I don’t think so. Just because we’re more willing to help out our friends than random strangers doesn’t imply we should be fine with people going around shooting random strangers in their legs. Likewise, we could favor our species compared to nonhuman animals and still not be fine with some of their harsh farming conditions.
How much value do you place on nonhuman animal welfare?
I do think so. The last few exchanges we had where about “I was interested in if you also were fine with others making other calls about what interests they would give inequal weight to.”.
I demonstrated that I’m fine with “inequal” and supposedly “unfair” (can we define that word?) preferences. While it may simple to separate the two. Unwillingness to help out and harming people are in many circumstances (due to opportunity costs for starters) the same thing.
Just because we’re more willing to help out our friends than random strangers doesn’t imply we should be fine with people going around shooting random strangers in their legs.
What if I shoot a stranger who is attacking my friends, my family or myself in the legs? Or choose to run over strangers rather than my daughter in a trolley problem?
I’m more fine with the suffering of random strangers than I am with the suffering of my friends or family. I don’t think that I’m exceptional in this regard. Does this mean that their suffering has no value to me? No, obviously not, I would never torture someone to get my friend a car or make my elderly mother a sandwich.
Put aside my earlier notions of “inequal” and “unfair”… I don’t think they’re necessary for us to proceed on this issue.
You said these things were “bad when they on net hurt people”. I noticed you said people, and not non-human animals, but you have said that you put at least some value on non-human animals.
Likewise, you’ve agreed that the pro-friend, pro-family preference only carries so far. But how far does the pro-human preference go? Assuming we agree on (1) the quality of life of certain nonhuman animals as they are made for food, (2) the capabilities for these nonhuman animals to feel a range of pain, and (3) the change in your personal quality of life by adopting habits to avoid most to all of this food (three big assumptions), then it seems like you’re fine with a significant measure of spiecieism.
I guess if you’re reaction is “so what”, we might just have rather different terminal values, though I’m kind of surprised that would be the case.
You said these things were “bad when they on net hurt people”. I noticed you said people, and not non-human animals, but you have said that you put at least some value on non-human animals.
That was in the context of thinking about sexism and racism. I assumed they have little impact on non-humans.
But how far does the pro-human preference go? Assuming we agree on (1) the quality of life of certain nonhuman animals as they are made for food, (2) the capabilities for these nonhuman animals to feel a range of pain, and (3) the change in your personal quality of life by adopting habits to avoid most to all of this food (three big assumptions), then it seems like you’re fine with a significant measure of spiecieism.
I guess if you’re reaction is “so what”, we might just have rather different terminal values, though I’m kind of surprised that would be the case.
I could be underestimating how much animals suffer (I almost certainly am to a certain existent simply because it is not something I have researched, and less suffering is the comforting default answer), you could be overestimating how much you care about animals being in pain due to anthropomorphizing them somewhat.
I don’t think so. Just because we’re more willing to help out our friends than random strangers doesn’t imply we should be fine with people going around shooting random strangers in their legs. Likewise, we could favor our species compared to nonhuman animals and still not be fine with some of their harsh farming conditions.
How much value do you place on nonhuman animal welfare?
I do think so. The last few exchanges we had where about “I was interested in if you also were fine with others making other calls about what interests they would give inequal weight to.”.
I demonstrated that I’m fine with “inequal” and supposedly “unfair” (can we define that word?) preferences. While it may simple to separate the two. Unwillingness to help out and harming people are in many circumstances (due to opportunity costs for starters) the same thing.
What if I shoot a stranger who is attacking my friends, my family or myself in the legs? Or choose to run over strangers rather than my daughter in a trolley problem?
I’m more fine with the suffering of random strangers than I am with the suffering of my friends or family. I don’t think that I’m exceptional in this regard. Does this mean that their suffering has no value to me? No, obviously not, I would never torture someone to get my friend a car or make my elderly mother a sandwich.
Put aside my earlier notions of “inequal” and “unfair”… I don’t think they’re necessary for us to proceed on this issue.
You said these things were “bad when they on net hurt people”. I noticed you said people, and not non-human animals, but you have said that you put at least some value on non-human animals.
Likewise, you’ve agreed that the pro-friend, pro-family preference only carries so far. But how far does the pro-human preference go? Assuming we agree on (1) the quality of life of certain nonhuman animals as they are made for food, (2) the capabilities for these nonhuman animals to feel a range of pain, and (3) the change in your personal quality of life by adopting habits to avoid most to all of this food (three big assumptions), then it seems like you’re fine with a significant measure of spiecieism.
I guess if you’re reaction is “so what”, we might just have rather different terminal values, though I’m kind of surprised that would be the case.
That was in the context of thinking about sexism and racism. I assumed they have little impact on non-humans.
I could be underestimating how much animals suffer (I almost certainly am to a certain existent simply because it is not something I have researched, and less suffering is the comforting default answer), you could be overestimating how much you care about animals being in pain due to anthropomorphizing them somewhat.
Definitely a possibility, though I try to eliminate it.