5. According to the PhilPapers Surveys, 56.5% of philosophers endorse physicalism, vs. 27.1% who endorse non-physicalism and 16.4% “other.” I expect the vast majority of philosophers who endorse physicalism to agree that a sufficiently detailed simulation of a human would be conscious. (My understanding is that biological naturalism is a fringe/unpopular position, and that physicalism + rejecting biological naturalism would imply believing that sufficiently detailed simulations of humans would be conscious.) I also expect that some philosophers who don’t endorse physicalism would still believe that such simulations would be conscious (David Chalmers is an example—see The Conscious Mind). These expectations are just based on my impressions of the field.
5. According to the PhilPapers Surveys, 56.5% of philosophers endorse physicalism, vs. 27.1% who endorse non-physicalism and 16.4% “other.” I expect the vast majority of philosophers who endorse physicalism to agree that a sufficiently detailed simulation of a human would be conscious. (My understanding is that biological naturalism is a fringe/unpopular position, and that physicalism + rejecting biological naturalism would imply believing that sufficiently detailed simulations of humans would be conscious.) I also expect that some philosophers who don’t endorse physicalism would still believe that such simulations would be conscious (David Chalmers is an example—see The Conscious Mind). These expectations are just based on my impressions of the field.