate suffering, as opposed to other consequences—such as the impact on the psychological well-being of those involved, their ability to contribute to society and the positive utility such individuals might then create, or the negative social utility of caring for those who have been exposed to such effects, etc., etc.. (For example; if we state that torture and dustspecks have exactly equal amounts of direct suffering, we should still obviously choose the specks. There is exactly zero social integration cost for recovery from a dust-speck—even 3^^^3 of them; the same is not true of the torture victim.
One of your original criticisms of the choice of torture instead of specks was that that choice assumed very particular consequences of actions—that torturing wouldn’t ever affect future choices to torture. However, you assume that it would always affect future choices to torture by making it more likely. Both of these assumptions are too extreme for the real world, though fine for hypotheticals in which other questions—such as aggregation of utility—are the subject.
Arguing that something would usually or often happen doesn’t undermine the original thought experiment in which that wasn’t one of the variables. In practice, I’m happy to say that for some small amount of pain and some number of people, inflicting more pain per person on fewer people is preferable, but those numbers depend on other consequences of the choice. If in practice every choice made to cause more pain to fewer people when it is not the first week of December, GMT, causes a plague somewhere, that affects the calculus. Sometimes it will be the first week of December, and in any case “some number of people” is not fixed and can be different depending on the week, etc.
if we state that torture and dustspecks have exactly equal amounts of direct suffering, we should still obviously choose the specks.
If inflicting x pain on Q people for t1 time directly causes the same amount of suffering as inflicting y pain on R people for t2 time, and inflicting x pain on Q people for t1 time indirectly causes more suffering than inflicting y pain on R people for t2 time, we prefer the first option. That doesn’t undermine any utilitarianism or make one question the coherence of aggregating suffering.
At a certain point human beings will—from sheer necessity for psychological stability—engage in the suspension of moral belief. “One person dying is a tragedy; a thousand is a statistic; a million is a number.”
Teenage Mugger: [Dundee and Sue are approached by a black youth stepping out from the shadows, followed by some others] You got a light, buddy? Michael J. “Crocodile” Dundee: Yeah, sure kid. [reaches for lighter] Teenage Mugger: [flicks open a switchmillion] And your wallet! Sue Charlton: [guardedly] Mick, give him your wallet. Michael J. “Crocodile” Dundee: [amused] What for? Sue Charlton: [cautiously] He’s got a large number. Michael J. “Crocodile” Dundee: [chuckles] That’s not a large number. [he pulls out a large Bowie 3^^^^3] Michael J. “Crocodile” Dundee: THAT’s a large number. [Dundee slashes the teen mugger’s jacket and maintains eyeball to eyeball stare] Teenage Mugger: Shit!
One of your original criticisms of the choice of torture instead of specks was that that choice assumed very particular consequences of actions—that torturing wouldn’t ever affect future choices to torture.
This is the exact opposite of a true statement about my original criticisms.
However, you assume that it would always affect future choices to torture by making it more likely.
Ceteris paribus, yes. All other things being equal, consciously selecting torture and then carrying it out will, in fact, make future tortures more likely. Under the assertions of the empirical research associated with the Broken Window Theory, this is not merely an assumption, it’s a fact. (In other words, my assumption is that the experiments on the topic allow for valid predictions in this question.)
Arguing that something would usually or often happen doesn’t undermine the original thought experiment in which that wasn’t one of the variables.
I’m sorry, consequentialism doesn’t work that way. Consequences of a choice are consequences of a choice. This is a tautology. When comparing the utilitarian consequences of a given choice, all utility-affecting consequences must be considered.
Furthermore, I do not understand why you would phrase this in terms of “undermining the original thought experiment”. Certainly, I’m undermining Eliezer’s conclusion of the experiment—and those who agree with him. But that’s hardly equivalent to undermining the experiment itself.
I’m arguing you are wrong to choose “torture”. Not that the experiment is invalid.
If inflicting x pain on Q people for t1 time directly causes the same amount of suffering as inflicting y pain on R people for t2 time, and inflicting x pain on Q people for t1 time indirectly causes more suffering than inflicting y pain on R people for t2 time, we prefer the first option.
