“I think a good path for nuclear modernization would be to generally reduce nuclear weapon yields while increasing precision”
I am unsure about this. I have the feeling that this is in part the trend going on right now, and that geopolitics experts are very worried, because it gives a path to gradual escalation and makes nuclear war more likely. When nuclear bombs were large and inaccurate, they were kept only as last option of deterrence: it was clear that any use would be followed by a devastating counter-strike with ~100% probability. In contrast, when a military has smaller, well-targeted tactical nukes, there is a temptation to use them for a limited strike, maybe to military installations, thinking that at worst the other country will do the same (that’s what the “tactical” word means in this context after all). But the country on the receiving may very well react with an all-out nuclear counter-strike, especially if their capabilities for a tactical strike are limited or absent (or crippled by the first country’s attack).
This is very much a real-world worry, btw. Only an year of two ago the risk of this scenario was discussed for an India-Pakistan war, after Pakistan increased its tactical nuke capabilities if I remember correctly. In fact, given the stated policies of the two countries and their respective capabilities, it is what would likely happen if no-one is bluffing. (In detail: India overwhelms Pakistani conventional forces and attempts a quick, deep invasion of Pakistan to disable nuclear installations and/or force surrender → Pakistan destroys the invading force or cripples the logistic chain with tactical nukes → India uses its own nukes, not ruling out targeting major cities.)
Of course the complete elimination of larger “strategic” arsenals, like you propose, would ease this worry somewhat. However, in a world where military technology levels are not equal everywhere, it may be impossible to convince the less-advanced military to give up what they think as their only deterrence.
I generally agree with this thought train of concern. That said, if the end state equilibrium is large states have counterforce arsenals and only small states have multi-megaton weapons, then I think that equilibrium is safer in terms of expected death because the odds of nuclear winter are so much lower.
There will be risk adaptation either way. The risk of nuclear war may go up contingent on their being a war, but the risk of war may go down because there are lower odds of being able to keep war purely conventional. I think that makes assessing the net risk pretty hard, but I doubt you’d argue for turning every nuke into a civilization ender to improve everyone’s incentives: at some point it just isn’t credible that you will use the weapons and this reduces their detergent effect. There is an equilibrium that minimizes total risk across sources of escalation, accidents, etc. and I’m trying to spark convo toward figuring out what that equilibrium is. I think as tech changes, the best equilibrium is likely to change, and it is unlikely to be the same arms control as decades ago, but I may be wrong about the best direction of change.
“I think a good path for nuclear modernization would be to generally reduce nuclear weapon yields while increasing precision”
I am unsure about this. I have the feeling that this is in part the trend going on right now, and that geopolitics experts are very worried, because it gives a path to gradual escalation and makes nuclear war more likely. When nuclear bombs were large and inaccurate, they were kept only as last option of deterrence: it was clear that any use would be followed by a devastating counter-strike with ~100% probability. In contrast, when a military has smaller, well-targeted tactical nukes, there is a temptation to use them for a limited strike, maybe to military installations, thinking that at worst the other country will do the same (that’s what the “tactical” word means in this context after all). But the country on the receiving may very well react with an all-out nuclear counter-strike, especially if their capabilities for a tactical strike are limited or absent (or crippled by the first country’s attack).
This is very much a real-world worry, btw. Only an year of two ago the risk of this scenario was discussed for an India-Pakistan war, after Pakistan increased its tactical nuke capabilities if I remember correctly. In fact, given the stated policies of the two countries and their respective capabilities, it is what would likely happen if no-one is bluffing. (In detail: India overwhelms Pakistani conventional forces and attempts a quick, deep invasion of Pakistan to disable nuclear installations and/or force surrender → Pakistan destroys the invading force or cripples the logistic chain with tactical nukes → India uses its own nukes, not ruling out targeting major cities.)
Of course the complete elimination of larger “strategic” arsenals, like you propose, would ease this worry somewhat. However, in a world where military technology levels are not equal everywhere, it may be impossible to convince the less-advanced military to give up what they think as their only deterrence.
I generally agree with this thought train of concern. That said, if the end state equilibrium is large states have counterforce arsenals and only small states have multi-megaton weapons, then I think that equilibrium is safer in terms of expected death because the odds of nuclear winter are so much lower.
There will be risk adaptation either way. The risk of nuclear war may go up contingent on their being a war, but the risk of war may go down because there are lower odds of being able to keep war purely conventional. I think that makes assessing the net risk pretty hard, but I doubt you’d argue for turning every nuke into a civilization ender to improve everyone’s incentives: at some point it just isn’t credible that you will use the weapons and this reduces their detergent effect. There is an equilibrium that minimizes total risk across sources of escalation, accidents, etc. and I’m trying to spark convo toward figuring out what that equilibrium is. I think as tech changes, the best equilibrium is likely to change, and it is unlikely to be the same arms control as decades ago, but I may be wrong about the best direction of change.