By contrast, conceptual analysis of belief has been stuck in an unproductive merry-go-round of definitions and counterexamples for decades.
Who’s escaped from it?
If everything philosophy considers is a concrete, tangible thing, then you can use empiricism to solve everything philosophy considers. But it is not the case that everything that philosophy considers is a concrete, tangible thing. Mainstream philosophy considers abstract topics like Truth and Goodness. So does rationalism. Rationalism considers abstract topics like Truth and Goodness, and it doesn’t have any empirical (or mathematical) methods for investigating them. So it’s using conceptual analysis, or something like conceptual analysis.
Which? Well, if we had a really clear exposition of conceptual analysis, with no fuzzy edge cases -- a conceptual analysis of conceptual analylis—we could tell. But if we did, it would work, in that case. On the other hand, if it never works, then we can’t apply it to itself, and we therefore can’t make clear claims that it fails in every case.
Who’s escaped from it?
If everything philosophy considers is a concrete, tangible thing, then you can use empiricism to solve everything philosophy considers. But it is not the case that everything that philosophy considers is a concrete, tangible thing. Mainstream philosophy considers abstract topics like Truth and Goodness. So does rationalism. Rationalism considers abstract topics like Truth and Goodness, and it doesn’t have any empirical (or mathematical) methods for investigating them. So it’s using conceptual analysis, or something like conceptual analysis.
Which? Well, if we had a really clear exposition of conceptual analysis, with no fuzzy edge cases -- a conceptual analysis of conceptual analylis—we could tell. But if we did, it would work, in that case. On the other hand, if it never works, then we can’t apply it to itself, and we therefore can’t make clear claims that it fails in every case.