You gave me the chance to check whether I was using “fragility of value” correctly. (I think so.) Your reply in that thread doesn’t fit the fragility thesis: you’re reading too much into it. EY is asserting that humanly-valuable outcomes are a small region in a high-dimensional space. That’s basically all there is to it, though some logical consequences are drawn that flesh it out, and some of the evidence for it is indicated.
If he is asserting only what you say, he is asserting nothing of interest. What FoV is usually taken to mean is that getting FAI right is difficult … and that is right called fragility, because it is a process. However, it is not a conclusion supported by a premise about higher dimensional spaces, because that is not a process.
You gave me the chance to check whether I was using “fragility of value” correctly. (I think so.) Your reply in that thread doesn’t fit the fragility thesis: you’re reading too much into it. EY is asserting that humanly-valuable outcomes are a small region in a high-dimensional space. That’s basically all there is to it, though some logical consequences are drawn that flesh it out, and some of the evidence for it is indicated.
If he is asserting only what you say, he is asserting nothing of interest. What FoV is usually taken to mean is that getting FAI right is difficult … and that is right called fragility, because it is a process. However, it is not a conclusion supported by a premise about higher dimensional spaces, because that is not a process.