It is not super clear whether “real numbers are ubiquitus” is a fair statement. We kinda know that nature is decidedly quantum ie discrete ie non-continuous. In fact we kinda have a name for theories that are continous-like, those tend to be called “classical” theories (even when the theory behind them is brand new). Restatement of the argument: the classical nature of the universe is evidence that it is a simulation. Counterargument: the universe is not classical, therefore we do not have any reason to assume it is a simulation.
It is also hazy on what it means by “details”. We could have physics that behaves one way when observed only roughly but another way when observed in detail. It is unclear whether “If someone takes a cursory glance at something you should only compute its rough details and only when someone looks at it closely, with a microscope say, do you need to fill in the details.” is satisfied in such a system. I guess the difference is that in rare occasions one would need to “fill out” rather than “fill in” that is it would be possible for a micro-observed phenomena to lie outside the range determined for a macro-observed phenomena. However we have direct examples of nature exhibiting this level of detail dependent physics. If a electron is not observed in a double-slit experiment it forms a path that favors the middle compared to when it is checked what slit is used. Thefore the starting assumption of the argument is relied on more heavily than it is known to hold for and in fact we know it doesn’t hold to the degree required. Restatement of the claim: “Since we live in a universe where you only need to ‘fill in’ details we have reason to believe it has intentionally especially light ontology”. Counterargument: “We occasionally need to ‘fill out’ details so a especially light ontology is a poor model of our universe therefore we don’t have any special reason to assume about its intentionality”.
The main problem with the argument is not that it is making errors but just that its premises are false or apply only to a extent far smaller than the attempted conclusion (there might be some basis to conclude that part of reality is a simulation, but a part-simulation, part-genuine reality is kind of a hypothesis that seems implausible even as a definition even before recourse to evidence (the standard way of saying that is that its prior is low?))
It is not super clear whether “real numbers are ubiquitus” is a fair statement. We kinda know that nature is decidedly quantum ie discrete ie non-continuous. In fact we kinda have a name for theories that are continous-like, those tend to be called “classical” theories (even when the theory behind them is brand new). Restatement of the argument: the classical nature of the universe is evidence that it is a simulation. Counterargument: the universe is not classical, therefore we do not have any reason to assume it is a simulation.
It is also hazy on what it means by “details”. We could have physics that behaves one way when observed only roughly but another way when observed in detail. It is unclear whether “If someone takes a cursory glance at something you should only compute its rough details and only when someone looks at it closely, with a microscope say, do you need to fill in the details.” is satisfied in such a system. I guess the difference is that in rare occasions one would need to “fill out” rather than “fill in” that is it would be possible for a micro-observed phenomena to lie outside the range determined for a macro-observed phenomena. However we have direct examples of nature exhibiting this level of detail dependent physics. If a electron is not observed in a double-slit experiment it forms a path that favors the middle compared to when it is checked what slit is used. Thefore the starting assumption of the argument is relied on more heavily than it is known to hold for and in fact we know it doesn’t hold to the degree required. Restatement of the claim: “Since we live in a universe where you only need to ‘fill in’ details we have reason to believe it has intentionally especially light ontology”. Counterargument: “We occasionally need to ‘fill out’ details so a especially light ontology is a poor model of our universe therefore we don’t have any special reason to assume about its intentionality”.
The main problem with the argument is not that it is making errors but just that its premises are false or apply only to a extent far smaller than the attempted conclusion (there might be some basis to conclude that part of reality is a simulation, but a part-simulation, part-genuine reality is kind of a hypothesis that seems implausible even as a definition even before recourse to evidence (the standard way of saying that is that its prior is low?))