Where there is enough data to use frequentist methods, that doesn’t imply one can produce relevant evidence for a case using those methods. I interpret you as agreeing with this based on your response, but feel free to clarify.
Jurors are not going to be able to tell to what extent frequentist methods produce valid evidence or not. It seems to me that if it is a good idea for judges to forbid using Bayesian reasoning because they can see where priors are arbitrary and are worried the jurors can’t, it is an even better idea for judges to forbid frequentist reasoning that doesn’t have a parallel permitted Bayesian process.
I agree with all of this. What I was trying to say is precisely that this isn’t about Bayes vs Fischer or whoever. Perhaps what I should have said to make that clearer is that the judge in this case did not (just) throw out Bayes, he threw out statistical inference.
I agree with all of this. What I was trying to say is precisely that this isn’t about Bayes vs Fischer or whoever. Perhaps what I should have said to make that clearer is that the judge in this case did not (just) throw out Bayes, he threw out statistical inference.