I get my points across to a theist the same way I get my points across to anyone else:
I get clear in my own head what point I want to get across, and why I want to get it across.
I get clear in my own head why I believe that.
I consider my model of the other person and how they differ from me and whether those differences are relevant to how compelling my reasons are. If the differences aren’t relevant, I share my reasons for believing what I believe.
If the differences are relevant, I either explicitly note that (“You’ll probably disagree with me about this, because you generally believe X where I believe Y, but I think Z.”) if my goal is to let the person know what I think, or I set my own reasons aside if my goal is to convince the person that what I think is true.
If the latter, I try to imagine whether I would believe Z if I believed X, and if so, why I would believe that, and I share those reasons instead. Otherwise, I give up on the point I started out with, which is too many inferential steps away, and either go do something else or I pick some instrumental goal along the way (e.g., decide to convince them of Y).
Worth noting is that at every step along the way I might fail. That is, I might discover that I don’t have a clear understanding of my own point, or of why I want to convey it, or of why I believe it, or of what the other person believes that might be relevant, etc.
At which point I generally switch goals, from trying to get my point across to the other person to trying to better understand my point, or my goals, or my reasons, or the other person, or etc.
I get my points across to a theist the same way I get my points across to anyone else:
I get clear in my own head what point I want to get across, and why I want to get it across.
I get clear in my own head why I believe that.
I consider my model of the other person and how they differ from me and whether those differences are relevant to how compelling my reasons are. If the differences aren’t relevant, I share my reasons for believing what I believe.
If the differences are relevant, I either explicitly note that (“You’ll probably disagree with me about this, because you generally believe X where I believe Y, but I think Z.”) if my goal is to let the person know what I think, or I set my own reasons aside if my goal is to convince the person that what I think is true.
If the latter, I try to imagine whether I would believe Z if I believed X, and if so, why I would believe that, and I share those reasons instead. Otherwise, I give up on the point I started out with, which is too many inferential steps away, and either go do something else or I pick some instrumental goal along the way (e.g., decide to convince them of Y).
Worth noting is that at every step along the way I might fail. That is, I might discover that I don’t have a clear understanding of my own point, or of why I want to convey it, or of why I believe it, or of what the other person believes that might be relevant, etc.
At which point I generally switch goals, from trying to get my point across to the other person to trying to better understand my point, or my goals, or my reasons, or the other person, or etc.