I think a more distinctly virtue ethicist way of putting it is that they don’t do slightly bad things because that would condition them to have bad dispositions, or to be bad people, something that is intrinsically disvaluable.
People who avoid doing slightly bad things to prevent instilling unhelpful habits, and to prevent themselves from bringing about future harm are (roughly) global utilitarians.
What’s a bad person with bad dispositions, if not someone who does bad things?
Well, in practice most of us do make these sorts of judgments. We don’t think a bad person stops being a bad person when we imprison them, for example, even if they are thereafter unable to do bad things and therefore don’t. Which suggests that we have some notion of a bad person who isn’t doing bad things.
This may not be justified, but I’d be very surprised if it were so alien to you that you don’t understand it.
I think a more distinctly virtue ethicist way of putting it is that they don’t do slightly bad things because that would condition them to have bad dispositions, or to be bad people, something that is intrinsically disvaluable.
People who avoid doing slightly bad things to prevent instilling unhelpful habits, and to prevent themselves from bringing about future harm are (roughly) global utilitarians.
I’m such a utilitarian, I don’t understand the difference. What’s a bad person with bad dispositions, if not someone who does bad things?
Well, in practice most of us do make these sorts of judgments. We don’t think a bad person stops being a bad person when we imprison them, for example, even if they are thereafter unable to do bad things and therefore don’t. Which suggests that we have some notion of a bad person who isn’t doing bad things.
This may not be justified, but I’d be very surprised if it were so alien to you that you don’t understand it.