Do you want to say the teenager’s computer also has evidence of the room’s temperature?
Yes. It has not proven that input is not connected to sensors in that room. There is a finite prior probability that they are. As such, that output is more likely given that that room is that temperature.
We could set up the thought experiment so that it’s extraordinarily unlikely that the teenager’s computer is receiving input from the sensors. It could be outside the light cone, say. This might still leave a finite prior probability of this possibility, but it’s low enough that even the favorable likelihood ratio of the subsequent evidence is insufficient to raise the hypothesis to serious consideration.
In any case, the analog of your argument in the Boltzmann brain case is that there might be some mechanism by which the brain is actually getting information about Obama, and its belief states are appropriately caused by that information. I agree that if this were the case then the Boltzmann brain would in fact have beliefs about Obama. But the whole point of the Boltzmann brain hypothesis is that its brain state is the product of a random fluctuation, not coherent information from a distant planet. So in this case, the hypothesis itself involves the assumption that the teenager’s computer is causally disconnected from the temperature sensors.
Do you agree that if the teenager’s computer were not receiving input from the sensors, it would be inaccurate to say it has evidence about the room’s temperature?
If the computer doesn’t know it’s outside of the lightcone, that’s irrelevant. The room may not even exist, but as long as the computer doesn’t know that, it can’t eliminate the possibility that it’s in that room.
but it’s low enough that even the favorable likelihood ratio of the subsequent evidence is insufficient to raise the hypothesis to serious consideration.
The probability of it being that specific room is far too low to be raised to serious consideration. That said, the utility function of the computer is such that that room or anything even vaguely similar will matter just about as much.
Do you agree that if the teenager’s computer were not receiving input from the sensors, it would be inaccurate to say it has evidence about the room’s temperature?
Only if the computer knows it’s not receiving input from the sensors.
It has no evidence of the temperature of the room given that it’s not receiving input from the sensors, but it does have evidence of the temperature of the room given that it is receiving input from the sensors, and the probability that it’s receiving input from the sensors is finite (it isn’t, but it doesn’t know that), so it ends up with evidence of the temperature of the room.
Yes. It has not proven that input is not connected to sensors in that room. There is a finite prior probability that they are. As such, that output is more likely given that that room is that temperature.
We could set up the thought experiment so that it’s extraordinarily unlikely that the teenager’s computer is receiving input from the sensors. It could be outside the light cone, say. This might still leave a finite prior probability of this possibility, but it’s low enough that even the favorable likelihood ratio of the subsequent evidence is insufficient to raise the hypothesis to serious consideration.
In any case, the analog of your argument in the Boltzmann brain case is that there might be some mechanism by which the brain is actually getting information about Obama, and its belief states are appropriately caused by that information. I agree that if this were the case then the Boltzmann brain would in fact have beliefs about Obama. But the whole point of the Boltzmann brain hypothesis is that its brain state is the product of a random fluctuation, not coherent information from a distant planet. So in this case, the hypothesis itself involves the assumption that the teenager’s computer is causally disconnected from the temperature sensors.
Do you agree that if the teenager’s computer were not receiving input from the sensors, it would be inaccurate to say it has evidence about the room’s temperature?
If the computer doesn’t know it’s outside of the lightcone, that’s irrelevant. The room may not even exist, but as long as the computer doesn’t know that, it can’t eliminate the possibility that it’s in that room.
The probability of it being that specific room is far too low to be raised to serious consideration. That said, the utility function of the computer is such that that room or anything even vaguely similar will matter just about as much.
Only if the computer knows it’s not receiving input from the sensors.
It has no evidence of the temperature of the room given that it’s not receiving input from the sensors, but it does have evidence of the temperature of the room given that it is receiving input from the sensors, and the probability that it’s receiving input from the sensors is finite (it isn’t, but it doesn’t know that), so it ends up with evidence of the temperature of the room.