Two-boxers think that decisions are things that can just fall out of the sky uncaused. (This can be made precise by a suitable description of how two-boxers set up the relevant causal diagram; I found Anna Salamon’s explanation of this particularly clear.) This is a view of how decisions work driven by intuitions that should be dispelled by sufficient knowledge of cognitive and / or computer science. I think acquiring such background will make you more sympathetic to the perspective that one should think in terms of winning agent types and not winning decisions.
I also think there’s a tendency among two-boxers not to take the stakes of Newcomb’s problem seriously enough. Suppose that instead of offering you a million dollars Omega offers to spare your daughter’s life. Now what do you do?
Two-boxers think that decisions are things that can just fall out of the sky uncaused.
But don’t LW one-boxers think that decision ALGORITHMS are things that can just fall out of the sky uncaused?
As an empirical matter, I don’t think humans are psychologically capable of time-consistent decisions in all cases. For instance, TDT implies that one should one-box even in a version of Newcomb’s in which one can SEE the content of the boxes. But would a human being really leave the other box behind, if the contents of the boxes were things they REALLY valued (like the lives of close friends), and they could actually see their contents? I think that would be hard for a human to do, even if ex ante they might wish to reprogram themselves to do so.
For instance, TDT implies that one should one-box even in a version of Newcomb’s in which one can SEE the content of the boxes. But would a human being really leave the other box behind, if the contents of the boxes were things they REALLY valued (like the lives of close friends), and they could actually see their contents?
Probably not, and thus s/he would probably never see the second box as anything but empty. His/her loss.
For instance, TDT implies that one should one-box even in a version of Newcomb’s in which one can SEE the content of the boxes. But would a human being really leave the other box behind, if the contents of the boxes were things they REALLY valued (like the lives of close friends), and they could actually see their contents?
Probably not, and thus they would probably never see the second box as anything but empty. His/her loss.
I think that would be hard for a human to do, even if ex ante they might wish to reprogram themselves to do so.
I think it’s hard because most human’s don’t live their lives according to principles. They care more about the lives of close friends than they care about their principles.
In the end reprograming yourself in that way is about being a good stoic.
Two-boxers think that decisions are things that can just fall out of the sky uncaused.
I’m not sure that’s a fair description of two-boxers. Two-boxers think that the best way to model the causal effects of a decision are by intervention or something similar. At no point do two-boxers need to deny that decisions are caused. Rather, they just need to claim that the way you figure out the causal effects of an action are by intervention like modelling.
I also think there’s a tendency among two-boxers not to take the stakes of Newcomb’s problem seriously enough. Suppose that instead of offering you a million dollars Omega offers to spare your daughter’s life. Now what do you do?
I don’t claim to be a two-boxer so I don’t know. But I don’t think this point really undermines the strength of the two-boxing arguments.
Two-boxers think that the best way to model the causal effects of a decision are by intervention or something similar.
Yes, that’s what I mean by decisions falling out of the sky uncaused. When a two-boxer models the causal effects of deciding to two-box even if Omega predicts that they one-box, they’re positing a hypothetical in which Omega’s prediction is wrong even though they know this to be highly unlikely or impossible depending on the setup of the problem. Are you familiar with how TDT sets up the relevant causal diagram?
But I don’t think this point really undermines the strength of the arguments I outline above.
I think it undermines their attractiveness. I would say unhesitatingly that one-boxing is the correct decision in that scenario because it’s the one that saves my daughter, and I would furthermore say this even if I didn’t have a decision theory that returned that as the correct decision.
If I write down a long argument that returns a conclusion I know is wrong, I can conclude that there’s something wrong with my argument even if I can’t point to a particular step in my argument I know to be wrong.
Yes, that’s what I mean by decisions falling out of the sky uncaused. When a two-boxer models the causal effects of deciding to two-box even if Omega predicts that they one-box, they’re positing a hypothetical in which Omega’s prediction is wrong even though they know this to be highly unlikely or impossible depending on the setup of the problem.
The two-boxer claims that causal consequences are what matters. If this is false, the two-boxer is already in trouble but if this is true then it seems unclear (to me) that the fact that the correct way of modelling causal consequences involves interventions should be a problem. So I’m unclear as to whether there’s really an independent challenge here. But I will have to think on this more so don’t have anything more to say for now (and my opinion may change on further reflection as I can see why this argument feels compelling).
And yes, I’m aware of how TDT sets up the causal diagrams.
