(I can’t give the exact quote, as it’s hearsay, and I’m translating it back into English from Russian)
During WW2, British aircraft engineers had to reach a compromise between an airplane’s structural durability and other uses of weight such as armor, defensive armament, etc. The odds of losing a bomber due to its structure falling apart were much less than those of it simply being shot down; 1:10000 and 1:20 respectively. Yet when the designers proposed sacrificing some structural integrity to improve the bomber’s armor plating or machineguns, the pilots were adamant. They hated the thought of their plane breaking up on its own so much that they passed up the opportunity to reduce a MUCH more likely risk.
(I suspect that the bias here had to do with risks somewhat dependent on the subject seeming much more controllable and less abhorrent).
Structures: Or Why Things Don’t Fall Down, by J. E. Gordon
(I can’t give the exact quote, as it’s hearsay, and I’m translating it back into English from Russian)
During WW2, British aircraft engineers had to reach a compromise between an airplane’s structural durability and other uses of weight such as armor, defensive armament, etc. The odds of losing a bomber due to its structure falling apart were much less than those of it simply being shot down; 1:10000 and 1:20 respectively. Yet when the designers proposed sacrificing some structural integrity to improve the bomber’s armor plating or machineguns, the pilots were adamant. They hated the thought of their plane breaking up on its own so much that they passed up the opportunity to reduce a MUCH more likely risk.
(I suspect that the bias here had to do with risks somewhat dependent on the subject seeming much more controllable and less abhorrent).
Structures: Or Why Things Don’t Fall Down, by J. E. Gordon