In this case, I think it’s worth being very VERY curious as to how that judge got in there in the first place. It’s also probably worth eventually doing psychological research in order to classify types of judge, in case they aren’t all the same. Do mathematicians above a certain caliber all possess internal judges with a common standard for proof? How does this phenomenon relate to actual judges?
In general, I would expect a person following this advice to, in the average case, diverge from the process of creating a map in correspondence with the territory, towards the replacement of the map with a feedback system conditioning model-free harmony. I would expect that their mind would gradually transition from asking ‘is this true’ to asking ‘is this what power wants me to say’, and eventually to come to see truth as a dreadful constraint on safety rather than as a support with which to achieve safety. I would expect them to grow in their ability to lead and to sell, but to loose the ability to manage, or otherwise constrain the actions of a group in order to direct them towards some goal other than politics.
That doesn’t at all mean that the ideal mode of cognition involves such a judge. Just that collaborative cognition requires a common set of protocols and this seems to be the default such set of protocols for constructive collaboration, while other protocols seem favored by predatory collaboration and seem likely to emerge if not suppressed.
For many people (but not for me), it seems the judge explicitly speaks in the voice of one of their parents.
Certainly I think the judge is serving a group-coordination role. It manages outward-facing justifiability. Hence, I associate the judge with crony beliefs. I interpret you as saying that if the judge didn’t handle those, they could start getting everywhere—and also that the judge may be associated with other benefits, as in the case of mathematical reasoning.
I have actually done away with the judge at times, one time lasting a whole week. I would use the same language as before for social coordination purposes, but it wouldn’t carry the same meaning—for example, “I feel bad about X” would mean “I wish X could have happened without giving anything else up”, but carry no feeling of conflict in my mind; normally, it would mean “I am feeling conflicted about my policy around X”.
So, from that perspective I expect that getting rid of the judge tends to make one more epistemically coherent and less prone to bend thoughts toward social consensus. The social-coordination role of the judge then has to be replaced with other strategies.
On the other hand, your hypothesis doesn’t seem absurd to me.
In this case, I think it’s worth being very VERY curious as to how that judge got in there in the first place. It’s also probably worth eventually doing psychological research in order to classify types of judge, in case they aren’t all the same. Do mathematicians above a certain caliber all possess internal judges with a common standard for proof? How does this phenomenon relate to actual judges?
In general, I would expect a person following this advice to, in the average case, diverge from the process of creating a map in correspondence with the territory, towards the replacement of the map with a feedback system conditioning model-free harmony. I would expect that their mind would gradually transition from asking ‘is this true’ to asking ‘is this what power wants me to say’, and eventually to come to see truth as a dreadful constraint on safety rather than as a support with which to achieve safety. I would expect them to grow in their ability to lead and to sell, but to loose the ability to manage, or otherwise constrain the actions of a group in order to direct them towards some goal other than politics.
That doesn’t at all mean that the ideal mode of cognition involves such a judge. Just that collaborative cognition requires a common set of protocols and this seems to be the default such set of protocols for constructive collaboration, while other protocols seem favored by predatory collaboration and seem likely to emerge if not suppressed.
You make an interesting point.
For many people (but not for me), it seems the judge explicitly speaks in the voice of one of their parents.
Certainly I think the judge is serving a group-coordination role. It manages outward-facing justifiability. Hence, I associate the judge with crony beliefs. I interpret you as saying that if the judge didn’t handle those, they could start getting everywhere—and also that the judge may be associated with other benefits, as in the case of mathematical reasoning.
I have actually done away with the judge at times, one time lasting a whole week. I would use the same language as before for social coordination purposes, but it wouldn’t carry the same meaning—for example, “I feel bad about X” would mean “I wish X could have happened without giving anything else up”, but carry no feeling of conflict in my mind; normally, it would mean “I am feeling conflicted about my policy around X”.
So, from that perspective I expect that getting rid of the judge tends to make one more epistemically coherent and less prone to bend thoughts toward social consensus. The social-coordination role of the judge then has to be replaced with other strategies.
On the other hand, your hypothesis doesn’t seem absurd to me.