The Nash equilibrium is a solution for non-cooperative games. Politics, almost by definition, is about cooperation. Cooperative games are a superset of non-cooperatives, because in the case of no communication it reduces to one.
The word “signalling” in virtue signalling is a form of communication. Democracy has many forms, the most common is representative democracy. In it, the voter does not choose a policy directly, but chooses a delegate. The job of the delegate is to learn about the world (for example economics), and make a decision based on this information. If the decision is bad for the voters, the they will be replaced in the next election. The moral hazard for delegates happens if for the delegate the cost of losing their job is lower then the cost of making a bad decision.
From the voters perspective it means that a potential delegate should show that they understand the world and make good decisions, a.k.a. they should signal their virtues. If the voter understands the world and capable of making better decisions than current delegates, than they should run for an office. The moral hazard happens, if the cost of running for office is greater than the cost of the current delegates making bad decisions.
Our democracies are not perfect: the cost of a delegate losing their job is quite low, and the cost of running for office is quite high. But the problem does not lie in mass ignorance. You awknowledge that learning about economics has costs. The same can be said about arts, literature, physics, social sciences, or ecology. It is not possible for everyone to learn all these subjects, but it is possible to select a few of our best to learn about them. The tragedy of commons would happen if everyone would need to learn about boring (for them) subjects for years.
Nevertheless, I agree with your conclusion, that in good places you are held indvidually accountable, becase it would clearly show your virtues. Writing longform posts about economics shows that you are capable of understanding the world, and given the post’s contents, you think that you are able to make better decisions than the current political delegates. Have you considered becoming/are you a political activist?
P.S.: Fish reserves might be in a bad state right now, but it’s not all coordination failures. International fishing agreements happen. I recommend this book: “Game Theory and Fisheries Management: Theory and Applications”.
If the decision is bad for the voters, the they will be replaced in the next election.
The central thesis of my post is that individual voters are not individually incentivized to vote well. For this reason, bad decisions by politicians do not necessarily result in them getting replaced in subsequent elections. Politicians are removed for violating mass stated preferences, which differ from good policy in predictable directions.
You awknowledge that learning about economics has costs. The same can be said about arts, literature, physics, social sciences, or ecology. It is not possible for everyone to learn all these subjects, but it is possible to select a few of our best to learn about them. The tragedy of commons would happen if everyone would need to learn about boring (for them) subjects for years.
Yes. I used economics in this post because it could perform double-duty, since this post also discusses moral hazard. The principle applies for foreign affairs, law, etc.
The Nash equilibrium is a solution for non-cooperative games. Politics, almost by definition, is about cooperation. Cooperative games are a superset of non-cooperatives, because in the case of no communication it reduces to one.
The word “signalling” in virtue signalling is a form of communication. Democracy has many forms, the most common is representative democracy. In it, the voter does not choose a policy directly, but chooses a delegate. The job of the delegate is to learn about the world (for example economics), and make a decision based on this information. If the decision is bad for the voters, the they will be replaced in the next election. The moral hazard for delegates happens if for the delegate the cost of losing their job is lower then the cost of making a bad decision.
From the voters perspective it means that a potential delegate should show that they understand the world and make good decisions, a.k.a. they should signal their virtues. If the voter understands the world and capable of making better decisions than current delegates, than they should run for an office. The moral hazard happens, if the cost of running for office is greater than the cost of the current delegates making bad decisions.
Our democracies are not perfect: the cost of a delegate losing their job is quite low, and the cost of running for office is quite high. But the problem does not lie in mass ignorance. You awknowledge that learning about economics has costs. The same can be said about arts, literature, physics, social sciences, or ecology. It is not possible for everyone to learn all these subjects, but it is possible to select a few of our best to learn about them. The tragedy of commons would happen if everyone would need to learn about boring (for them) subjects for years.
Nevertheless, I agree with your conclusion, that in good places you are held indvidually accountable, becase it would clearly show your virtues. Writing longform posts about economics shows that you are capable of understanding the world, and given the post’s contents, you think that you are able to make better decisions than the current political delegates. Have you considered becoming/are you a political activist?
P.S.: Fish reserves might be in a bad state right now, but it’s not all coordination failures. International fishing agreements happen. I recommend this book: “Game Theory and Fisheries Management: Theory and Applications”.
The central thesis of my post is that individual voters are not individually incentivized to vote well. For this reason, bad decisions by politicians do not necessarily result in them getting replaced in subsequent elections. Politicians are removed for violating mass stated preferences, which differ from good policy in predictable directions.
Yes. I used economics in this post because it could perform double-duty, since this post also discusses moral hazard. The principle applies for foreign affairs, law, etc.