I assume Eliezer would agree there’s a lot we don’t know about MWI, starting with whether or not anyone actually experiences a low-amplitude “world”. Then there’s the (separate?) question of whether or not we should require a causal connection between states before treating one as a continuation of another. And we’re very confused as to what sort of ‘starting conditions’ are allowed, philosophically—I would agree that the theory seems to allow all sorts of weird variants, but see point 1 and our lack of understanding of the Born rule. (If we allow Bolztmann brains to share our past experience, the probabilities appear very different!)
Oh, and as near as I can tell you’re concluding that sleep gives us new information about what world we’re in because you falsely assume we have the potential option of not sleeping.
Oh, and as near as I can tell you’re concluding that sleep gives us new information about what world we’re in because you falsely assume we have the potential option of not sleeping.
Not even close; I went over this extensively in a previous thread.
Where? Because your demon sounds like exactly what I’m talking about, and it illustrates some kind of weird disconnect. If these “copies” don’t have my memories (nor much of my personality, if I understand the motivation for this scenario, nor my genes or appearance), why should I identify with them? And what do you picture happening to these strangers that upsets you so?
No, I’m saying that under Dust Theory our memories and perceptions ground us in our universe, and that losing grasp of them blurs the outside world beyond recognition.
I don’t know; maybe only MWI is required, but Eliezer seems to take it seriously.
I assume Eliezer would agree there’s a lot we don’t know about MWI, starting with whether or not anyone actually experiences a low-amplitude “world”. Then there’s the (separate?) question of whether or not we should require a causal connection between states before treating one as a continuation of another. And we’re very confused as to what sort of ‘starting conditions’ are allowed, philosophically—I would agree that the theory seems to allow all sorts of weird variants, but see point 1 and our lack of understanding of the Born rule. (If we allow Bolztmann brains to share our past experience, the probabilities appear very different!)
Oh, and as near as I can tell you’re concluding that sleep gives us new information about what world we’re in because you falsely assume we have the potential option of not sleeping.
Not even close; I went over this extensively in a previous thread.
Where? Because your demon sounds like exactly what I’m talking about, and it illustrates some kind of weird disconnect. If these “copies” don’t have my memories (nor much of my personality, if I understand the motivation for this scenario, nor my genes or appearance), why should I identify with them? And what do you picture happening to these strangers that upsets you so?
No, I’m saying that under Dust Theory our memories and perceptions ground us in our universe, and that losing grasp of them blurs the outside world beyond recognition.