(Note that I myself do not subscribe to wireheading, I am merely trying to fathom the possible thought processes of those that subscribe to it.)
You are right. But the basic point is that if you are human and subscribe to rational, consistent, unbounded utility maximization, then you assign at least non-negligible utility to unconditional bodily sensations. If you further accept uploading and that emulations can experience more in a shorter period of time compared to fleshly humans, then it is a serious possibility that you can outweigh the extra utility you assign to the referents of rewards in the form of bodily sensations and other differences like chatbots instead of real agents (a fact that you can choose to forget).
I believe the gist of the matter to be that wireheading appears to its proponents to be the rational choice for an utility maximizing agent which is the effect of biological evolution within our universe. For what it’s worth, this could be an explanation for the Fermi paradox.
(Note that I myself do not subscribe to wireheading, I am merely trying to fathom the possible thought processes of those that subscribe to it.)
You are right. But the basic point is that if you are human and subscribe to rational, consistent, unbounded utility maximization, then you assign at least non-negligible utility to unconditional bodily sensations. If you further accept uploading and that emulations can experience more in a shorter period of time compared to fleshly humans, then it is a serious possibility that you can outweigh the extra utility you assign to the referents of rewards in the form of bodily sensations and other differences like chatbots instead of real agents (a fact that you can choose to forget).
I believe the gist of the matter to be that wireheading appears to its proponents to be the rational choice for an utility maximizing agent which is the effect of biological evolution within our universe. For what it’s worth, this could be an explanation for the Fermi paradox.