Say the value of direct disutility is d(X). We here stipulate that d(torture) and d(speck) are equal. Say that the indirect disutility is i(X). We here stipulate that i(torture) > i(speck). We have also stipulated that we are using identical units for disutility. d(torture)+i(torture) > d(speck)+i(speck), yet we prefer torture? I am going to choose to believe that by “prefer” you mean to say that you prefer to say that torture is the worse outcome. I believe your skills as a rationalist exceed the possibility of you intentionally saying the opposite.
That doesn’t undermine any utilitarianism or make one question the coherence of aggregating suffering.
I never even remotely suggested either of these things were notions worthy of consideration. Why bring them up?
-- “Crocodile” Dundee, alternate universe
I’m not quite sure what you were saying here, but I know it was funny as hell. :-)
Of course not. I was not especially aware that I had extended the discussion beyond the realm of the moral into the legal, however—so I can’t say I find anything relating to the comparison between the two to be especially relevant to the discussion at hand.
I am not, here, making any forays into the legal arena. I will say that I, agnostic to any other considerations, strongly prefers scenarios that result in less torture being committed as opposed to more.
My argument, here, does rest on the need to consider secondary consequences when making a properly “consequentialist” argument for which choice to make, yes. I’m not entirely sure that actually answers the question you’re asking, however.
I see the following as an argument against legalizing or otherwise endorsing behavior, but not as an argument against an individual’s performing the behavior:
On the balance, how did the gatherer effect the social taboo against “work” on the Sabbath?
He provided an excuse to reinforce the prohibition. Someone knowing the outcome of the story couldn’t have said his action made it less taboo, as it wasn’t previously established that it as a capital offense. All the more so for the 1,000,001st person to torture someone, after the million who preceded him, so long as the 1,000,001st is punished severely.
As a general trend if we accept one form of action as opposed to the other we are reducing the threshold towards its being repeated. This is akin to the Broken Window Theory: what was permitted once may be argued more permissible in the future due to said permission. Individual instances of a behavior then become arguments for or against it. For example, I believe that the US’s practice of condoning “enhanced interrogation techniques” was directly contributive to the events in Abu Ghraib.
What I mean to say is: as a practical argument, deciding between the two must consider the impact of the decision on the likelihood for the type of behavior to recur, amongst other things. The key is in that “or otherwise endorsing behavior”—graffiti in a neighborhood results in increased burglaries, litering, and other forms of crime. Increasing the instances of intentional/chosen torture increases the likelihood of acts of equivalent or lesser severity being committed.
There is historical inertia to how individual actions accumulate to affect the actions society deems acceptable, yes. This is an element of my argument.
Part of figuring out the impact of the decision on the likelihood for the type of behavior to recur is other peoples’ responses to it, amongst other things.
The act of painting graffiti doesn’t cause crime, certain responses to it do. Increasing the instances of graffiti only increases crime all else equal, but does not increase it irrespective of communal response.
In this post and several of its threads you seem to be violating the principle of least convenient possible world. One of your original criticisms of torture instead of specks was that it assumed very particular consequences of actions—that torturing wouldn’t ever affect future choices to torture. However, you illegitimately assume that it will always affect future choices to torture by making it more likely. It seems almost parallel.
If anything, appealing to future cases makes the argument for specking stronger. At a certain number of future cases, at a certain quantity of specks, more people would be tortured for 50 years if one always chose specks than if one always chose torture!
… My original criticism depended on the idea that torturing would affect future choices to torture. That continues to be my criticism. From where do you derive this idea that I assert it does not?
Please explain why you find this to be an “illegitimate assumption”. Especially in the face of the explanations I have thus far given as to why it would in fact occur.
I disagree. Strongly. Very strongly, in fact. For the same reason I’ve already made: by the time 3^^^3 people are tortured for fifty years as a result of dustspecks, for the equivalent number of choices to be made for torture instead would require—even if we assume that the torture scenario has only a quarter the total suffering of the 3^^^3 speckings—the sheer volume of such tortures would definitely invoke the Broken Window Theory. At a certain point human beings will—from sheer necessity for psychological stability—engage in the suspension of moral belief. “One person dying is a tragedy; a thousand is a statistic; a million is a number.” Such immunization to the suffering of others as would be resultant from the sheer volume of such suffering would result, unless some major alterations are made to human psychology, in the institutionalization of such suffering. As a result of that, then, there would be—again, all other things being equal—far more torture, rape, and sheer absence of compassion and aid resultant. We still have societies of this nature today.
