But changing one’s behavior often involves switching costs. Going with the flow avoids these costs. Since the benefits from switching are sometimes lower than the costs of switching (including the effort spent estimating the costs and benefits!), going with the flow is sometimes net-beneficial.
Example: Aren’t heuristics often adaptive, even in the modern world?
Is being satisfied in a local optima rational? A rationalist should recognize that there are costs to change and they might outweigh benefits, but being better at achieving goals is the point.
That is true, people should recognize that. In fact, I don’t think I disagree with anything you’ve said. But I think the wording of the quotation made it sound as though following pre-established behavioral patterns were always suboptimal. Surely that claim is false?
It’s an interesting empirical question how much of what we do is sub-optimal. I’m sure it is larger than what most people would guess. For example, I expect that most LWers would agree that unwritten social norms, especially politeness norms, are optimized for status showing, not achievement of material goals.
for no other reason than this
That part of the quote seems to limit the applicable scope. I read it as rejection of “tradition” as a stand-alone justification. That is, we don’t drive on the right side of the street in the US by “tradition,” but based on Schelling point type analysis.
It’s an interesting empirical question how much of what we do is sub-optimal.
Sub-optimal relative to what? To what a hypothetical God/AI with unlimited computing power would recommend? Well, we don’t have access to that kind of computing power.
I read it as rejection of “tradition” as a stand-alone justification.
As Nick Szabo points out in this essay, tradition often contains wisdom that would be computationally infeasible recover from first principals. So yes, all other things being equal, you should accept “tradition” as a stand-alone justification. If all other things aren’t equal, then you should treat the existence of the tradition as evidence to be incorporated like other.
Thanks for the link to that interesting essay. It seems to rely on the possibility of inter-subjective truths (i.e. truths that should persuade) that are not objective (i.e. based on empirical results). Basically, I don’t believe in inter-subjective truths of that kind because they are capable of proving too much. For example, “God exists” is a plausible candidate for inter-subjective truth, but there are empirical things I would expect in a world where God exists that do not appear to be present. In short, there seems to be no limit to what can be labeled inter-subjective, non-objective truth.
Most small deviations, and practically all “radical” deviations [in cultural beliefs], result in the equivalent of death for the organism: a mass breakdown of civilization which can include genocide, mass poverty, starvation, plagues, and, perhaps most commonly and importantly, highly unsatisying, painful, or self-destructive individual life choices.
This asserted fragility of society is inconsistent with historical evidence. You can pick just about any moral taboo (E.g. human sacrifice or incest) and find a society that violated it but continued on, and fell for reasons independent of the violation of the moral taboo. For example, Nazi Germany didn’t lose WWII because they were immoral jerkwads. Germany lost WWII because it picked a fight with a more powerful opponent (who happened to also be an immoral jerkwad).
Ok, it’s clear that I don’t understand what is meant by the concept of “inter-subjective truth.” Why use the word truth? Especially when there is the perfectly appropriate word “evidence” for the concept of believing based on the fact that others believe.
Evidence and truth are not pointing to similar concepts at all. Something can be true even if I have no evidence to believe it to be so. Contrarily, I can have evidence in support of a belief that is, in fact, false.
the possibility of inter-subjective truths (i.e. truths that should persuade)
I don’t think “truths that should persuade” is a good definition of what Szabo (or others) mean by “inter-subjective truths”.
Wikipedia is not very helpful, but I understand it more as “things whose truth-value depends of how many people believe in them”, i.e. “children are expected to obey their parents”, “you should drive on the left side of the road”, etc.
Would be more interesting had author defined what he means by “highly evolved tradition” and added some real world examples.
Most small deviations, and practically all “radical” deviations [in cultural beliefs], result in the equivalent of death for the organism: a mass breakdown of civilization which can include genocide, mass poverty, starvation, plagues, and, perhaps most commonly and importantly, highly unsatisying, painful, or self-destructive individual life choices.
Genocide is usually (and traditionally) fate of traditional society that meets more modern one.
And as for mass poverty, starvation and plagues, these were traditional part of life for all recorded history and were abolished by modernity. I’m afraid the author disproves his own thesis...
