The problem here is that this “optimal” doesn’t cash out to anything in terms of real world prediction, which means it’s alberzle vs. bargulum all over again. A and B don’t disagree about predictions of what will happen in the world, meaning they are only disagreeing over which definition of a word to use.
In this context, a two boxer has to have some definition of “optimal” that doesn’t cash out the same as LWers cash out that word. Because our definition is based on what it actually gets you, not what it could have gotten you if the rules were different.
If you’re facing a decision about what algorithm to adopt, then adopt the optimal algorithm (which one-boxers on all future versions of NP though not ones where the prediction has occurred). If you are not able to choose between algorithms but are just choosing a decision for this occasion then choose two-boxing.
And what you just described is a decision algorithm, and it is that algorithm which Omega will use as input to decide what to put in the boxes. “Decide to use algorithm X” is itself an algorithm. This is why it’s incoherent to speak of a decision independently—it’s always being made by an algorithm.
“Just decide” is a decision procedure, so there’s actually no such thing as “just choosing for this occasion”.
And, given that algorithm, you lose on Newcomb’s problem, because what you described is a two-boxing decision algorithm: if it is ever actually in the Newcomb’s problem situation, an entity using that decision procedure will two-box, because “the prediction has occurred”. It is therefore trivial for me to play the part of Omega here and put nothing under the box when I play against you. I don’t need any superhuman predictive ability, I just need to know that you believe two boxing is “optimal” when the prediction has already been made. If you think that way, then your two-boxing is predictable ahead of time, and there is no temporal causation being violated.
Barring some perverse definition of “optimal”, you can’t think two-boxing is coherent unless you think that decisions can be made without using your brain—i.e. that you can screen off the effects of past brain state on present decisions.
Again, though, this is alberzle vs bargulum. It doesn’t seem there is any argument about the fact that your decision is the result of prior cause and effect. The two-boxer in this case seems to be saying “IF we lived in a world where decisions could be made non-deterministically, then the optimal thing to do would be to give every impression of being a one-boxer until the last minute.” A one boxer agrees that this conditional statement is true… but entirely irrelevant to the problem at hand, because it does not offer such a loophole.
So, as to the question of whether two boxing is optimal, we can say it’s alberzle-optimal but not bargulum-optimal, at which point there is nothing left to discuss.
Taboo “optimal”.
The problem here is that this “optimal” doesn’t cash out to anything in terms of real world prediction, which means it’s alberzle vs. bargulum all over again. A and B don’t disagree about predictions of what will happen in the world, meaning they are only disagreeing over which definition of a word to use.
In this context, a two boxer has to have some definition of “optimal” that doesn’t cash out the same as LWers cash out that word. Because our definition is based on what it actually gets you, not what it could have gotten you if the rules were different.
And what you just described is a decision algorithm, and it is that algorithm which Omega will use as input to decide what to put in the boxes. “Decide to use algorithm X” is itself an algorithm. This is why it’s incoherent to speak of a decision independently—it’s always being made by an algorithm.
“Just decide” is a decision procedure, so there’s actually no such thing as “just choosing for this occasion”.
And, given that algorithm, you lose on Newcomb’s problem, because what you described is a two-boxing decision algorithm: if it is ever actually in the Newcomb’s problem situation, an entity using that decision procedure will two-box, because “the prediction has occurred”. It is therefore trivial for me to play the part of Omega here and put nothing under the box when I play against you. I don’t need any superhuman predictive ability, I just need to know that you believe two boxing is “optimal” when the prediction has already been made. If you think that way, then your two-boxing is predictable ahead of time, and there is no temporal causation being violated.
Barring some perverse definition of “optimal”, you can’t think two-boxing is coherent unless you think that decisions can be made without using your brain—i.e. that you can screen off the effects of past brain state on present decisions.
Again, though, this is alberzle vs bargulum. It doesn’t seem there is any argument about the fact that your decision is the result of prior cause and effect. The two-boxer in this case seems to be saying “IF we lived in a world where decisions could be made non-deterministically, then the optimal thing to do would be to give every impression of being a one-boxer until the last minute.” A one boxer agrees that this conditional statement is true… but entirely irrelevant to the problem at hand, because it does not offer such a loophole.
So, as to the question of whether two boxing is optimal, we can say it’s alberzle-optimal but not bargulum-optimal, at which point there is nothing left to discuss.