If nothing else, the expansion from a single instance to multiple makes this principle far more overtly obvious—it allowed me to make what I personally feel an absurd declaration (that ‘terrific’ torture for fifty years is equivalent to 1/4th of 3^^^3 almost-unnoticeable near-instant nuisance events in terms of direct suffering—when as I said before I feel that dustspecking is infinitessimal in comparison to said torture.)
And that’s only considering the immediate suffering, as opposed to other consequences—such as the impact on the psychological well-being of those involved, their ability to contribute to society and the positive utility such individuals might then create, or the negative social utility of caring for those who have been exposed to such effects, etc., etc.. (For example; if we state that torture and dustspecks have exactly equal amounts of direct suffering, we should still obviously choose the specks. There is exactly zero social integration cost for recovery from a dust-speck—even 3^^^3 of them; the same is not true of the torture victim.
One of your original criticisms of the choice of torture instead of specks was that that choice assumed very particular consequences of actions—that torturing wouldn’t ever affect future choices to torture. However, you assume that it would always affect future choices to torture by making it more likely. Both of these assumptions are too extreme for the real world, though fine for hypotheticals in which other questions—such as aggregation of utility—are the subject.
Arguing that something would usually or often happen doesn’t undermine the original thought experiment in which that wasn’t one of the variables. In practice, I’m happy to say that for some small amount of pain and some number of people, inflicting more pain per person on fewer people is preferable, but those numbers depend on other consequences of the choice. If in practice every choice made to cause more pain to fewer people when it is not the first week of December, GMT, causes a plague somewhere, that affects the calculus. Sometimes it will be the first week of December, and in any case “some number of people” is not fixed and can be different depending on the week, etc.
If inflicting x pain on Q people for t1 time directly causes the same amount of suffering as inflicting y pain on R people for t2 time, and inflicting x pain on Q people for t1 time indirectly causes more suffering than inflicting y pain on R people for t2 time, we prefer the first option. That doesn’t undermine any utilitarianism or make one question the coherence of aggregating suffering.
Teenage Mugger: [Dundee and Sue are approached by a black youth stepping out from the shadows, followed by some others] You got a light, buddy?
Michael J. “Crocodile” Dundee: Yeah, sure kid.
[reaches for lighter]
Teenage Mugger: [flicks open a switchmillion] And your wallet!
Sue Charlton: [guardedly] Mick, give him your wallet.
Michael J. “Crocodile” Dundee: [amused] What for?
Sue Charlton: [cautiously] He’s got a large number.
Michael J. “Crocodile” Dundee: [chuckles] That’s not a large number.
[he pulls out a large Bowie 3^^^^3]
Michael J. “Crocodile” Dundee: THAT’s a large number.
[Dundee slashes the teen mugger’s jacket and maintains eyeball to eyeball stare]
Teenage Mugger: Shit!
--”Crocodile” Dundee, alternate universe
This is the exact opposite of a true statement about my original criticisms.
Ceteris paribus, yes. All other things being equal, consciously selecting torture and then carrying it out will, in fact, make future tortures more likely. Under the assertions of the empirical research associated with the Broken Window Theory, this is not merely an assumption, it’s a fact. (In other words, my assumption is that the experiments on the topic allow for valid predictions in this question.)
I’m sorry, consequentialism doesn’t work that way. Consequences of a choice are consequences of a choice. This is a tautology. When comparing the utilitarian consequences of a given choice, all utility-affecting consequences must be considered.
Furthermore, I do not understand why you would phrase this in terms of “undermining the original thought experiment”. Certainly, I’m undermining Eliezer’s conclusion of the experiment—and those who agree with him. But that’s hardly equivalent to undermining the experiment itself.
I’m arguing you are wrong to choose “torture”. Not that the experiment is invalid.
Say the value of direct disutility is d(X). We here stipulate that d(torture) and d(speck) are equal. Say that the indirect disutility is i(X). We here stipulate that i(torture) > i(speck). We have also stipulated that we are using identical units for disutility. d(torture)+i(torture) > d(speck)+i(speck), yet we prefer torture? I am going to choose to believe that by “prefer” you mean to say that you prefer to say that torture is the worse outcome. I believe your skills as a rationalist exceed the possibility of you intentionally saying the opposite.
I never even remotely suggested either of these things were notions worthy of consideration. Why bring them up?
I’m not quite sure what you were saying here, but I know it was funny as hell. :-)