Basically, I think Wittgenstein was too quick to pattern-match every mention of such things as “national character” with propagandistic nationalist ramblings.
You suspect he’s too quick to pattern-match every mention from a single example?
I suspect this is just an instance of a bias that’s been widespread in the Western world for quite a while now, namely the tendency to write off the use of certain kinds of conditional probabilities about people, including most of those conditioned on national origin, as inherently incorrect or immoral.
I’m aware this is a common bias now, but I don’t think it was that widespread in 1939.
Moreover, from the “wouldn’t surprise him at all” comment, it does appear that Wittgenstein had, for whatever reason, a biased unfavorable view of the British government.
Perhaps this is because I have an unfavorable view of governments in general, but it seems that for an even slightly cynical student of history assassination attempts on rival heads of state by a government should not come as a surprise, especially as monarchies were replaced by democracies. It’s not clear he was singling out the British, and even if he were singling out the British, it’s not clear if that was the result of bias or cool calculation. (The British did have the best spy network in Europe, although whether or not Wittgenstein would have known that is not something I am able to guess.)
I agree that being biased can lead to fury, but I think for someone as passionately logical as Wittgenstein seeing bias, especially in a friend, could also lead to fury. It’s not clear to me that his immediate reaction is evidence between those hypotheses, and his persisting fury strikes me as slightly better evidence for the latter. (Background: Almost twenty years earlier, Wittgenstein was rebuked as a teacher because he would also beat the girls if they made mathematical mistakes.)
That is, it is possible that Wittgenstein was biased in pronouncing Malcolm’s bias, but it seems to me unlikely. The evidence seems to point the other way, especially the conclusion he draws- that philosophy should help one with the important questions of everyday life.
You suspect he’s too quick to pattern-match every mention from a single example?
Admittedly, this is speculative, but from his tone I did get the impression that he was prone to such matching.
Perhaps this is because I have an unfavorable view of governments in general, but it seems that for an even slightly cynical student of history assassination attempts on rival heads of state by a government should not come as a surprise, especially as monarchies were replaced by democracies.
Actually, a very strong taboo against such assassinations follows from a very cynical theory. Namely, it provides for a convenient Schelling point for national leaders, where they can otherwise escalate war as much as they like without fear for their personal safety. (As long as they don’t let themselves get totally conquered, of course.)
But more importantly, who are all these heads of state supposedly assassinated under orders from rival governments prior to 1939? Can you name any attempts of such assassinations in the period of, say, one hundred years preceding 1939? Or even just cases where the culprit is unknown, but a plot directed by a rival government seems plausible?
(The closest example I can think of is the killing of Engelbert Dollfuss that kicked off the coup attempt in 1934 by the Austrian Nazis, who were clearly acting in concert with Berlin. But even that was an all-out coup attempt accompanied by an armed Nazi uprising across the country, so not really an assassination plot, and also symptomatic of the new and unprecedented wave of political gangsterism of which the British government was not a part.)
Given this history (or rather a lack thereof), do you think that it was possible for a non-biased observer in 1939 to view the accusation against British government plot to assassinate the German head of state as unsurprising if true?
Namely, it provides for a convenient Schelling point for national leaders
The Schelling Point is stronger for monarchs than for ministers, and so as monarchies disappear or become less relevant one could expect assassinations to increase.
But more importantly, who are all these heads of state supposedly assassinated under orders from rival governments prior to 1939?
Does the first such assassination have to be a surprise? I think unprecedented events can be unsurprising if they were anticipated. We may be interpreting Wittgenstein’s comment very differently: for me, “X would not surprise me” means something like P(X)>.01, not something like P(X)>.5.
But, since you asked, consider the case of Tomas Mac Curtain, assassinated by British forces in 1920. I don’t think he qualifies as a head of state, but he was a fairly prominent government official. In 1939, it would have been plausible that Napoleon had been poisoned by the British (though that’s a bit outside your hundred year window).
do you think that it was possible for a non-biased observer in 1939 to view the accusation against British government plot to assassinate the German head of state as unsurprising?
I don’t think this is the question you meant to ask, but I think that the accusation should have been entirely unsurprising, regardless of its veracity. I think that most observers would assign a higher probability to the accusation being false than true, but I don’t think an unbiased, moderately informed observer could put the chance that the accusation was false at less than ~5% on the day the accusation was reported.