I think it undermines their attractiveness. I would say unhesitatingly that one-boxing is the correct decision in that scenario because it’s the one that saves my daughter, and I would furthermore say this even if I didn’t have a decision theory that returned that as the correct decision.
In response, the two-boxer would say that it isn’t your decision that saves your daughter (it’s your agent type) and they’re not talking about agent type. Now I’m not saying they’re right to say this but I don’t think that this line advances the argument (I think we just end up where we were before).
Okay, but why does the two-boxer care about decisions when agent type appears to be what causes winning (on Newcomblike problems)? Your two-boxer seems to want to split so many hairs that she’s willing to let her daughter die for it.
No argument here. I’m very open to the suggestion that the two-boxer is answering the wrong question (perhaps they should be interested in rational agent type rather than rational decisions) but it is often suggested on LW that two-boxers are not answering the wrong question but rather are getting the wrong answer (that is, it is suggested that one-boxing is the rational decision, not that it is uninteresting whether this is the case).
One-boxing is the rational decision; in LW parlance “rational decision” means “the thing that you do to win.” I don’t think splitting hairs about this is productive or interesting.
I agree. A semantic debate is uninteresting. My original assumption about the differences between two-boxing philosophers and one-boxing LWers was that the two groups used words differently and were engaged in different missions.
If you think the difference is just:
(a) semantic;
(b) a difference of missions;
(c) a different view of which missions are important
then I agree and I also agree that a long hair splitting debate is uninteresting.
However, my impression was that some people on LW seem to think there is more than a semantic debate going on (for example, my impression was that this is what Eliezer thought). This assumption is what motivated the writing of this post. If you think this assumption is wrong, it would be great to know as if this is the case, I now understand what is going on.
There is more than a semantic debate going on to the extent that two-boxers are of the opinion that if they faced an actual Newcomb’s problem, then what they should actually do is to actually two-box. This isn’t a disagreement about semantics but about what you should actually do in a certain kind of situation.
Okay, but why does the two-boxer care about decisions when agent type appears to be what causes winning (on Newcomblike problems)?
The two-boxer cares about decisions because they use the word decision to refer to those things we can control. So they say that we can’t control our past agent type but can control our taking of the one or two boxes. Of course, a long argument can be held about what notion of “control” we should appeal to here but it’s not immediately obvious to me that the two-boxer is wrong to care about decisions in their sense. So they would say that what thing we care about depends not only on what things can cause the best outcome but also on whether we can exert control over these things. The basic claim here seems reasonable enough.
Yes, and then their daughters die. Again, if a long argument outputs a conclusion you know is wrong, you know there’s something wrong with the argument even if you don’t know what it is.
It’s not clear to me that the argument outputs the wrong conclusion. Their daughters die because of their agent type at time of prediction not because of their decision and they can’t control their agent type at this past time so they don’t try to. It’s unclear that someone is irrational for exerting the best influence they can. Of course, this is all old debate so I don’t think we’re really progressing things here.
they can’t control their agent type at this past time so they don’t try to.
But if they didn’t think this, then their daughters could live. You don’t think, in this situation, you would even try to stop thinking this way? I’m trying to trigger a shut up and do the impossible intuition here, but if you insist on splitting hairs, then I agree that this conversation won’t go anywhere.
Yes, if the two boxer had a different agent type in the past then their daughters would live. No disagreement there. But I don’t think I’m splitting hairs by thinking this doesn’t immediately imply that one-boxing is the rational decision (rather, I think you’re failing to acknowledge the possibility of potentially relevant distinctions).
I’m not actually convinced by the two-boxing arguments but I don’t think they’re as obviously flawed as you seem to. And yes, I think we now agree on one thing at least (further conversation will probably not go anywhere) so I’m going to leave things at that.
As the argument goes, you can’t control your past selves, but that isn’t the form of the experiment. The only self that you’re controlling is the one deciding whether to one-box (equivalently, whether to be a one-boxer).
See, that is the self that past Omega is paying attention to in order to figure out how much money to put in the box. That’s right, past Omega is watching current you to figure out whether or not to kill your daughter / put money in the box. It doesn’t matter how he does it, all that matters is whether or not your current self decides to one box.
To follow a thought experiment I found enlightening here, how is it that past Omega knows whether or not you’re a one-boxer? In any simulation he could run of your brain, the simulated you could just know it’s a simulation and then Omega wouldn’t get the correct result, right? But, as we know, he does get the result right, almost all of the time. Ergo, the simulated you looks outside, it sees a bird on a tree. If it uses the bathroom, the toilet might clog. Any giveaway might make the selfish you try to two-box while still one-boxing in real life.
