Obviously the most self-similar person to help is actually yourself (100% gene match), then your identical twin, parent/children/sibling/etc. It’s no surprise that this is the hierarchy of our preferences. The evolutionary reason for that is plain.
I’m (mostly) not my genes. Remember I don’t see a big difference between flesh-me and brain-emulation-me. These two entities share no DNA molecules. But sure I probably do somewhat imperfectly, by proxy, weight genes in themselves, kin selection and all that has probably made sure of it.
But evolution doesn’t make it “right”.
No, it being in my brain makes it right. Whether it got there by the process of evolution or from the semen of an angry philandering storm god dosen’t really make a difference to me.
If you’re comfortable ignoring this idea of morality as evolutionary baggage that’s been hijacked by our society’s non-resemblance to our ancestral environment, then okay. If you can make that peace with yourself stick, then go ahead. Personally though, I find the concept much harder to get rid of. In other words, I need to believe I’m making the world a better place—using a standard of “better” that doesn’t depend on my own individual perspective
I don’t think you are getting that a universe that dosen’t contain me or my nephews or my brain ems might still be sufficiently better according to my preferences that I’d pick it over us. There is nothing beyond your own preferences, “ethics” of any kind are preferences too.
I think you yearn for absolute morality. That’s ok, we all do to varying extents. Like I said somewhere else on LessWrong my current preferences are set up in such a way that if I received mathematical proof that the universe actually does have a “objectively right” ethical system that is centred on making giant cheesecakes, I think I’d probably dedicate a day or so during the weekends for that purpose. Ditto for paper-clips.
Maybe I’d even organize with like-minded people for a two hour communal baking or materials gathering event. But I’d probably spend the rest of the week much like I do now.
I’m (mostly) not my genes. Remember I don’t see a big difference between flesh-me and brain-emulation-me. These two entities share no DNA molecules. But sure I probably do somewhat imperfectly, by proxy, weight genes in themselves, kin selection and all that has probably made sure of it.
Right, sorry. The genes tack was in error, I should’ve read more closely.
I think I’ve understood the problem a bit better, and I’m trying to explain where I think we differ in reply to the “taboo” comment.
There is nothing beyond your own preferences, “ethics” of any kind are preferences too.
I don’t think I believe this, although I suspect the source of our disagreement is over terminology rather than facts.
I tend to think of ethics as a complex set of facts about the well-being of yourself and others. So something is ethical if it makes people happy, helps them achieve their aspirations, treats them fairly, etc. So if, when ranking your preferences, you find that the universe you have the greatest preference for isn’t one in which peoples’ well-being, along certain measures, is as high as possible, that doesn’t mean that improving people’s well-being along these various measures isn’t ethical. It just means that you don’t prefer to act 100% ethically.
To make an analogy, the fact that an object is the color green is a fact about what wavelengths of light it reflects and absorbs. You may prefer that certain green-colored objects not be colored green. Your preference does not change the objective and absolute fact that these objects are green. It just means you don’t prefer them to be green.
“I think you yearn for absolute morality. That’s ok, we all do to varying extents”
I think syllogism’s preference is for unbiased morality.
Yearns is in quotes because he decided on his ethics before deciding he cared. his reasoning probably has nothing to do with yearning or similiar, as you seem to be implying.
also “That’s ok, we all do to varying extents” I don’t think it is. i think it’s silly, and there are almost certainly people who don’t (and they count). “absolute morality” in the sense “objectively (universally) right” shouldn’t even parse
I’m (mostly) not my genes. Remember I don’t see a big difference between flesh-me and brain-emulation-me. These two entities share no DNA molecules. But sure I probably do somewhat imperfectly, by proxy, weight genes in themselves, kin selection and all that has probably made sure of it.
No, it being in my brain makes it right. Whether it got there by the process of evolution or from the semen of an angry philandering storm god dosen’t really make a difference to me.
I don’t think you are getting that a universe that dosen’t contain me or my nephews or my brain ems might still be sufficiently better according to my preferences that I’d pick it over us. There is nothing beyond your own preferences, “ethics” of any kind are preferences too.
I think you yearn for absolute morality. That’s ok, we all do to varying extents. Like I said somewhere else on LessWrong my current preferences are set up in such a way that if I received mathematical proof that the universe actually does have a “objectively right” ethical system that is centred on making giant cheesecakes, I think I’d probably dedicate a day or so during the weekends for that purpose. Ditto for paper-clips.
Maybe I’d even organize with like-minded people for a two hour communal baking or materials gathering event. But I’d probably spend the rest of the week much like I do now.
Right, sorry. The genes tack was in error, I should’ve read more closely.
I think I’ve understood the problem a bit better, and I’m trying to explain where I think we differ in reply to the “taboo” comment.
I don’t think I believe this, although I suspect the source of our disagreement is over terminology rather than facts.
I tend to think of ethics as a complex set of facts about the well-being of yourself and others. So something is ethical if it makes people happy, helps them achieve their aspirations, treats them fairly, etc. So if, when ranking your preferences, you find that the universe you have the greatest preference for isn’t one in which peoples’ well-being, along certain measures, is as high as possible, that doesn’t mean that improving people’s well-being along these various measures isn’t ethical. It just means that you don’t prefer to act 100% ethically.
To make an analogy, the fact that an object is the color green is a fact about what wavelengths of light it reflects and absorbs. You may prefer that certain green-colored objects not be colored green. Your preference does not change the objective and absolute fact that these objects are green. It just means you don’t prefer them to be green.
...and also about how certain cells in your eye function. Which doesn’t change your analogy at all, but it’s sometims a useful thing to remember.
“I think you yearn for absolute morality. That’s ok, we all do to varying extents”
I think syllogism’s preference is for unbiased morality.
Yearns is in quotes because he decided on his ethics before deciding he cared. his reasoning probably has nothing to do with yearning or similiar, as you seem to be implying.
also “That’s ok, we all do to varying extents” I don’t think it is. i think it’s silly, and there are almost certainly people who don’t (and they count). “absolute morality” in the sense “objectively (universally) right” shouldn’t even parse
An unbiased morality may be one centred on cheesecake.