Yes, yes, and yes—in the usual meaning of “belief”. There are different-but-related meanings which are sometimes used, but the way you use it is completely unlike the usual meanings.
More importantly, your state that a BB can’t have “beliefs” in your sense, which is a (re)definition—that merely makes your words unclear and misunderstood—but then you conclude that because you have “beliefs” you are not a BB. This is simply wrong, even using your own definition of “belief”—because under your definition, having “real beliefs” is not a measurable fact of someone’s brain in reality, and so you can never make conclusions like “I have real beliefs” or “I am not a BB” based on your own brain state. (And all of our conclusions are based on our brain states.)
IOW: a BB similar to yourself, would reach the same conclusions as you—that it is not a BB—but it would be wrong. However, it would be reasoning from the exact same evidence as you. Therefore, your reasoning is faulty.
IOW: a BB similar to yourself, would reach the same conclusions as you—that it is not a BB—but it would be wrong. However, it would be reasoning from the exact same evidence as you.
I disagree that it would be reasoning from the exact same evidence as me. I’m an externalist about evidence too, not just about belief.
Again, you’re using the word “evidence” differently from everyone else. This only serves to confuse the discussion.
Tabooing “evidence”, what I was saying is that a BB would have the same initial brain-state (what I termed “evidence”) and therefore would achieve the same final brain-state (what I termed “conclusions”). The laws of physics for its brain-state evolution, and the physical causality between the two states, are the same as for your brain. This is trivially so by the very definition of a BB that is sufficiently similar to your brain.
I don’t know what you mean by “externalist evidence” and I don’t see how it would matter. The considerations that apply here are exactly the same as in Eliezer’s discussion of p-zombies. Imagine a BB which is a slightly larger fluctuation than a mere brain; it is a fluctuation of a whole body, which can live for a few seconds, and can speak and think in that time. It would think and say “I am conscious” for the same reasons as you do; therefore it is not a p-zombie. It would think and say “Barack Obama exists” for the same reasons as you do; therefore what everyone-but-you calls its knowledge and its beliefs about “Barack Obama”, are of the same kind as yours.
Yes, yes, and yes—in the usual meaning of “belief”. There are different-but-related meanings which are sometimes used, but the way you use it is completely unlike the usual meanings.
More importantly, your state that a BB can’t have “beliefs” in your sense, which is a (re)definition—that merely makes your words unclear and misunderstood—but then you conclude that because you have “beliefs” you are not a BB. This is simply wrong, even using your own definition of “belief”—because under your definition, having “real beliefs” is not a measurable fact of someone’s brain in reality, and so you can never make conclusions like “I have real beliefs” or “I am not a BB” based on your own brain state. (And all of our conclusions are based on our brain states.)
IOW: a BB similar to yourself, would reach the same conclusions as you—that it is not a BB—but it would be wrong. However, it would be reasoning from the exact same evidence as you. Therefore, your reasoning is faulty.
I disagree that it would be reasoning from the exact same evidence as me. I’m an externalist about evidence too, not just about belief.
Again, you’re using the word “evidence” differently from everyone else. This only serves to confuse the discussion.
Tabooing “evidence”, what I was saying is that a BB would have the same initial brain-state (what I termed “evidence”) and therefore would achieve the same final brain-state (what I termed “conclusions”). The laws of physics for its brain-state evolution, and the physical causality between the two states, are the same as for your brain. This is trivially so by the very definition of a BB that is sufficiently similar to your brain.
I don’t know what you mean by “externalist evidence” and I don’t see how it would matter. The considerations that apply here are exactly the same as in Eliezer’s discussion of p-zombies. Imagine a BB which is a slightly larger fluctuation than a mere brain; it is a fluctuation of a whole body, which can live for a few seconds, and can speak and think in that time. It would think and say “I am conscious” for the same reasons as you do; therefore it is not a p-zombie. It would think and say “Barack Obama exists” for the same reasons as you do; therefore what everyone-but-you calls its knowledge and its beliefs about “Barack Obama”, are of the same kind as yours.