Imagine Evil Omega forces you to choose between torture and dust-specks (by threatening to end humanity or something else totally unacceptable).
That doesn’t modify, I believe, the argument/response as I have placed it. I was already stipulating that the choice was binary between the two options. (That is, I was already stipulating that the choice had to be made, and could not be avoided.) The point I was making was that the mere comparison of suffering is insufficient grounds to declare which outcome is preferable; there are other consequences that, I believe, ought to be included in the consequentialistic-utilitarian “weighting algorithm”. Questions such as: “What kind of society would result from this choice?”
Adding the issue of choice (i.e. moral responsibility) for the outcome seems to be fighting the hypo.
Perhaps I didn’t explain my meaning sufficiently? What I meant by “moral responsibility” in this case was that in comparing the two options, the “weighting” of the moral responsibility between the two choices needs to be included. (I’m curious; did you actually read the short story? Perhaps we merely took different things away from it. That is a problem of allegory.)
This “weighting of the moral responsibility” thing seems like double counting to me. It isn’t something that would make a linear-additive change her mind. And a logarithmic-additive like me doesn’t need additional reasoning not to torture.
Perhaps we merely took different things away from [the story]
From the Wikipedia summary, it looks a bit like the criticism of act utilitarianism embedded in the sheriff faced with a riotous mob, but that’s a different question. Picking a different moral theory doesn’t get you out of the torture v. dust speck issue, but it basically decides whether you stay or leave Omelas.
This “weighting of the moral responsibility” thing seems like double counting to me.
Not at all. It’s acknowledging that the consequences of a given decision extend beyond the immediate result of the decision to the historical inertia of having accepted said decision and how that transforms any society that results from said decision being made.
Example: We disallow the starving to steal bread not because we believe that the starving should starve—nor even that the bread-sellers “deserve” the bread ‘more’ than the starving. We disallow it because of the impact that allowing it would have on our society. My argument rests entirely on the fact that we must acknowledge, in making the selection between the two, not just the immediate results of our decisions, but the ways in which our decisions will alter what is considered “morally responsible” thereafter.
It isn’t something that would make a linear-additive change her mind.
If and only if we exclusively consider the immediate results, certainly. But my entire argument rests on the notion that solely considering the immediate results is insufficient to properly considering the consequences of the decision.
Picking a different moral theory doesn’t get you out of the torture v. dust speck issue,
I am confused. Why do you believe the notion of “getting out of the issue” relevant to this discussion? I explicitly stated that it was stipulated as incontrovertible that the issue was unavoidable.
From the Wikipedia summary, it looks a bit like the criticism of act utilitarianism embedded in the sheriff faced with a riotous mob, but that’s a different question.
I see. We did, in fact, take away different things from the story. I was referring to the story’s depiction of the suffering of widespread individuals from the knowledge that their happiness—or “lack of suffering”—existed at the expense of another person. I.e.; I was attempting to note that there were secondary consequences that bore consideration. I was not making inferences about act/rule utilitarianism, or criticisms therein.
It’s acknowledging that the consequences of a given decision extend beyond the immediate result of the decision to the historical inertia of having accepted said decision and how that transforms any society that results from said decision being made.
You think the torture-choosers aren’t including this already? Because I assumed they were, and it didn’t change their result.
Why do you believe the notion of “getting out of the issue” relevant to this discussion?
I was only trying to explain why I don’t think the story of Omelas is relevant.
You think the torture-choosers aren’t including [consequences above and beyond direct suffering] already? Because I assumed they were, and it didn’t change their result.
I so far haven’t seen evidence that you are, either. All discussion I have seen previously on the topic discussed how the torture compared to the dust-specks directly, and at that solely in terms of which was the greater total suffering amount.
Why do you believe the notion of “getting out of the issue” relevant to this discussion?
I was only trying to explain why I don’t think the story of Omelas is relevant.
I see. As I said; we have taken different things away from the story, because I did not take its reference as bearing on the topic of “getting out of the issue” at all.
I so far haven’t seen evidence that you are, either.
As you said, ideas have momentum. I’m not sure if it’s an expression of human cognitive bias or human moral plasticity. But it is the case that talking about whether to torture a person makes torturing someone more likely. Because evil is especially intractable when it is banal.
But those are reasons not to have the conversation. At all. If that’s what you believe, you shouldn’t have resurrected the topic because it involves a secret man is “not ready to know.”
None of this is a reason to decide that suffering does not add linearly. And that’s the only interesting question in the hypo. Because everyone already agrees that choosing either would be immoral if there were no forced choice. And everything you say about choosing to torture is just as true about choosing to dust-speck, except that it is totally impossible for us to dust-speck, given our current capacities.
In short, you seem to want to avoid the question of linear-suffering entirely. That’s why the criticism of “getting out of the issue” could have any bite at all.
But it is the case that talking about whether to torture a person makes torturing someone more likely.
Citation, please? I have seen evidence that this is true of actual instances of torture. I have also seen evidence that this is true of cases where a person has written “I will torture”. I have never seen evidence to support the idea that discussing the notion of torture causes rise in the rates of torture-incidences. (I am giving the benefit of the doubt and assuming you do not mean this in the ‘magical thinking’ sense.)
