The idea that Solomonoff induction has something to do with the Kolmogorov complexity of the universe seems very strange to me.
Wouldn’t it put an upper bound on the complexity of any given piece, as you can describe it with “the universe, plus the location of what I care about”?
Edited to add: Ah, yes but “the location of what I care about” is has potentially a huge amount of complexity to it.
Wouldn’t it put an upper bound on the complexity of any given piece, as you can describe it with “the universe, plus the location of what I care about”?
As you say, if the multiverse happens to have a small description, the address of an object in the multiverse can still get quite large...
...but yes, things we see might well have a maximum complexity—associated with the size and complexity of the universe.
When dealing with practical approximations to Solomonoff induction this is “angels and pinheads” material, though. We neither know nor care about such things.
Wouldn’t it put an upper bound on the complexity of any given piece, as you can describe it with “the universe, plus the location of what I care about”?
Edited to add: Ah, yes but “the location of what I care about” is has potentially a huge amount of complexity to it.
As you say, if the multiverse happens to have a small description, the address of an object in the multiverse can still get quite large...
...but yes, things we see might well have a maximum complexity—associated with the size and complexity of the universe.
When dealing with practical approximations to Solomonoff induction this is “angels and pinheads” material, though. We neither know nor care about such things.
Fair enough.