I agree “unsatisfactory” is different from disgust. I think people vary in which emotions end up loadbearing for them.
I know rationalists who feel disgust reactions to people who have unclean “epistemic hygiene”, or who knowingly let themselves into situations where their epistemics will be reliably fucked.
For that matter, in the OP, some people are responding to regular ol’ criminal morality with disgust, and while you (or Jim, or in fact, me) can say “man I really don’t trust people who run their morality off disgust”, it doesn’t necessarily follow that it’d, for example, work well if you simply removed disgust from the equation for everyone – it might turn out to be loadbearing to how society is function.
I’m not sure if we disagree about a particular thing here, because, like, it’s not like you’re exactly proposing to snap your fingers and eliminate disgust from human morality unilaterally (but it sounds like you might be encouraging people to silence/ignore their disgust reactions, without tracking that this may be important for how some significant fraction of people are currently tracking morality, in a way that would destroy a lot of important information and coordination mechanism if you didn’t more thoughtfully replace it with other things)
I agree high reflectivity people probably have less disgust-oriented morality (because yeah, disgust-morality is often not well thought out or coherent), but I just have a general precautionary principle against throwing out emotional information.
I, uh, maybe want to summon @divia who might have more specific thoughts here.
Yeah, that’s not what I’m suggesting. I think the thing I want to encourage is basically just to be more reflective on the margin of disgust-based reactions (when it concerns other people). I agree it would be bad to throw it out unilaterally, and probably not a good idea for most people to silence or ignore it. At the same time, I think it’s good to treat appeals to disgust with suspicion in moral debates (which was the main point I was trying to make) (especially since disgust in particular seems to be a more “contagious” emotion for reasons that make sense in the context of infectious diseases but usually not beyond that, making appeals to it more “dark arts-y”).
As far as the more object-level debate on whether disgust is important for things like epistemic hygiene, I expect it to be somewhere where people will vary, so I think we probably agree here too.
I agree “unsatisfactory” is different from disgust. I think people vary in which emotions end up loadbearing for them.
I know rationalists who feel disgust reactions to people who have unclean “epistemic hygiene”, or who knowingly let themselves into situations where their epistemics will be reliably fucked.
For that matter, in the OP, some people are responding to regular ol’ criminal morality with disgust, and while you (or Jim, or in fact, me) can say “man I really don’t trust people who run their morality off disgust”, it doesn’t necessarily follow that it’d, for example, work well if you simply removed disgust from the equation for everyone – it might turn out to be loadbearing to how society is function.
I’m not sure if we disagree about a particular thing here, because, like, it’s not like you’re exactly proposing to snap your fingers and eliminate disgust from human morality unilaterally (but it sounds like you might be encouraging people to silence/ignore their disgust reactions, without tracking that this may be important for how some significant fraction of people are currently tracking morality, in a way that would destroy a lot of important information and coordination mechanism if you didn’t more thoughtfully replace it with other things)
I agree high reflectivity people probably have less disgust-oriented morality (because yeah, disgust-morality is often not well thought out or coherent), but I just have a general precautionary principle against throwing out emotional information.
I, uh, maybe want to summon @divia who might have more specific thoughts here.
Yeah, that’s not what I’m suggesting. I think the thing I want to encourage is basically just to be more reflective on the margin of disgust-based reactions (when it concerns other people). I agree it would be bad to throw it out unilaterally, and probably not a good idea for most people to silence or ignore it. At the same time, I think it’s good to treat appeals to disgust with suspicion in moral debates (which was the main point I was trying to make) (especially since disgust in particular seems to be a more “contagious” emotion for reasons that make sense in the context of infectious diseases but usually not beyond that, making appeals to it more “dark arts-y”).
As far as the more object-level debate on whether disgust is important for things like epistemic hygiene, I expect it to be somewhere where people will vary, so I think we probably agree here too.