The largest part of my second part is “If consciousness is possible at all for simulated beings, it seems likely that it’s not some “special sauce” that they can apply separately to some entities and not to otherwise identical entities, but a property of the structure of the entities themselves.” This mostly isn’t about simulators and their motivations, but about the nature of consciousness in simulated entities in general.
On the other hand your argument is about simulators and their motivations, in that you believe they largely both can and will apply “special sauce” to simulated entities that are the most extreme in some human-obvious way and almost never to the others.
I don’t think we have any qualitative disagreements, just about what fraction of classes of simulated entities may or may not have consciousness.
Yes okay fair enough. I’m not certain about your claim in quotes, but neither am I certain about my claim which you phrased well in your second paragraph. You have definitely answered this better than anyone else here.
But still, I feel like this problem is somehow similar to the Presumtuous Philosopher problem, and so there should be some anthropic reasoning to deduce which universe I’m likely in / how exactly to update my understanding.
The largest part of my second part is “If consciousness is possible at all for simulated beings, it seems likely that it’s not some “special sauce” that they can apply separately to some entities and not to otherwise identical entities, but a property of the structure of the entities themselves.” This mostly isn’t about simulators and their motivations, but about the nature of consciousness in simulated entities in general.
On the other hand your argument is about simulators and their motivations, in that you believe they largely both can and will apply “special sauce” to simulated entities that are the most extreme in some human-obvious way and almost never to the others.
I don’t think we have any qualitative disagreements, just about what fraction of classes of simulated entities may or may not have consciousness.
Yes okay fair enough. I’m not certain about your claim in quotes, but neither am I certain about my claim which you phrased well in your second paragraph. You have definitely answered this better than anyone else here.
But still, I feel like this problem is somehow similar to the Presumtuous Philosopher problem, and so there should be some anthropic reasoning to deduce which universe I’m likely in / how exactly to update my understanding.