The point? How do you know that current you isn’t the simulation past Omega is using to figure out whether to kill your daughter? Are philosophical claims about the irreducibility of intentionality enough to take the risk?
In response, the two-boxer would say that it isn’t your decision that saves your daughter (it’s your agent type) and they’re not talking about agent type.
I think that’s again about decisions falling out of the sky. The agent type causes decisions to happen. People can’t make decisions that are inconsistent with their own agent type.
Thank you for referencing Anna Salamon’s diagrams. I would have one boxed in the first place, but I really think that those help make it much more clear in general.
Two-boxers think that decisions are things that can just fall out of the sky uncaused.
It seems that 2-boxers make this assumption, whereas some 1-boxers (including me) apply a Popperian approach to selecting a model of reality consistent with the empirical evidence.
Two-boxers think that decisions are things that can just fall out of the sky uncaused. (This can be made precise by a suitable description of how two-boxers set up the relevant causal diagram; I found Anna Salamon’s explanation of this particularly clear.) This is a view of how decisions work driven by intuitions that should be dispelled by sufficient knowledge of cognitive and / or computer science. I think acquiring such background will make you more sympathetic to the perspective that one should think in terms of winning agent types and not winning decisions.
I also think there’s a tendency among two-boxers not to take the stakes of Newcomb’s problem seriously enough. Suppose that instead of offering you a million dollars Omega offers to spare your daughter’s life. Now what do you do?
But don’t LW one-boxers think that decision ALGORITHMS are things that can just fall out of the sky uncaused?
As an empirical matter, I don’t think humans are psychologically capable of time-consistent decisions in all cases. For instance, TDT implies that one should one-box even in a version of Newcomb’s in which one can SEE the content of the boxes. But would a human being really leave the other box behind, if the contents of the boxes were things they REALLY valued (like the lives of close friends), and they could actually see their contents? I think that would be hard for a human to do, even if ex ante they might wish to reprogram themselves to do so.
Probably not, and thus s/he would probably never see the second box as anything but empty. His/her loss.
Probably not, and thus they would probably never see the second box as anything but empty. His/her loss.
I think it’s hard because most human’s don’t live their lives according to principles. They care more about the lives of close friends than they care about their principles.
In the end reprograming yourself in that way is about being a good stoic.
Thanks for the reply, more interesting arguments.
I’m not sure that’s a fair description of two-boxers. Two-boxers think that the best way to model the causal effects of a decision are by intervention or something similar. At no point do two-boxers need to deny that decisions are caused. Rather, they just need to claim that the way you figure out the causal effects of an action are by intervention like modelling.
I don’t claim to be a two-boxer so I don’t know. But I don’t think this point really undermines the strength of the two-boxing arguments.
Yes, that’s what I mean by decisions falling out of the sky uncaused. When a two-boxer models the causal effects of deciding to two-box even if Omega predicts that they one-box, they’re positing a hypothetical in which Omega’s prediction is wrong even though they know this to be highly unlikely or impossible depending on the setup of the problem. Are you familiar with how TDT sets up the relevant causal diagram?
I think it undermines their attractiveness. I would say unhesitatingly that one-boxing is the correct decision in that scenario because it’s the one that saves my daughter, and I would furthermore say this even if I didn’t have a decision theory that returned that as the correct decision.
If I write down a long argument that returns a conclusion I know is wrong, I can conclude that there’s something wrong with my argument even if I can’t point to a particular step in my argument I know to be wrong.
The two-boxer claims that causal consequences are what matters. If this is false, the two-boxer is already in trouble but if this is true then it seems unclear (to me) that the fact that the correct way of modelling causal consequences involves interventions should be a problem. So I’m unclear as to whether there’s really an independent challenge here. But I will have to think on this more so don’t have anything more to say for now (and my opinion may change on further reflection as I can see why this argument feels compelling).
And yes, I’m aware of how TDT sets up the causal diagrams.
In response, the two-boxer would say that it isn’t your decision that saves your daughter (it’s your agent type) and they’re not talking about agent type. Now I’m not saying they’re right to say this but I don’t think that this line advances the argument (I think we just end up where we were before).
Okay, but why does the two-boxer care about decisions when agent type appears to be what causes winning (on Newcomblike problems)? Your two-boxer seems to want to split so many hairs that she’s willing to let her daughter die for it.
