I know some people with disgust reactions to bad epistemics (that are at least morally tinged, if not explicitly part of the person’s morality).
I think “disgust for in-elegance” is actually an important component on how “desire for consistency / reflectively fair rules” gets implemented in humans (at least. for the philosophers and lawmakers who set in motion the rules/culture that other people absorb via a less-opinionated “monkey see monkey do”)
I recall some discussion of one paper claiming conservatives had higher disgust response, but this was in part becaused they asked questions about “what do you think about homosexuality” and not “what do you think about cutting up books” or “not recycling”, etc (I think the book-cutting up purity response isn’t quite disgust-mediated, at least for me, but it’s at least adjacent).
None of that is a strong claim about exactly how important disgust is to morality, either now or historically, but, I think there’s at least more to it than you’re alluding to.
I know some people with disgust reactions to bad epistemics (that are at least morally tinged, if not explicitly part of the person’s morality).
I think “disgust for in-elegance” is actually an important component on how “desire for consistency / reflectively fair rules” gets implemented in humans (at least. for the philosophers and lawmakers who set in motion the rules/culture that other people absorb via a less-opinionated “monkey see monkey do”)
I feel at least a little disgusted by people who are motivated by disgust, which I have discussed the paradoxicality of.
I recall some discussion of one paper claiming conservatives had higher disgust response, but this was in part becaused they asked questions about “what do you think about homosexuality” and not “what do you think about cutting up books” or “not recycling”, etc (I think the book-cutting up purity response isn’t quite disgust-mediated, at least for me, but it’s at least adjacent).
None of that is a strong claim about exactly how important disgust is to morality, either now or historically, but, I think there’s at least more to it than you’re alluding to.