The Schelling Point is stronger for monarchs than for ministers, and so as monarchies disappear or become less relevant one could expect assassinations to increase.
Why? Even an elected ruler who breaks the convention against assassination makes himself fair game for immediate retaliation of the same kind. I don’t see why the transitory nature of his office would make the incentives significantly different.
First, it seems to me that monarchs have more invested in the legitimacy of monarchy than ministers have in the legitimacy of democracy. Second, an elected official may be expected to sacrifice themselves for the good of the population, whereas the roles may be reversed for a monarch. Third, succession works differently in democracies than monarchies, which may make assassination more attractive against elected officials.
You suspect he’s too quick to pattern-match every mention from a single example?
I’m aware this is a common bias now, but I don’t think it was that widespread in 1939.
Perhaps this is because I have an unfavorable view of governments in general, but it seems that for an even slightly cynical student of history assassination attempts on rival heads of state by a government should not come as a surprise, especially as monarchies were replaced by democracies. It’s not clear he was singling out the British, and even if he were singling out the British, it’s not clear if that was the result of bias or cool calculation. (The British did have the best spy network in Europe, although whether or not Wittgenstein would have known that is not something I am able to guess.)
I agree that being biased can lead to fury, but I think for someone as passionately logical as Wittgenstein seeing bias, especially in a friend, could also lead to fury. It’s not clear to me that his immediate reaction is evidence between those hypotheses, and his persisting fury strikes me as slightly better evidence for the latter. (Background: Almost twenty years earlier, Wittgenstein was rebuked as a teacher because he would also beat the girls if they made mathematical mistakes.)
That is, it is possible that Wittgenstein was biased in pronouncing Malcolm’s bias, but it seems to me unlikely. The evidence seems to point the other way, especially the conclusion he draws- that philosophy should help one with the important questions of everyday life.
Admittedly, this is speculative, but from his tone I did get the impression that he was prone to such matching.
Actually, a very strong taboo against such assassinations follows from a very cynical theory. Namely, it provides for a convenient Schelling point for national leaders, where they can otherwise escalate war as much as they like without fear for their personal safety. (As long as they don’t let themselves get totally conquered, of course.)
But more importantly, who are all these heads of state supposedly assassinated under orders from rival governments prior to 1939? Can you name any attempts of such assassinations in the period of, say, one hundred years preceding 1939? Or even just cases where the culprit is unknown, but a plot directed by a rival government seems plausible?
(The closest example I can think of is the killing of Engelbert Dollfuss that kicked off the coup attempt in 1934 by the Austrian Nazis, who were clearly acting in concert with Berlin. But even that was an all-out coup attempt accompanied by an armed Nazi uprising across the country, so not really an assassination plot, and also symptomatic of the new and unprecedented wave of political gangsterism of which the British government was not a part.)
Given this history (or rather a lack thereof), do you think that it was possible for a non-biased observer in 1939 to view the accusation against British government plot to assassinate the German head of state as unsurprising if true?
The Schelling Point is stronger for monarchs than for ministers, and so as monarchies disappear or become less relevant one could expect assassinations to increase.
Does the first such assassination have to be a surprise? I think unprecedented events can be unsurprising if they were anticipated. We may be interpreting Wittgenstein’s comment very differently: for me, “X would not surprise me” means something like P(X)>.01, not something like P(X)>.5.
But, since you asked, consider the case of Tomas Mac Curtain, assassinated by British forces in 1920. I don’t think he qualifies as a head of state, but he was a fairly prominent government official. In 1939, it would have been plausible that Napoleon had been poisoned by the British (though that’s a bit outside your hundred year window).
I don’t think this is the question you meant to ask, but I think that the accusation should have been entirely unsurprising, regardless of its veracity. I think that most observers would assign a higher probability to the accusation being false than true, but I don’t think an unbiased, moderately informed observer could put the chance that the accusation was false at less than ~5% on the day the accusation was reported.
Why? Even an elected ruler who breaks the convention against assassination makes himself fair game for immediate retaliation of the same kind. I don’t see why the transitory nature of his office would make the incentives significantly different.
First, it seems to me that monarchs have more invested in the legitimacy of monarchy than ministers have in the legitimacy of democracy. Second, an elected official may be expected to sacrifice themselves for the good of the population, whereas the roles may be reversed for a monarch. Third, succession works differently in democracies than monarchies, which may make assassination more attractive against elected officials.