None of this is a reason to decide that suffering does not add linearly. And that’s the only interesting question in the hypo.
None of that is relevant to the question of linear vs. logarithmic quantification of suffering, yet they are all questions raised by the hypothesis—a direct falsification of your claim of that contrast being the “only interesting question” in the hypothesis.
. And everything you say about choosing to torture is just as true about choosing to dust-speck,
How do you figure? I am unable to conceive of a way for this statement to be valid. Enlighten me.
In short, you seem to want to avoid the question of linear-suffering entirely.
What? I seem to want nothing of the sort. I even allowed for the stipulation of linear-additive suffering as a means of demonstrating that it was uninteresting to the topic at hand; the argument by myself that the refusal to acknowledge the non-immediate consequences of either option was grounds for invalidating the answers thus far given.
That’s why the criticism of “getting out of the issue” could have any bite at all.
Please stop using that phrase. It’s putting words into my mouth and they just are NOT applicable to me or my argument whatsoever. It is patently dishonest of you to keep doing that.
Any solution to the question which ignores these elements . . . are of no value in making practical decisions—they cannot be, as ‘consequence’ extends beyond the mere instantiation of a given choice—the exact pain inflicted by either scenario—into the kind of society that such a choice would result in.
As a general trend if we accept one form of action as opposed to the other we are reducing the threshold towards its being repeated. This is akin to the Broken Window Theory: what was permitted once may be argued more permissible in the future due to said permission.
See, e.g., the conventional wisdom that the show 24 made implementation of torture more politically feasible.
Look, people keep telling you that you are trying to fight the hypo. You admit the essential elements of this charge. That’s fine with me. Some hypothetical questions are not worth engaging.
You quote me, yes. I recal writing that. How in the world do you extrapolate from those words to a citation of the idea that merely discussing torture makes it more likely? You’ll have to walk me through it slowly; the logic by which such a conclusion is reached escapes me entirely.
, the conventional wisdom that the show 24 made implementation of torture more politically feasible.
Humans react to depictions of actual torture in a manner similar to the thing itself being real. Furthermore, the show was itself a positive argument for torture. So it’s no surprise then that it would have that effect; positive arguments—if accepted, and mere popularity is a form of acceptance—do tend to cause the things they argue for to be treated as valid.
That’s not even remotely similar to what we’re doing here.
You admit the essential elements of this charge.
Look; I already once asked you to stop with the dishonest conversational tactics. What, exactly, made you believe that going on from there to link to a comment by me and claim that I said things in it that I absolutely did not say would be acceptable?
Why do you feel it necessary to do this? What is your purpose?
Look, people keep telling you that you are trying to fight the hypo.
Yes, and in doing so all of you thus far are in fact doing exactly that to me. You reject, universally, the notion that secondary consequences are still consequences and then claim that by pointing this out I am the one who is ’fighting the hypothesis.
This is simply untrue. I have come to a conclusion that is not accepted here. I have justified and argued for that position extensively. No one has offered, as yet, anything resembling or approaching the resemblance of a valid reason why all consequences should not be considered as consequences. I have requested that this be done repeatedly—all such requests have gone unanswered.
I am, based on this, sufficiently justified in asserting that I am the one who is correct and all those with that reaction are the ones in error—that’s how evidence works, after all.
You reject, universally, the notion that secondary consequences are still consequences and then claim that by pointing this out I am the one who is ’fighting the hypothesis.
I reject that the consequences you listed are secondary consequences. They are direct consequences of torture.
That doesn’t modify, I believe, the argument/response as I have placed it. I was already stipulating that the choice was binary between the two options. (That is, I was already stipulating that the choice had to be made, and could not be avoided.) The point I was making was that the mere comparison of suffering is insufficient grounds to declare which outcome is preferable; there are other consequences that, I believe, ought to be included in the consequentialistic-utilitarian “weighting algorithm”. Questions such as: “What kind of society would result from this choice?”
Perhaps I didn’t explain my meaning sufficiently? What I meant by “moral responsibility” in this case was that in comparing the two options, the “weighting” of the moral responsibility between the two choices needs to be included. (I’m curious; did you actually read the short story? Perhaps we merely took different things away from it. That is a problem of allegory.)
This “weighting of the moral responsibility” thing seems like double counting to me. It isn’t something that would make a linear-additive change her mind. And a logarithmic-additive like me doesn’t need additional reasoning not to torture.
From the Wikipedia summary, it looks a bit like the criticism of act utilitarianism embedded in the sheriff faced with a riotous mob, but that’s a different question. Picking a different moral theory doesn’t get you out of the torture v. dust speck issue, but it basically decides whether you stay or leave Omelas.
Not at all. It’s acknowledging that the consequences of a given decision extend beyond the immediate result of the decision to the historical inertia of having accepted said decision and how that transforms any society that results from said decision being made.
