Intuition and induction are in my view very similar to what is understood as faith.
I don’t see how this works. Induction is, basically, the principle of inferring the future from the past (or the past from the present), which basically requires the universe to consistently obey the same laws. The problem with this, of course, is that the only evidence we have that the future will be like the past is the fact that it always has been, so there’s a necessary circularity. You can’t provide evidence for induction without assuming induction is correct; indeed, the very concept of “evidence” assumes induction is correct.
Intuition, on the other hand, is entirely susceptible to being analyzed on its merits. If our intuition tends to be right, we are justified in relying on it, even if we don’t understand precisely how it works. If it isn’t typically right for certain things, or if it contradicts other, better evidence, we’re wrong to rely on it, even though believing contrary to our intuition can be difficult.
I don’t see how either of these concepts can be equated with a conventional use of “faith.”
Edited in response to EY’s comment below: I’m not meaning to compare faith in induction to faith in religion at all. The “leap” involved differs extraordinarily, as one is against evidence and the other is evidence. Not to mention every religious person also believes in induction, so the faith required for religion is necessarily in addition to that required by everyone to not get hit by a bus.
Induction is thinking that if the sun has risen every day for the last billion years, it will probably rise tomorrow.
Faith is believing that even though the sun has risen every day for the last billion years, it won’t rise tomorrow.
Trying to call induction a “religion” to excuse religion isn’t going to help you much; all it does is admit the two are comparable, and then simple observation shows that induction is the correct “religion” and faith proves false. Shall we see whether prayer heals this time?
I think you, EY and most use the term faith in a historical context related to religion rather than its definitional context as it relates to epistemological concerns of trust in an idea or claim
The best definition I have found so far for faith is thus:
Faith is to commit oneself to act based on sufficient experience to warrant belief, but without absolute proof.
So I have no problem using faith and induction interchangeably because it is used just as you say:
inferring the future from the past (or the past from the present), which basically requires the universe to consistently obey the same laws.
Religions claim that they do this. Of course they don’t because they do not apply a constant standard to their worldview to all events. It is not because of their faith that they are wrong, it is because of their inconsistent application of accepting claims and ignoring evidence.
The point of the system is to deconstruct why you see their claims of evidence as faith and vice versa. Hence the incorruptible example.
Faith is to commit oneself to act based on sufficient experience to warrant belief, but without absolute proof.
The problem with this definition is that it describes every action you will ever take. “Absolute proof” does not exist with respect to anything in the real world. You only have absolute certainty in a definitional context, e.g.”There are no married bachelors”—this is true by definition, but tells you nothing about the actual world. Given that the last statement applies to every single instance, your statement reduces to:
Faith is to commit oneself to act based on sufficient experience to warrant belief.
This statement sounds just like “rational action.” That’s why many of us take issue with your definition of faith; it does not appear to be a productive concept. Insofar as absolute certainty is impossible, if you’re using faith to get you to absolute certainty, you’re doing something very, very wrong.
The other problem with this definition is that it is not really compatible with the dictionary definitions, the most pertinent one of which is “belief in the absence of proof.”
I don’t see how this works. Induction is, basically, the principle of inferring the future from the past (or the past from the present), which basically requires the universe to consistently obey the same laws. The problem with this, of course, is that the only evidence we have that the future will be like the past is the fact that it always has been, so there’s a necessary circularity. You can’t provide evidence for induction without assuming induction is correct; indeed, the very concept of “evidence” assumes induction is correct.
Intuition, on the other hand, is entirely susceptible to being analyzed on its merits. If our intuition tends to be right, we are justified in relying on it, even if we don’t understand precisely how it works. If it isn’t typically right for certain things, or if it contradicts other, better evidence, we’re wrong to rely on it, even though believing contrary to our intuition can be difficult.
I don’t see how either of these concepts can be equated with a conventional use of “faith.”
Edited in response to EY’s comment below: I’m not meaning to compare faith in induction to faith in religion at all. The “leap” involved differs extraordinarily, as one is against evidence and the other is evidence. Not to mention every religious person also believes in induction, so the faith required for religion is necessarily in addition to that required by everyone to not get hit by a bus.
Induction is thinking that if the sun has risen every day for the last billion years, it will probably rise tomorrow.
Faith is believing that even though the sun has risen every day for the last billion years, it won’t rise tomorrow.
Trying to call induction a “religion” to excuse religion isn’t going to help you much; all it does is admit the two are comparable, and then simple observation shows that induction is the correct “religion” and faith proves false. Shall we see whether prayer heals this time?
I think you, EY and most use the term faith in a historical context related to religion rather than its definitional context as it relates to epistemological concerns of trust in an idea or claim
The best definition I have found so far for faith is thus:
So I have no problem using faith and induction interchangeably because it is used just as you say:
Religions claim that they do this. Of course they don’t because they do not apply a constant standard to their worldview to all events. It is not because of their faith that they are wrong, it is because of their inconsistent application of accepting claims and ignoring evidence.
The point of the system is to deconstruct why you see their claims of evidence as faith and vice versa. Hence the incorruptible example.
The problem with this definition is that it describes every action you will ever take. “Absolute proof” does not exist with respect to anything in the real world. You only have absolute certainty in a definitional context, e.g.”There are no married bachelors”—this is true by definition, but tells you nothing about the actual world. Given that the last statement applies to every single instance, your statement reduces to:
This statement sounds just like “rational action.” That’s why many of us take issue with your definition of faith; it does not appear to be a productive concept. Insofar as absolute certainty is impossible, if you’re using faith to get you to absolute certainty, you’re doing something very, very wrong.
The other problem with this definition is that it is not really compatible with the dictionary definitions, the most pertinent one of which is “belief in the absence of proof.”