No argument here. I’m very open to the suggestion that the two-boxer is answering the wrong question (perhaps they should be interested in rational agent type rather than rational decisions) but it is often suggested on LW that two-boxers are not answering the wrong question but rather are getting the wrong answer (that is, it is suggested that one-boxing is the rational decision, not that it is uninteresting whether this is the case).
One-boxing is the rational decision; in LW parlance “rational decision” means “the thing that you do to win.” I don’t think splitting hairs about this is productive or interesting.
I agree. A semantic debate is uninteresting. My original assumption about the differences between two-boxing philosophers and one-boxing LWers was that the two groups used words differently and were engaged in different missions.
If you think the difference is just:
(a) semantic; (b) a difference of missions; (c) a different view of which missions are important
then I agree and I also agree that a long hair splitting debate is uninteresting.
However, my impression was that some people on LW seem to think there is more than a semantic debate going on (for example, my impression was that this is what Eliezer thought). This assumption is what motivated the writing of this post. If you think this assumption is wrong, it would be great to know as if this is the case, I now understand what is going on.
There is more than a semantic debate going on to the extent that two-boxers are of the opinion that if they faced an actual Newcomb’s problem, then what they should actually do is to actually two-box. This isn’t a disagreement about semantics but about what you should actually do in a certain kind of situation.
Okay. Clarified, so to return to:
The two-boxer cares about decisions because they use the word decision to refer to those things we can control. So they say that we can’t control our past agent type but can control our taking of the one or two boxes. Of course, a long argument can be held about what notion of “control” we should appeal to here but it’s not immediately obvious to me that the two-boxer is wrong to care about decisions in their sense. So they would say that what thing we care about depends not only on what things can cause the best outcome but also on whether we can exert control over these things. The basic claim here seems reasonable enough.
Yes, and then their daughters die. Again, if a long argument outputs a conclusion you know is wrong, you know there’s something wrong with the argument even if you don’t know what it is.
It’s not clear to me that the argument outputs the wrong conclusion. Their daughters die because of their agent type at time of prediction not because of their decision and they can’t control their agent type at this past time so they don’t try to. It’s unclear that someone is irrational for exerting the best influence they can. Of course, this is all old debate so I don’t think we’re really progressing things here.
But if they didn’t think this, then their daughters could live. You don’t think, in this situation, you would even try to stop thinking this way? I’m trying to trigger a shut up and do the impossible intuition here, but if you insist on splitting hairs, then I agree that this conversation won’t go anywhere.
Yes, if the two boxer had a different agent type in the past then their daughters would live. No disagreement there. But I don’t think I’m splitting hairs by thinking this doesn’t immediately imply that one-boxing is the rational decision (rather, I think you’re failing to acknowledge the possibility of potentially relevant distinctions).
I’m not actually convinced by the two-boxing arguments but I don’t think they’re as obviously flawed as you seem to. And yes, I think we now agree on one thing at least (further conversation will probably not go anywhere) so I’m going to leave things at that.
As the argument goes, you can’t control your past selves, but that isn’t the form of the experiment. The only self that you’re controlling is the one deciding whether to one-box (equivalently, whether to be a one-boxer).
See, that is the self that past Omega is paying attention to in order to figure out how much money to put in the box. That’s right, past Omega is watching current you to figure out whether or not to kill your daughter / put money in the box. It doesn’t matter how he does it, all that matters is whether or not your current self decides to one box.
To follow a thought experiment I found enlightening here, how is it that past Omega knows whether or not you’re a one-boxer? In any simulation he could run of your brain, the simulated you could just know it’s a simulation and then Omega wouldn’t get the correct result, right? But, as we know, he does get the result right, almost all of the time. Ergo, the simulated you looks outside, it sees a bird on a tree. If it uses the bathroom, the toilet might clog. Any giveaway might make the selfish you try to two-box while still one-boxing in real life.
The point? How do you know that current you isn’t the simulation past Omega is using to figure out whether to kill your daughter? Are philosophical claims about the irreducibility of intentionality enough to take the risk?
I think that’s again about decisions falling out of the sky. The agent type causes decisions to happen. People can’t make decisions that are inconsistent with their own agent type.
Thank you for referencing Anna Salamon’s diagrams. I would have one boxed in the first place, but I really think that those help make it much more clear in general.
Yes, every two boxer I’ve ever known has said exactly that a thousand times.
It seems that 2-boxers make this assumption, whereas some 1-boxers (including me) apply a Popperian approach to selecting a model of reality consistent with the empirical evidence.