Of course, you exist in every possible world which would produce that mindstate, but some are ‘vaster’ than others, leading you down the most probable courses.
This is basically the answer. You can think of different worlds as having different amounts of “magical reality fluid,” or “measure.” You are more likely to be in one of the worlds with lots of magical reality fluid—if there are two worlds with a 2 to 1 ratio of magical reality fluid, and you otherwise have no information distinguishing them, your probabilities about which world you’re in should likewise have a ratio of 2 to 1.
Suppose that going to sleep or losing grasp of your surroundings opens a wider space of worlds you could exist in, which jumps you into another reality along with consistent memories of it.
There are no jumps. There is nothing to do any jumping—no soul, no thread of consciousness above and beyond your physical state (at least not when it comes to assigning probabilities—when it comes to utilities, you are allowed to value continuity of experience or content of your memories if you want). In any given world, you either exist or you don’t. If you go to sleep in this world, the only way to leave is to die in your sleep.
The idea of sleeping being simpler than waking, and therefore there being more sleeping boltzmann brains of you than waking ones, is interesting, and debatable, but basically irrelevant. You go to sleep, you wake up. The boltzmann brains evaporate back into their constituent atoms. Life goes on.
Yes, but don’t I have to have one set of experiences? Even asleep, more stable universes still have a much greater measure than the Boltzmann brains, but the universes that had a dominant measure when I was awake no longer do so. So I could easily awake into a different world, with perfectly consistent memories when I reach for them. That’s what I mean by ‘jumping.’
(Also, I wasn’t really talking about Boltzmann brains. I’m just saying that if Dust Theory were true your lack of consciousness should give more chaotic, dreamlike universes a larger measure. Your mind would slowly dissolve.)
I think that if you embrace “Dust Theory” then for consistency you must also reject the way of thinking about identity that views the question “of all these future Eitan Zohars, which will be me?” as a sensible one to ask.
You go to sleep. (In this world and many others, in all of which your mind-state including all its memories and current perceptions are identical.) You wake up. (In this world and many others, in all of which your mind-state including all its memories and current perceptions are identical.) If you’re worried that in this process you may “jump” into a different world, you should worry exactly the same every second of your waking life.
[EDITED to add the last 6 words of the paragraph beginning “I think”; I must have got distracted while writing this the first time. It looks like I was understood anyway.]
My consciousness only follows one path, so yes, an indeterminate future Eitan Zohar will in fact be me. Since I’m no longer awake to keep the measure of my dominant reality stable, I’m worried that my unconscious mind will create it instead.
Yes, it does. In the future, I will not be perceiving events from other quantum branches. According to Dust Theory, the branches of me will continue experiencing events, but that isn’t any good once I’ve separated from them!
All I’m saying is that a large measure of me may be going down a bad path.
This is basically the answer. You can think of different worlds as having different amounts of “magical reality fluid,” or “measure.” You are more likely to be in one of the worlds with lots of magical reality fluid—if there are two worlds with a 2 to 1 ratio of magical reality fluid, and you otherwise have no information distinguishing them, your probabilities about which world you’re in should likewise have a ratio of 2 to 1.
There are no jumps. There is nothing to do any jumping—no soul, no thread of consciousness above and beyond your physical state (at least not when it comes to assigning probabilities—when it comes to utilities, you are allowed to value continuity of experience or content of your memories if you want). In any given world, you either exist or you don’t. If you go to sleep in this world, the only way to leave is to die in your sleep.
The idea of sleeping being simpler than waking, and therefore there being more sleeping boltzmann brains of you than waking ones, is interesting, and debatable, but basically irrelevant. You go to sleep, you wake up. The boltzmann brains evaporate back into their constituent atoms. Life goes on.
Yes, but don’t I have to have one set of experiences? Even asleep, more stable universes still have a much greater measure than the Boltzmann brains, but the universes that had a dominant measure when I was awake no longer do so. So I could easily awake into a different world, with perfectly consistent memories when I reach for them. That’s what I mean by ‘jumping.’
(Also, I wasn’t really talking about Boltzmann brains. I’m just saying that if Dust Theory were true your lack of consciousness should give more chaotic, dreamlike universes a larger measure. Your mind would slowly dissolve.)
What do you mean by “I”?
I think that if you embrace “Dust Theory” then for consistency you must also reject the way of thinking about identity that views the question “of all these future Eitan Zohars, which will be me?” as a sensible one to ask.
You go to sleep. (In this world and many others, in all of which your mind-state including all its memories and current perceptions are identical.) You wake up. (In this world and many others, in all of which your mind-state including all its memories and current perceptions are identical.) If you’re worried that in this process you may “jump” into a different world, you should worry exactly the same every second of your waking life.
[EDITED to add the last 6 words of the paragraph beginning “I think”; I must have got distracted while writing this the first time. It looks like I was understood anyway.]
My consciousness only follows one path, so yes, an indeterminate future Eitan Zohar will in fact be me. Since I’m no longer awake to keep the measure of my dominant reality stable, I’m worried that my unconscious mind will create it instead.
I don’t see how you can coherently both endorse “Dust Theory” and also hold that “my consciousness only follows one path”.
Yes, it does. In the future, I will not be perceiving events from other quantum branches. According to Dust Theory, the branches of me will continue experiencing events, but that isn’t any good once I’ve separated from them!
All I’m saying is that a large measure of me may be going down a bad path.