Example: We disallow the starving to steal bread not because we believe that the starving should starve—nor even that the bread-sellers “deserve” the bread ‘more’ than the starving. We disallow it because of the impact that allowing it would have on our society. My argument rests entirely on the fact that we must acknowledge, in making the selection between the two, not just the immediate results of our decisions, but the ways in which our decisions will alter what is considered “morally responsible” thereafter.
If and only if we exclusively consider the immediate results, certainly. But my entire argument rests on the notion that solely considering the immediate results is insufficient to properly considering the consequences of the decision.
I am confused. Why do you believe the notion of “getting out of the issue” relevant to this discussion? I explicitly stated that it was stipulated as incontrovertible that the issue was unavoidable.
I see. We did, in fact, take away different things from the story. I was referring to the story’s depiction of the suffering of widespread individuals from the knowledge that their happiness—or “lack of suffering”—existed at the expense of another person. I.e.; I was attempting to note that there were secondary consequences that bore consideration. I was not making inferences about act/rule utilitarianism, or criticisms therein.
You think the torture-choosers aren’t including this already? Because I assumed they were, and it didn’t change their result.
I was only trying to explain why I don’t think the story of Omelas is relevant.
I so far haven’t seen evidence that you are, either. All discussion I have seen previously on the topic discussed how the torture compared to the dust-specks directly, and at that solely in terms of which was the greater total suffering amount.
I see. As I said; we have taken different things away from the story, because I did not take its reference as bearing on the topic of “getting out of the issue” at all.
As you said, ideas have momentum. I’m not sure if it’s an expression of human cognitive bias or human moral plasticity. But it is the case that talking about whether to torture a person makes torturing someone more likely. Because evil is especially intractable when it is banal.
But those are reasons not to have the conversation. At all. If that’s what you believe, you shouldn’t have resurrected the topic because it involves a secret man is “not ready to know.”
None of this is a reason to decide that suffering does not add linearly. And that’s the only interesting question in the hypo. Because everyone already agrees that choosing either would be immoral if there were no forced choice. And everything you say about choosing to torture is just as true about choosing to dust-speck, except that it is totally impossible for us to dust-speck, given our current capacities.
In short, you seem to want to avoid the question of linear-suffering entirely. That’s why the criticism of “getting out of the issue” could have any bite at all.
Citation, please? I have seen evidence that this is true of actual instances of torture. I have also seen evidence that this is true of cases where a person has written “I will torture”. I have never seen evidence to support the idea that discussing the notion of torture causes rise in the rates of torture-incidences. (I am giving the benefit of the doubt and assuming you do not mean this in the ‘magical thinking’ sense.)
None of that is relevant to the question of linear vs. logarithmic quantification of suffering, yet they are all questions raised by the hypothesis—a direct falsification of your claim of that contrast being the “only interesting question” in the hypothesis.
How do you figure? I am unable to conceive of a way for this statement to be valid. Enlighten me.
What? I seem to want nothing of the sort. I even allowed for the stipulation of linear-additive suffering as a means of demonstrating that it was uninteresting to the topic at hand; the argument by myself that the refusal to acknowledge the non-immediate consequences of either option was grounds for invalidating the answers thus far given.
Please stop using that phrase. It’s putting words into my mouth and they just are NOT applicable to me or my argument whatsoever. It is patently dishonest of you to keep doing that.
Just stop.
Cites
See, e.g., the conventional wisdom that the show 24 made implementation of torture more politically feasible.
Look, people keep telling you that you are trying to fight the hypo. You admit the essential elements of this charge. That’s fine with me. Some hypothetical questions are not worth engaging.
You quote me, yes. I recal writing that. How in the world do you extrapolate from those words to a citation of the idea that merely discussing torture makes it more likely? You’ll have to walk me through it slowly; the logic by which such a conclusion is reached escapes me entirely.
Humans react to depictions of actual torture in a manner similar to the thing itself being real. Furthermore, the show was itself a positive argument for torture. So it’s no surprise then that it would have that effect; positive arguments—if accepted, and mere popularity is a form of acceptance—do tend to cause the things they argue for to be treated as valid.
That’s not even remotely similar to what we’re doing here.
Look; I already once asked you to stop with the dishonest conversational tactics. What, exactly, made you believe that going on from there to link to a comment by me and claim that I said things in it that I absolutely did not say would be acceptable?
Why do you feel it necessary to do this? What is your purpose?
Yes, and in doing so all of you thus far are in fact doing exactly that to me. You reject, universally, the notion that secondary consequences are still consequences and then claim that by pointing this out I am the one who is ’fighting the hypothesis.
This is simply untrue. I have come to a conclusion that is not accepted here. I have justified and argued for that position extensively. No one has offered, as yet, anything resembling or approaching the resemblance of a valid reason why all consequences should not be considered as consequences. I have requested that this be done repeatedly—all such requests have gone unanswered.
I am, based on this, sufficiently justified in asserting that I am the one who is correct and all those with that reaction are the ones in error—that’s how evidence works, after all.
I reject that the consequences you listed are secondary consequences. They are direct consequences of torture.