As Nick Szabo points out in this essay, tradition often contains wisdom
The problem is that there is no such thing as “tradition”. In every society bigger than village there are numerous, mostly incompatible traditions. Even in one family often happens that, if you follow grandmother’s way, you anger the other one.
“If you follow the ways in which you were trained, which you may have inherited, for no other reason than this, you are illogical.”
--Jalaluddin Rumi
Maybe you are irrational. There’s nothing illogical about the process.
But changing one’s behavior often involves switching costs. Going with the flow avoids these costs. Since the benefits from switching are sometimes lower than the costs of switching (including the effort spent estimating the costs and benefits!), going with the flow is sometimes net-beneficial.
Example: Aren’t heuristics often adaptive, even in the modern world?
Is being satisfied in a local optima rational? A rationalist should recognize that there are costs to change and they might outweigh benefits, but being better at achieving goals is the point.
That is true, people should recognize that. In fact, I don’t think I disagree with anything you’ve said. But I think the wording of the quotation made it sound as though following pre-established behavioral patterns were always suboptimal. Surely that claim is false?
It’s an interesting empirical question how much of what we do is sub-optimal. I’m sure it is larger than what most people would guess. For example, I expect that most LWers would agree that unwritten social norms, especially politeness norms, are optimized for status showing, not achievement of material goals.
That part of the quote seems to limit the applicable scope. I read it as rejection of “tradition” as a stand-alone justification. That is, we don’t drive on the right side of the street in the US by “tradition,” but based on Schelling point type analysis.
Sub-optimal relative to what? To what a hypothetical God/AI with unlimited computing power would recommend? Well, we don’t have access to that kind of computing power.
As Nick Szabo points out in this essay, tradition often contains wisdom that would be computationally infeasible recover from first principals. So yes, all other things being equal, you should accept “tradition” as a stand-alone justification. If all other things aren’t equal, then you should treat the existence of the tradition as evidence to be incorporated like other.
Thanks for the link to that interesting essay. It seems to rely on the possibility of inter-subjective truths (i.e. truths that should persuade) that are not objective (i.e. based on empirical results). Basically, I don’t believe in inter-subjective truths of that kind because they are capable of proving too much. For example, “God exists” is a plausible candidate for inter-subjective truth, but there are empirical things I would expect in a world where God exists that do not appear to be present. In short, there seems to be no limit to what can be labeled inter-subjective, non-objective truth.
This asserted fragility of society is inconsistent with historical evidence. You can pick just about any moral taboo (E.g. human sacrifice or incest) and find a society that violated it but continued on, and fell for reasons independent of the violation of the moral taboo. For example, Nazi Germany didn’t lose WWII because they were immoral jerkwads. Germany lost WWII because it picked a fight with a more powerful opponent (who happened to also be an immoral jerkwad).
Only if you think of them as incontrovertible evidence, rather than merely another type of evidence to be incorporated.
Ok, it’s clear that I don’t understand what is meant by the concept of “inter-subjective truth.” Why use the word truth? Especially when there is the perfectly appropriate word “evidence” for the concept of believing based on the fact that others believe.
Evidence and truth are not pointing to similar concepts at all. Something can be true even if I have no evidence to believe it to be so. Contrarily, I can have evidence in support of a belief that is, in fact, false.
I don’t think “truths that should persuade” is a good definition of what Szabo (or others) mean by “inter-subjective truths”.
Wikipedia is not very helpful, but I understand it more as “things whose truth-value depends of how many people believe in them”, i.e. “children are expected to obey their parents”, “you should drive on the left side of the road”, etc.
Would be more interesting had author defined what he means by “highly evolved tradition” and added some real world examples.
Genocide is usually (and traditionally) fate of traditional society that meets more modern one. And as for mass poverty, starvation and plagues, these were traditional part of life for all recorded history and were abolished by modernity. I’m afraid the author disproves his own thesis...
The problem is that there is no such thing as “tradition”. In every society bigger than village there are numerous, mostly incompatible traditions. Even in one family often happens that, if you follow grandmother’s way, you anger the other one.