Would you still prefer to be “out” if you expected your life outside to be much, much worse than your life inside?
I would prefer to act to make my life outside better.
Scaling the imaginary situation back to everyday matters, your question is like responding to the statement “I’m taking a holiday in Venice” with “but suppose you hate it when you get there?” Or responding to “I’m starting a new business” with “but suppose it fails?” Or responding to “I’m going out with someone new” with “but suppose she’s a serial killer?”
All you have done is imagine the scenario ending in failure. Why?
All you have done is imagine the scenario ending in failure. Why?
Because I’m building it to parallel the original question of whether you’d want to go into an MBLS. In both cases, your potential future life in the simulated or “inside” world is assumed to be much better than the one you might have in the simulating “outside” world. If you give different answers (inside vs. outside) in the two cases, why?
You said:
There is another world outside. If there is another world, I’d rather be out
As a reason for not entering the MBLS. Would that reason also make you want to escape from our current world to a much more dismal life in the simulating one? To me that would be a repugnant conclusion and is why I’d prefer a much better life in a simulated world, in both cases.
I would prefer to act to make my life outside better.
An individual’s control over their life, in our current world, is far below what I consider acceptable. People are stuck with sick bodies and suffering minds and bad relationships and die in unexpected or painful ways or, ultimately, of unavoidable old age. I would happily trade this for the MBLS experience which would surely offer much greater control.
Do you attach intrinsic value to affecting (even if weakly) the true ultimate level of reality, or do you disagree with my preference for a different reason? If the former, how would you deal with not knowing if we’re simulated, or infinite recursions of simulation, or scenarios where infinite numbers of worlds are simulated and simulate others? Would it mean you give high priority to discovering if we’re in a simulation and, if so, breaking out—at the expense of efforts to optimize our life in this world?
There is another world outside. If there is another world, I’d rather be out
As a reason for not entering the MBLS. Would that reason also make you want to escape from our current world to a much more dismal life in the simulating one? To me that would be a repugnant conclusion and is why I’d prefer a much better life in a simulated world, in both cases.
Both scenarios involve the scenario-setter putting their hand on one side of the scales and pushing hard enough to sway my preferences. You might as well ask if I would torture babies for a sufficiently high incentive. These questions are without significance. Ask me again when we actually have uploads and simulations. Meanwhile, strongly rigged scenarios can always beat strong hypothetical preferences, and vice versa. It just becomes a contest over who can name the biggest number.
how would you deal with not knowing if we’re simulated, or infinite recursions of simulation, or scenarios where infinite numbers of worlds are simulated and simulate others?
I don’t take such speculations seriously. I’ve read the arguments for why we’re probably living in a simulation and am unimpressed; I am certainly not going to be mugged à la Pascal into spending any substantial effort considering the matter.
I would prefer to act to make my life outside better.
Scaling the imaginary situation back to everyday matters, your question is like responding to the statement “I’m taking a holiday in Venice” with “but suppose you hate it when you get there?” Or responding to “I’m starting a new business” with “but suppose it fails?” Or responding to “I’m going out with someone new” with “but suppose she’s a serial killer?”
All you have done is imagine the scenario ending in failure. Why?
Because I’m building it to parallel the original question of whether you’d want to go into an MBLS. In both cases, your potential future life in the simulated or “inside” world is assumed to be much better than the one you might have in the simulating “outside” world. If you give different answers (inside vs. outside) in the two cases, why?
You said:
As a reason for not entering the MBLS. Would that reason also make you want to escape from our current world to a much more dismal life in the simulating one? To me that would be a repugnant conclusion and is why I’d prefer a much better life in a simulated world, in both cases.
An individual’s control over their life, in our current world, is far below what I consider acceptable. People are stuck with sick bodies and suffering minds and bad relationships and die in unexpected or painful ways or, ultimately, of unavoidable old age. I would happily trade this for the MBLS experience which would surely offer much greater control.
Do you attach intrinsic value to affecting (even if weakly) the true ultimate level of reality, or do you disagree with my preference for a different reason? If the former, how would you deal with not knowing if we’re simulated, or infinite recursions of simulation, or scenarios where infinite numbers of worlds are simulated and simulate others? Would it mean you give high priority to discovering if we’re in a simulation and, if so, breaking out—at the expense of efforts to optimize our life in this world?
Both scenarios involve the scenario-setter putting their hand on one side of the scales and pushing hard enough to sway my preferences. You might as well ask if I would torture babies for a sufficiently high incentive. These questions are without significance. Ask me again when we actually have uploads and simulations. Meanwhile, strongly rigged scenarios can always beat strong hypothetical preferences, and vice versa. It just becomes a contest over who can name the biggest number.
I don’t take such speculations seriously. I’ve read the arguments for why we’re probably living in a simulation and am unimpressed; I am certainly not going to be mugged à la Pascal into spending any substantial effort considering the matter.